Preamble

The House—after the Adjournment on 23rd May for the Whitsun Recess—met at half-past Two o'clock.

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

DEATHS OF MEMBERS

Mr. Speaker: I regret to have to inform the House of the death of Mrs. Alice Cullen, Member for Glasgow, Gorbals, and of Benjamin Theaker Parkin, esquire, Member for Paddington, North and the right hon. Gerald William Reynolds, Member for Islington, North. I desire, on behalf of the House, to express our sense of the loss we have sustained and our sympathy with the relatives of the right hon. and hon. Members.

NEW WRIT

For Birmingham, Ladywood, in the room of Victor Francis Yates, esquire, deceased.—[Mr. Mellish.]

Oral Answers to Questions — TRANSPORT

Motor Vehicle Safety (International Regulations)

Mr. Dudley Smith: asked the Minister of Transport if he will institute a technological inquiry into the feasibility of standardising safety features in motor vehicles to harmonise with the safety requirements of other countries where car manufacture is concerned; and if he will also initiate talks on this subject with his counterparts in other major car-producing countries, with a view to reaching international agreement.

The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport (Mr. Bob Brown): The United Kingdom is participating fully in the work of an Economic Commission for Europe Working Party which is drawing up internationally agreed regulations on motor vehicle safety.

Mr. Smith: Is it not vital for our export performance to have car safety standardisation? When does the Parliamentary Secretary expect these negotiations to reach a fruitful conclusion?

Mr. Brown: I agree that there should be common standards for car safety. The E.C.E. Working Party has already introduced eight international regulations for lighting equipment, and four more international safety regulations concerning steering columns, anti-burst door latches and hinges, brakes, and padding of passenger compartments, have been completed. Many others are being prepared. We are not standing still.

Children (Safety Harness)

Mr. Berry: asked the Minister of Transport what plans he has to publicise the need for parents to ensure that children wear safety belts in cars.

Mr. Bob Brown: An important theme in our road safety publicity is that drivers and front seat passengers should always wear seat belts. This applies to older children as well as adults. Our Road Safety Publicity Unit is also arranging publicity for our advice that young children are safer in the back of the car preferably in a safety harness.

Mr. Berry: I am obliged for that Answer. But is the hon. Gentleman not aware that there is still some doubt among medical opinion and other experts as to whether safety belts are the right answer for smaller children because of the state of their bones? Will he give an urgent decision in the matter and redouble his efforts, at the same time looking into the danger of small children being carried on parents' laps? This is something which many of us, including myself, are tempted to do; it is pleasant, but it is very dangerous.

Mr. Brown: Clearly, the safest place for a small child is on the back seat of a car, wearing a safety harness. For very young children there are special safety seats with built-in harnesses.

Channel Link

Mr. Sheldon: asked the Minister of Transport if he will make a statement on the progress of the further studies he is conducting on the cost of a Channel link.

The Minister of Transport (Mr. Richard Marsh): The British and French Governments have already concluded that among fixed Channel links only a rail tunnel is a practical proposition. New estimates of the cost of such a tunnel will be prepared during the final period of studies which will begin when a financing group has been chosen.

Mr. Sheldon: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the results of those studies will be looked at with considerable interest? Is he further aware that the quality of the previous White Paper was not as high as we had a right to expect, and will he improve on the fact finding which goes into these reports?

Mr. Marsh: Certainly, it is intended that these studies shall be very comprehensive and sophisticated because large sums of money are at stake.

National Freight Corporation Vehicles (Testing)

Mr. Dance: asked the Minister of Transport how many of the 32,900 road freight vehicles and trailers transferred to the National Freight Corporation on the 31st December, 1968, have been now submitted for testing under his Department's scheme; and how many he expects will be submitted in the near future.

The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport (Mr. Neil Carmichael): As indicated to the hon. Member on 21st April, compliance with the regulations governing the testing of heavy goods vehicles is a matter for the National Freight Corporation. I have nothing further to add to the Answer given to the hon. Member on 2nd April.—[Vol. 782, c. 121]

Mr. Dance: Will the hon. Gentleman agree that his earlier Answer to a Question of mine was highly misleading when he said that only 1 per cent. of vehicles submitted for testing had failed? Will he confirm what I believe is correct, that the £5 million loan to the National Freight Corporation is for one purpose

alone, and that is to replace vehicles which have been badly maintained by British Railways in the past?

Mr. Carmichael: I have given the hon. Member the figures on a number of occasions before and I have no reason to doubt the accuracy of those figures; I per cent. of the 12,000 vehicles failed the test. We expect that of roughly 32,000 vehicles taken over, at least 30,000 will go for test. But it is unreasonable to ask the National Freight Corporation for detailed information on this subject which is basically a subject for management.

Ireland (Car Ferries)

Mr. Gresham Cooke: asked the Minister of Transport if he will give a general direction to British Railways that they should provide every day a sailing during daylight hours of car-carrying ships from England to Ireland throughout the year.

Mr. Carmichael: No, Sir.

Mr. Gresham Cooke: Is the Parliamentary Secretary aware that British Railways, apart from three months in the year, do not run any day services for carrying cars to Ireland? Is he aware that, as in the case of Southampton to Le Havre, they may lose the business of carrying cars and then competitors will step in and take over from them?

Mr. Carmichael: This is a matter for the commercial judgment and management of British Railways. During the main season there are frequent services from Stranraer, Holyhead and Fishguard. British Railways are very well aware of the demands of the public and they try to cater for them.

Road Accidents

Mr. Eadie: asked the Minister of Transport if he proposes to alter his method of publishing road accident statistics during holiday periods following representations by the motoring organisations.

Mr. Marsh: No, Sir.

Mr. Eadie: Is my right hon. Friend aware that some organisations have expressed the view that the publishing of road accident figures for holiday periods serves no useful purpose and have made


an appeal that new methods should be tried?

Mr. Marsh: I am aware of a recent speech made on this subject. There are two arguments here. First, this practice gives us the opportunity four times a year to get over to people just how important this issue is. We are talking about the large numbers of people who are killed and injured on the roads. When we look at the figures for 1968 we see that the daily average was 261 and, apart from Easter, the number was higher at holiday weekends. At Whitsun it was 291 and at the Summer Bank Holiday 337. This gives a convenient opportunity to get across to the public this serious problem and it is worth taking advantage of the opportunity.

Mr. Michael Heseltine: Does not the right hon. Gentleman agree that by focussing attention on the figures at peak weekends he may give the impression that driving standards are markedly different then—[HON. MEMBERS: "They are."]—whereas in fact the overall number of fatalities is much the same throughout the year? By concentrating on peak weekends, is it not possible to give an impression of a degree of complacency about other parts of the calendar about which figures are not published although they are much the same?

Mr. Marsh: Fatal and serious casualties tend to be higher on the occasion of holiday weekends when there are many people on the roads and these weekends tend to be a drinking time. The driving tends to leave something to be desired. People should not be at all complacent about the toll of the roads. They need take only 30 seconds to think of this. We are talking about close on 400,000 people killed or injured every year. There is certainly nothing to be complacent about.

Mr. Gardner: asked the Minister of Transport what were the total road casualties in England and Wales between the hours of 10.30 p.m. and midnight for the first quarter of 1969; and how these figures compare with the same period in 1968.

Mr. Marsh: Figures are not readily available in the precise form requested. Between 10 p.m. and midnight fatal and serious casualties in Great Britain

totalled 960 in January, 1969, and 686 in January, 1968. I will send my hon. Friend the figures for the whole of the first quarter when they are compiled.

Mr. Gardner: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the deterrent effect of the Road Safety Act is now wearing off? Will he therefore ask the Home Secretary to issue new advice to chief constables about the use of the breathalyser test?

Mr. Marsh: I think one should pause before trying to form conclusions from these figures, because in January there were big increases in areas not normally associated with drinking. Also, while this is not a satisfactory position, late-night casualties are still 20 per cent. lower than they were in 1967. Police enforcement has increased and there were nearly 40 per cent. more breath tests in the first quarter of 1969 than in the same months of 1968.

Mrs. Thatcher: Is the Minister aware that one should be very much on guard about drawing too much in the way of conclusions from these figures? Can he give some idea of what weight we should attach to them by saying how many hours were travelled in these times, because it is not only the number of casualties but the number of casualties in relation to the number of hours travelled?

Mr. Marsh: We want to go even further than that. January was a very bad month for accident figures. The February figures seem to be better. We must first establish how far these figures are typical. We cannot take one month on its own; we need a longer experience of this. It was always thought that there would be some wear-off from the initial impact, but we still remain about the only country in the world that has reduced road accidents in two successive years.

Motorcyclists (Compulsory Passenger Insurance)

Mr. Speed: asked the Minister of Transport what discussions he is having with the motor-cycle industry and motorcycling associations about his proposal for compulsory passenger insurance.

Mr. Marsh: The Kent Committee took evidence from the motor-cycling interests, and its subsequent Report was circulated widely for comment. I considered


all the comments received, including those from the motor-cycling interests.
The British Motorcyclists Federation wrote to me on 18th March asking for further consultations. A reply seeking more information about the ground the Federation wanted to cover was sent on 27th March, and I am now considering its reply which was received on 2nd June.

Mr. Speed: The Kent Committee sat several years ago, and the situation has changed since then. Will the right hon. Gentleman consider receiving representations from both the industry and the users when he is framing the Bill and take due note of the up-to-date situation from both sides?

Mr. Marsh: The Kent Report was circulated in February, 1968. If there is anything new since then I shall be only too happy to hear it.

Transport Services (Greater London)

Captain Elliot: asked the Minister of Transport what proposals he has to improve co-ordination between transport services covering Greater London and particularly the commuter services; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Marsh: The Transport (London) Bill now before Parliament provides that the Greater London Council shall have a duty to plan for integrated, efficient and economic services. It provides also that the main operators shall co-operate directly with one another to co-ordinate their services.

Captain Elliot: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the passage of the Bill does not end his labours? Will he consider giving to a junior Minister special responsibility for transport services covering Greater London and the surrounding commuter area? This area, after all, covers about 30 per cent. of the population and has the most intensive and dense traffic system in the world.

Mr. Marsh: I have some interest myself in London Transport and I assure the hon. and gallant Member that the situation is watched very carefully. The purpose of the Bill is to make the G.L.C. responsible for its own transport services. A joint transport planning group has already been set up under the chairmanship of the G.L.C. and is at work on a

provisional basis. The Bill's purpose is to enable the elected representatives of Londoners to determine the traffic.

London Transport (Fares)

Captain Elliot: asked the Minister of Transport what conditions he laid down before agreeing to the fares increases proposed by London Transport to be brought into effect in the autumn of this year.

Mr. Marsh: None, Sir.

Captain Elliot: Will the right hon. Gentleman try to convince the London Transport authorities, whoever they are, that the way to show a profit is not necessarily to raise prices? Would he not agree that, if an efficient and profitable public transport service is provided, people will be glad to leave their cars at home or at the station and use it?

Mr. Marsh: It is not quite as simple as that, and in any case the basis of this decision was that the Government agreed with the G.L.C. that the undertaking would be viable on hand-over. It was that, of course, which gave rise to the fares increase and that proposition was, I believe, supported not only by the G.L.C. but by right hon. and hon. Members opposite.

Mr. Whitaker: Will my right hon. Friend tell the G.L.C. that to expect a public transport undertaking not only to cover costs but to make £2 million profit a year is flying in the face of traffic experts across the world?

Mr. Marsh: The agreement was that the undertaking would be viable on hand-over. I do not think that a relatively small transfer to reserves is unreasonable in an undertaking of that size. It is important to point out, however, that the G.L.C. may find that subsidising public transport can be cheaper than incurring congestion costs.

Emergency Vehicles (Two-tone Horns)

Mr. Ronald Bell: asked the Minister of Transport whether he will alter the regulations governing the use of horns by motor vehicles so as to prohibit the use of two-tone horns by the police, fire and ambulance services and restore the use of bells by drivers in the emergency services.

Mr. Bob Brown: No, Sir. Experience has shown that in modern traffic a two-tone horn is more effective than a bell in clearing the way for emergency vehicles.

Mr. Bell: Must we always copy the worst features of other countries? Is the hon. Gentleman really satisfied with this competition in noise he has described? Would it not be better if his Ministry were to press forward far more vigorously in reducing general noise of urban traffic so that some less strident signal would be adequate for emergency vehicles?

Mr. Brown: The hon. and learned Gentleman must realise that the advent of the trafficator has meant that people do not need to have their windows wound down so often in order to give hand signals. In addition, more motorists are listening to radios, which makes it much more difficult to hear warning signals.

Learner Drivers (Training Areas)

Mr. Heffer: asked the Minister of Transport what response he has from the Liverpool City Council to his proposal contained in a letter to local authorities urging that training areas be set up for learner drivers.

Mr. Bob Brown: I assume my hon. Friend has in mind the Department's circular of 25th April to local authorities which gave general guidance over the whole field of road safety. Among the local tasks listed in the circular was arranging for the use of suitable training grounds, for example for cycle and motorcycle training. We did not expect immediate responses on detailed points, and have had none on this point from Liverpool City Council.

Mr. Heffer: My hon. Friend's assumption is absolutely right. Has he had any response from local authorities? Will he continue to press them to establish such training grounds, which are essential for the proper training of drivers?

Mr. Brown: Offhand, I could not say what reply we have had from local authorities, but, as the circular went out only recently. I do not expect that we have had many. Over the next few months we shall ask local authorities

what progress they have been able to make in their local road safety activities in the light of the circular.

Oral Answers to Questions — RAILWAYS

Derailments

Mr. Edward M. Taylor: asked the Minister of Transport how many trains were derailed in 1968; and what were the comparable figures in each of the previous three years.

Mr. Carmichael: The provisional total number of reportable derailments on all railways in Great Britain in 1968 is 370. The comparable figures for 1965, 1966 and 1967 are 260, 289 and 311 respectively.

Mr. Taylor: Are not these figures disturbing? As Colonel McMullen expressed concern about the trend in his report over a year ago, can the Parliamentary Secretary give any indication of what steps are being taken to endeavour to identify the causes?

Mr. Carmichael: I remember Colonel McMullen's Report. It is in the Library. The steps that have been taken are a reduction in the speed of freight wagons, including short wheelbase wagons, improved training of drivers, action to check the observance of speed limits, including radar checks, the replacement of jointed track by continuous welded rails, and modification of braking systems. I will write to the hon. Gentleman if he wants fuller details, because I know that he is very concerned about this matter.

Mr. Edwin Wainwright: Did some of the derailments occur at places where jointing of the long rails did not have sleepers underneath? If so, what action is being taken?

Mr. Carmichael: I could not say. It is unlikely that there would be many rails welded without having proper support, but I will look into this point.

Mr. Speed: Is not the Parliamentary Secretary aware that there have been a large number of derailments on the most modern stretch of track in Britain—the electrified line out of Euston? Is the hon. Gentleman satisfied that the signalling and track maintenance are up to the


very high speeds of the trains using this stretch of track?

Mr. Carmichael: Colonel McMullen stressed in his report the difficulties arising in the case of short wheelbase wagons. This is the main problem. Speeds of trains with wagons such as these have been reduced twice, but modern conditions of longer runs and various other matters give rise to difficulties which are only now becoming apparent. Every effort is being made. The Railway Inspectorate is kept fully informed of all derailments and makes a detailed examination of them.

Season Tickets (Refunds)

Mr. Hunt: asked the Minister of Transport if he will issue a general direction to British Railways instructing it to formulate a more equitable basis for the refunds of unused portions of season tickets.

Mr. Carmichael: No, Sir.

Mr. Hunt: Is the Minister aware that one of my constituents bought a monthly season ticket for £6 8s. and on surrendering it with nine days unused was offered a refund of just 1s. 4d.? Is not that an example of the way in which British Railways' calculations in these matters are weighted against the passenger to an almost fraudulent extent?

Mr. Carmichael: I am aware of the case of the hon. Gentleman's constituent and the reason behind this Question. The question of how to deal with unexpired portions of season tickets is a management matter for British Railways. Whilst my right hon. Friend has power to give a general direction, this is only if in his opinion it is necessary to do so in the national interest. I do not believe that this is a matter in which such a direction would be appropriate. I am sure that the Railways Board will read the Questions and Answers and will be aware of the hon. Gentleman's displeasure.

Main-line Routes (Speed Limits)

Mr. Hector Hughes: asked the Minister of Transport if he will give a general direction to British Railways that they should re-examine the speed limits on sharp curves on all main-line routes with

a view to ensuring that trains travel at speeds which do not involve the risk of causing derailments and other mishaps.

Mr. Carmichael: No, Sir. The regulation of the speed of trains is a matter for the Board and it would not be appropriate for my right hon. Friend to issue a general direction.

Mr. Hughes: Surely, if it is a matter for the Board, it is also a matter for the general populace? Will my hon. Friend give a direction so that science can be used to re-lay the tracks and make them more consistent with the age of speed in which we live, and so save life?

Mr. Carmichael: Safety is the statutory responsibility of the British Railways Board. On the questions of track, experimenting and generally studying the question of speed, British Railways are as far ahead as anyone in the world with their continuously welded track, and there is the possibility of a high-speed advance passenger train, which is exciting railway people all over the world. The basis of all this is safety.

Mr. Edward M. Taylor: Whilst I appreciate the action that is being taken, in view of the figures the Minister gave a short while ago of train derailments increasing by about 40 per cent. in four years despite the reduction in track mileage, will the hon. Gentleman give an assurance that this matter is regarded as one of great urgency by all concerned?

Mr. Carmichael: Of course it is, but while there have been accidents we must keep the matter in proportion. There are roughly 1 million train miles per derailment and 100 million passenger journeys for each fatal accident caused by derailment. Whilst this is not something which we should ever forget or over look, we should get it into perspective.

Diesel Trains (Fires)

Mr. Allason: asked the Minister of Transport whether, as a result of recent inquiries, he has found a common cause in the recent fires in the diesel trains of British Railways.

Mr. Carmichael: No, Sir, but I am writing in detail to the hon. Member.

Mr. Allason: Is it not alarming that there should be a diesel fire almost every


year on British Railways? Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the recommendations of the report of the inquiry into the Radlett disaster in February, 1966, have not yet been implemented by British Railways?

Mr. Carmichael: More than three-quarters of the fires in diesel multiple unit trains occurred in under-floor traction equipment for a variety of reasons, including the ignition of oil leaks by defective exhaust systems, mechanical failures, etc. By the end of 1968, about 2,500 out of 4,000 planned individual modifications had already been made and the target for the completion of the modifications recommended following various inquiries, both public and private, is the end of 1970. I am writing more fully about this to the hon. Gentleman.

Fleet Line (Extension)

Mr. Moyle: asked the Minister of Transport when he expects to receive proposals for the extension of the Fleet Line into South-East London.

Mr. Marsh: I understand that London Transport hopes to put forward detailed proposals within a few weeks.

Mr. Moyle: I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for that reply. Is he aware that Press reports in South-East London state that no action can be expected for 10 years on this line? Will he undertake to follow up these proposals as quickly as possible with action on the ground?

Mr. Marsh: The proposals will have to be discussed both with the British Railways Board and the G.L.C.

Oral Answers to Questions — PORTS

Nationalisation

Mr. Edward M. Taylor: asked the Minister of Transport if he will make a further statement on his plans to nationalise the ports.

Mr. Marsh: No, Sir.

Mr. Taylor: In view of our difficult economic situation and the fact that it is almost certain that the present Government will not be in power after the next General Election, would it not be wise

to abandon this plan for the nationalisation of the ports?

Mr. Marsh: No, it would not. The hon. Gentleman's arguments are based, as frequently happens, on a number of false premises. The reorganisation of the ports is regarded as long overdue and is welcomed by many people both inside and outside industry. Indeed, about the only people who still seem unable to understand it are hon. Members opposite.

Mr. Heffer: Will my right hon. Friend take it from me that we on this side of the House believe that we should encourage the nationalisation of the ports at the earliest possible moment? Will not my right hon. Friend also agree that it is utter nonsense for hon. Members on the other side of the House to suggest that there will be a Tory Government after the next election?

Mr. Marsh: I agree with my hon. Friend. The only thing which concerns me is that my hon. Friend still seems to be surprised when hon. Members opposite make these glaring errors. I agree that it is inconceivable that there will be a change of Government.

Mrs. Ewing: Will the right hon. Gentleman tell the House whether his plans will follow the principle of the centralisation of decision making or the principle of the decentralisation of decision making?

Mr. Marsh: The hon. Lady will find this fully set out in the satements which have been made and in the White Paper. It is not intended that the management of these ports should be centralised.

Mr. Manuel: Of the number of ports which my right hon. Friend intends to nationalise, could he say how many are privately owned?

Mr. Marsh: One, Sir.

Merseyside

Mr. Heffer: asked the Minister of Transport what talks he had with the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board recently when he visited Merseyside; and what future plans are being prepared for the port.

Mr. Marsh: The object of my visit to the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board was to see something of the port facilities


and to meet informally the members of the Board and representatives of the workers in the port. The preparation of future plans for the port is a matter for the Board.

Mr. Heffer: Is my right hon. Friend aware that there is some disquiet amongst workers in the port who believe that some of the work that has been traditionally carried out by the Mersey Docks and Harbours Board is being sublet to private enterprise at a stage just before port nationalisation? Will he take a look at this problem, particularly in relation to dredging, since it appears that the only dredgers able to do the work in the Port of Liverpool at the moment are made in Germany, which seems a serious reflection on the position in this country?

Mr. Marsh: This point was made to me by some of the men who work in the port. I had to explain to them that I have no powers in this direction in relation to what is still a port outside national control.

Oral Answers to Questions — ROADS

Signposts

Mr. Dudley Smith: asked the Minister of Transport if he will send a circular to county councils and other local authorities giving guidance with a view to ensuring that all towns, villages and hamlets in England and Wales are adequately signposted.

Mr. Carmichael: Modern traffic signs to the standards recommended by the Worboys Committee are being provided by highway authorities as quickly as possible, within the limits of the funds available. We are consulting organisations concerned about target dates for the completion of the conversion programme.

Mr. Smith: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that it is almost like being in wartime Britain when leaving the main roads in some parts of the country? Is he aware that the popular pastime of vandalism has extended to road signs in rural areas, and that very often the local authorities neglect to replace them? Will the hon. Gentleman remind local authorities of their responsibilities?

Mr. Carmichael: I agree that it is the responsibility of local authorities, but the hon. Gentleman is rather exaggerating the amount of vandalism and also the lack of signs. Our side roads are reasonably well sign posted. The Worboys Committee, which reported two years ago, recommended a complete new set of signs more in keeping with the speed of modern travel and of traffic generally. However, it is an expensive business to complete these new signs and it is being done in stages throughout the country.

Motorways

Mr. Berry: asked the Minister of Transport how many miles of motorways he now expects to be completed during 1969.

Mr. Marsh: Nearly 44 miles, Sir.

Mr. Berry: Is not that a very disappointing figure? It is well below the average of the last few years. Surely we should be increasing the figure each year? Have cuts been made in the programmes during the last three years for the main motorways such as the M3 and M5, and is there a shortfall programme for this year?

Mr. Marsh: I do not know why the hon. Gentleman should say that it is disappointing. The target figure announced in January was "about 45 miles", and 44 miles is about 45 miles. We expect to complete the target that we have set ourselves.

Mr. Michael Heseltine: Would the right hon. Gentleman answer the second part of the question, whether there have been cuts in the programme this year? Could the right hon. Gentleman explain why the British Road Federation has claimed that of 37 schemes published for starting in 1969 by his Ministry, 18 have been delayed within six months?

Mr. Marsh: In reply to the latter point, there is a subsequent Question, and in answering that I shall be able to answer the hon. Gentleman's point.

Mr. John Lee: May we have the section of M4 around the south of Reading completed as soon as possible?

Mr. Marsh: I give my hon. Friend my undertaking that that section and all the others will be completed as soon as possible.

Mr. Berry: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I give notice that I shall raise the matter on the Adjournment at the earliest opportunity.

Mr. Gresham Cooke: asked the Minister of Transport, in view of the Report on Accidents on the M4 1965–67 showing a better accident record and a superior braking force coefficient on the concrete as opposed to the asphalt sections, whether he will now construct all new motorway and primary route sections with a concrete surface.

Mr. Marsh: No, Sir. General conclusions cannot be drawn from isolated tests on an exceptional motorway. Good roads with acceptable skidding resistance can be built with either asphalt or concrete, and it is my policy to use whichever will achieve and maintain the required standards more economically in each particular case.

Mr. Gresham Cooke: Does not the Road Research Laboratory's Report on accidents on M4 clearly show that the braking force coefficient was superior on the concrete sections and that the asphalt sections were below the minimum standard required by the Road Research Laboratory? Does not this fact indicate that motorways should be constructed in deeply textured concrete as has been done in the last five years?

Mr. Marsh: No, Sir. The point is that adequate roads can be built with either substance. The M4 is a quite exceptional motorway with very dense traffic on it. The problem is a common one of polishing over parts of it. This is not an argument for one form of covering as opposed to another.

Mr. Raphael Tuck: My right hon. Friend referred to the economics of the situation. Should not safety rather than economics be the guiding line? In those circumstances, should not preference be given to reinforced concrete?

Mr. Marsh: Only if there were evidence that concrete was of itself a better and safer form of surface than asphalt, but this is not the case. There is no evidence on this one way or the other. There can be safe roads on either.

Mr. Geoffrey Wilson: asked the Minister of Transport how many miles of motorway originally planned for 1968–69 were carried over to 1969–70; how many miles planned for 1969–70 he now estimates will have to be carried over to 1970–71; and what amount of investment these deferments represent.

Mr. Awdry: asked the Minister of Transport (1) what factors have caused the delays in the implementation of the motorway programme during the current year;
(2) how many miles of motorway which will be started this year have so far been delayed for six months or more.

Mr. Marsh: Of the 36 motorway schemes which it was expected in January, 1968, would be ready to start in 1968, eight totalling about 74 miles were carried over into 1969: of these 25 miles were started before 31st March, 1969, leaving five schemes totalling about 48 miles and costing about £50 million to be started in 1969–70. Of these five schemes about 35 miles have been delayed for six months or more. Delays have been due to a variety of factors, including the time required to deal with objections during the statutory procedures, difficulties of land acquisition and unexpected constructional problems.
In addition to schemes carried over from 1968, we expect that construction will have started or contracts be let during 1969 on a further 98 miles of motorway. Our present estimate is that we will achieve this objective.

Mr. Wilson: Is not this rather unsatisfactory? In view of the continued growth of motor traffic, should not there be a steady increase in motorway construction instead of constant delays?

Mr. Marsh: This is the whole point. Far from a steady growth, there has been a very rapid growth, and that is why at present the road programme is twice as big as it was when hon. Members opposite left office and six times as big as it was 10 years ago.

Mr. Awdry: Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that whatever other cuts are necessary in public expenditure the motorway programme should not be cut


but expanded? Will he give an answer now to the question asked earlier by my hon. Friend the Member for Tavistock (Mr. Michael Heseltine)?

Mr. Marsh: The roads programme has been expanding ever since the present Government have been in office. It is considerably higher than it was when hon. Members opposite were in office. The basis of the Question was a report of the British Road Federation's statement that 18 motorway and trunk road schemes which should have begun this year will be delayed by an average of six months each, and that is not so.

Mr. Michael Heseltine: Will the Minister therefore call for an inquiry to discover how it is that the British Road Federation should have in its possession information of this sort—how it can claim that in October, 1968, 37 schemes were published in detail for commencement in 1969 and that of the same schemes listed only six months later 18 have been delayed by an average of six months.

Mr. Marsh: It is not for me to carry out inquiries into the statements of the British Road Federation. One would have thought that if hon. Members opposite wanted to inquire they would have asked the Ministry before putting down the Questions. The mistake that the British Road Federation made was that its statement was based on the assumption that lists of schemes issued to contractors for forward planning purposes, with estimated starting dates, constituted the Ministry's firm programme. It was made clear to contractors at the time that the lists issued were purely tentative, and I think that it is true to say that the first list published was clearly more than we could have constructed anyway.

Mr. McNamara: Does not my right hon. Friend agree that it is rather strange to hear the nature of some of the complaints from the benches opposite not only because of our own expanded programme but also because the main reason for the delays is defending the individual, making sure that proper inquiries are held, that land is acquired properly, and that people have a proper opportunity to put forward their objection?

Mr. Marsh: This is inevitable. One of the biggest causes of delay is the statutory procedures, and it is difficult

to know how one can avoid them. I have great sympathy with hon. Gentlemen opposite and the hon. Lady, because the problem they face is the one we have seen before where one drafts the supplementary question before hearing the Answer to the Question.

Car Parking (London)

Mr. Driberg: asked the Minister of Transport if he is aware that inconvenience is caused to residents of towns on the periphery of London by commuters from more distant parts who ignore local authority car parks and park their cars in residential streets before taking trains to London; and if he will seek to provide against this practice.

Mr. Bob Brown: The regulation of traffic and parking in London is primarily a matter for the Greater London Council. The Council is aware of this problem and is taking action as enforcement staff become available.

Mr. Driberg: While thanking my hon. Friend for his two very helpful letters on this subject, may I ask whether he will consider circulating in HANSARD details of the London boroughs which already have schemes for residents' parking permits in their own streets?

Mr. Brown: I will consider that point. I shall decide later whether I shall write to my hon. Friend or circulate the information in HANSARD.

Internally Illuminated Bollards

Mr. Patrick Jenkin: asked the Minister of Transport whether he is aware that internally illuminated bollards designed in accordance with British Standard 873/1959 constitute a road hazard; and if he will take steps to secure the design of improved bollards which would constitute less of an accident hazard.

Mr. Carmichael: We have little evidence to suggest that such bollards constitute a road hazard. The 1959 standard is, however, being revised to meet modern road and traffic conditions.

Mr. Jenkin: Is the Parliamentary Secretary aware that, following the removal of a number of bollards in my constituency, the number of accidents at the relevant junctions has declined substantially? To quote his hon. Friend the


other Parliamentary Secretary, is there not some evidence that bollards constructed to 1959 standards are in fact unsafe?

Mr. Carmichael: I should need to have evidence of the type of accident concerned. I should need to know, for instance, whether it was caused by collision with a bollard, in which case the position rather than the design would be to blame. There is little evidence to suggest that the design of bollards constitutes any hazard.

Cambridge (Bypasses)

Mr. Lane: asked the Minister of Transport whether, in the light of the report of the East Anglia Economic Planning Council and of the recent Ministerial decision affecting Cambridge roads, he will now give higher priority to the northern and western bypasses projected for Cambridge.

Mr. Bob Brown: Preparations are going ahead on the Western bypass and being considered for the proposed Northern bypass as a preliminary to future programming. This preparatory design and other work is necessary before decisions can be taken about priorities.

Mr. Lane: Will the Parliamentary Secretary do his best to make an early announcement about the Northern bypass, which is needed just as urgently, if not more urgently, than the Western bypass? If he intends to visit East Anglia during the Summer Recess, will he bear in mind that he will be very much welcomed in Cambridge to see the situation for himself?

Mr. Brown: I am grateful to the hon. Member for his kind invitation to look at the situation in Cambridge. My right hon. Friend expects to make an announcement in the next few weeks relative to the Northern bypass.

Sir Harwood Harrison: While welcoming what the hon. Gentleman has said, may I ask him to bear in mind the importance of the A.45 road from Birmingham to the docks at Ipswich and Felix-stowe? This is a main highway which is particularly important in view of the fact that more goods are being taken from Hayes Wharf, such as in the Polish bacon trade, and sent to Ipswich and Felix-stowe.

Mr. Brown: We are aware of this and it was mentioned in the Green Paper on Strategic Routes.

Bridge Building and Repair Work

Mr. Gardner: asked the Minister of Transport what machinery exists for the co-ordination and planning of bridge building and repair work between British Railways, British Waterways, local authorities and his Department.

Mr. Carmichael: Under the special programme of bridge strengthening announced by my right hon. Friend's predecessor both boards are reconstructing or strengthening several hundreds of their bridges.
The Department assists by advising as to priorities and ways of minimising as far as practicable inconvenience to traffic. Liaison with local authorities regarding execution of the work is a matter for the boards.

Mr. Gardner: Is my hon. Friend aware that the failure to co-ordinate the work on Stanton Bridge in Derbyshire is causing considerable inconvenience to my constituency and the constituency of Derbyshire, South-East? I think he is aware that this bridge serves a major steel works. Cannot he get better co-ordination between the British Railways Board and local authorities?

Mr. Carmichael: I am aware of this problem. When two adjacent bridges are known to require reconstruction, such as these two bridges, the boards concerned are asked to liaise closely to ensure that they can prevent disruption to commercial and industrial establishments. The boards are doing this, but the problem before them is quite gigantic. British Railways has something like 13,000 substandard bridges and of the Waterways Board's 1,200 bridges about 500 are substandard. They have to spread the work of reconstruction and make the best job of it that they can.

Mr. George Jeger: Is not my hon. Friend aware that considerable delays and confusion are caused by questions of demarcation and by the buck being passed from one authority to another? Could he not streamline the co-ordination he has started on in order to make it more effective?

Mr. Carmichael: The job of the Ministry is basically to lay down the conditions and standards to which bridges must be kept, but I am sure the respective boards, having heard this Question, will take note and will co-operate together. If they have not been doing so already it would surprise me. I am sure they will do so in future.

Motor Vehicles (Underbody Corrosion)

Mr. Speed: asked the Minister of Transport what steps he intends to take next winter to minimise underbody corrosion caused by the spreading of salt on roads in icy weather.

Mr. Bob Brown: We have insufficient knowledge of suitable all-purpose inhibitors which would effectively reduce the risk of underbody corrosion caused by salt, and direct action in the coming winter will not be possible. The Road Research Laboratory will, however, be testing two of the most promising types of inhibitors under field conditions next winter. Future policy on their use will depend on the results of this research, which are not likely to be available before 1970 or 1971.

Mr. Speed: I thank the Minister for that reply. Can he say what will be the extent of the experiments? Is it not a fact that we could have nation-wide experiments at a cost of about £1 million and could then see how much we are saving the motorist as regards corrosion, and, more important, perhaps increasing road safety as a result?

Mr. Brown: The Road Research Laboratory test will take place next winter with about seven new cars on the test circut at Crowthorne.

Advance Warning Triangles

Mr. Macdonald: asked the Minister of Transport if he will take steps to ensure that all advance warning triangles carried by vehicles of this country comply with the appropriate British standard specification; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Bob Brown: We still have no evidence of non-complying triangles causing damage, but we feel it is desirable to have an agreed international standard and we are discussing this at present.

Mr. Macdonald: What is the meaning of the Government urging the Vienna Convention to insist that these triangles ought to be manufactured to a certain standard when they do not insist on that standard being observed in this country?

Mr. Brown: I said that we were working towards an agreement. An international standard is being prepared by the Economic Commission for Europe's Working Party on the Construction of Vehicles.

Mr. Macdonald: asked the Minister of Transport what steps he is taking towards ratification of the Vienna Convention on Road Traffic; and, in particular, what steps he is taking to ensure that advance warning triangles are carried by all motor vehicles in this country, other than two-wheelers, and used.

Mr. Bob Brown: The Convention was laid before Parliament by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on 3rd June. I hope that we shall later be able to ratify both this and the related Convention on Signs and Signals.
The Highway Code advises anyone carrying an advance warning sign to place it on the road if they break down or have an accident, but there are no present plans to make the carriage of these devices compulsory, nor will the Convention require this.

Mr. Macdonald: As 34 countries have signed the Convention, and as 11 European countries already require these advance warning triangles to be carried, would it not set an admirable example if we translated words into deeds and became the twelfth?

Mr. Brown: No, Sir. The Convention recommends countries to require their vehicles to carry these triangles. It is a recommendation and not a requirement.

Basingstoke Motorway

Mr. Wingfield Digby: asked the Minister of Transport when he estimates the Basingstoke motorway will be completed.

Mr. Bob Brown: The section of the M3 between Popham in Hampshire and Lightwater in Surrey will be completed


in 1971. Subject to satisfactory completion of statutory procedures we would hope to complete the remainder of the route to Sunbury Cross by the end of 1972.

Mr. Digby: Will the hon. Gentleman do all he can to speed this up? It is urgently needed not only for communications with the South-West but for the important Southampton-Bournemouth area as well.

Mr. Brown: I can give the hon. Gentleman that assurance.

A30 and A303

Mr. Wingfield Digby: asked the Minister of Transport what will be the total expenditure in the current financial year on the A30 and A303 roads to the South-West.

Mr. Carmichael: About £2½ million.

Mr. Digby: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the roads are increasingly insufficient to deal with the very great volume of traffic there, particularly at this time of year? Will he go and take a look for himself?

Mr. Carmichael: I have been in the area and I am fully aware of the problem, which is to be found not only there but all over the country. But I agree with the hon. Gentleman that it is rather worse there at this time of the year. The total estimated value of improvement schemes for the area in progress or likely to start during 1969–70 is about £6¾ million, so that the hon. Gentleman will see that we are taking the matter seriously.

Motorways (Service Areas)

Mr. Biggs-Davison: asked the Minister of Transport what is the normal interval between service areas on motorways.

Mr. Bob Brown: About 12 miles, but usually only alternate sites are developed initially.

Mr. Biggs-Davison: In that case, would it not be unnecessary, in the regrettable event of the M11 going down the Roding Valley, to put a service area in Chigwell, where it would ruin the amenities of a beautiful place?

Mr. Brown: We consider that when the M11 is complete three service areas will

be needed—at or near Chigwell, near Harlow and near Newport.

Mr. Kenneth Lewis: Will the hon. Gentleman consider introducing service areas on the A1? This road is now almost a motorway, but has hardly any service areas and it is very difficult for motorists driving along it to get service or even refreshment.

Mr. Brown: The provision of service areas on trunk roads is not a direct responsibility of the Ministry.

South Docks, Hull

Mr. James Johnson: asked the Minister of Transport when it is his intention to give approval to the scheme for the South Docks Road in Hull.

Mr. Bob Brown: We do not at present consider that this scheme has sufficient priority to justify approval.

Mr. Johnson: I thank my hon. Friend for that reply. Does he agree with me that any future benefits which we may get in Hull with better communications between the Al and the docks south and east of Hull may be largely nullified or negatived by delay and congestion in the centre? The road for which we are asking is parallel to the north bank of the Humber and would direct traffic out of the city centre around to the docks.

Mr. Brown: I appreciate the need for good communications from the Al to the Hull docks, but I am sure that my hon. Friend will agree that the land use transport study of the Hull area which is now going on will establish where the priority for this road lies.

Oral Answers to Questions — CIVIL SERVICE

Civil Servants (Early Retirement)

Mr. Worsley: asked the Minister for the Civil Service (1) whether he is satisfied with the terms on which established civil servants are being retired early with the offer of another job at a lower salary; and if he will make a statement;
(2) whether the pension of an established civil servant compulsorily retired early is protected when he refuses another job at a lower salary.

The Paymaster-General (Mrs. Judith Hart): A civil servant who is retired early and takes another job in the Civil Service at a lower salary may draw sufficient of any pension due to him to raise his income by way of salary plus pension to the level of the salary he was receiving on his retirement. He may refuse reemployment in a lower-paid job without loss of pension. I consider these to be satisfactory terms.

Mr. Worsley: Does the right hon. Lady agree that there is some discontent with these provisions in the Civil Service and that it is important that people should be encouraged to do this without any feeling of loss of status?

Mrs. Hart: The present arrangements are not unreasonable. However, as we look at the whole question of Civil Service superannuation in the course of the current review we shall be looking at this point in the light of recent circumstances.

Mr. Luard: Does not my right hon. Friend agree that there is considerable disquiet in the Foreign Service as a result of the fact that many senior Foreign Service officials have had to be retired through no fault of their own but simply because of a contraction in the size of the Foreign Service and the considerable recruitment when they joined? Is it not important that everything possible should be done to provide suitable alternative employment for these people?

Mrs. Hart: I entirely agree with my hon. Friend, but I do not think that the present pension arrangements are any kind of deterrent to achieving this entirely sensible objective. But we are undertaking a review in the course of looking at the whole of the Civil Service superannuation arrangements and we shall bear this point very much in mind.

Oral Answers to Questions — FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

Hours of Work (I.L.O. Conventions)

Mr. Rankin: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether, since 1969 is the 50th anniversary of the founding of the International Labour Organisation, he will now ratify those International Labour Organisation conventions which relate to hours of work.

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. William Whitlock): It has been the policy of successive Governments only to ratify International Labour Conventions when our law and practice are in complete conformity with their provisions.

Mr. Rankin: Is my hon. Friend aware that many people regard that as simply an escape route from facing up to the real problem? Is it not disturbing that in a British colony today people should be working in service industries for 15, 16 or 17 hours a day at a time when we are celebrating this great anniversary? Will he not think about this matter again?

Mr. Whitlock: As I informed my hon. Friend on 12th May, the United Kingdom, the Member State concerned, has not ratified the I.L.O. conventions which relate to hours of work; therefore, the question of applying those conventions to the dependent territories does not arise.

Malaysia (Military Assistance)

Mr. Biggs-Davison: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what requests Her Majesty's Government received from Malaysia for military assistance in connection with the restoration of law and order after the recent disturbances and what replies were given.

Mr. Whitlock: None, Sir.

Mr. Biggs-Davison: Is it the case that no request for arms was made? Secondly, can the hon. Gentleman say whether the whole question of Commonwealth assistance, particularly against subversion, will be fully discussed at Canberra?

Mr. Whitlock: The Malaysian Government recently asked us if we would supply some items of military equipment and we have told the Malaysian Government that we would be willing to supply the items requested subject to their being available and to there being an agreement on the method of payment.

Mr. Richard: Is it not very important that we should avoid giving any appearance of taking sides in this Malaysian problem, particularly having regard to the legitimate sensibilities of Singapore? Secondly, if there is to be any real and lasting settlement inside Malaysia, is it


not very important that the Malaysian Government should be under no illusion but that it is Her Majesty's Government's opinion that it can be achieved only on the basis of a truly multi-racial society?

Mr. Whitlock: I fully agree with my hon. Friend on the latter point. Britain is the traditional supplier of military equipment to Malaysia and the Malaysian armed forces already use mostly British equipment.

Oral Answers to Questions — SCOTLAND

Caledonian Steam Packet Company (Crewmen's Pay)

Mr. Rankin: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will make a statement on the progress of the negotiations about the increases in wages proposed for the crewmen employed by the Caledonian Steam Packet Company; and when a settlement can be expected.

The Under-Secretary of State for Scotland (Mr. Bruce Milan): I understand that a settlement has now been reached.

Mr. Rankin: I warmly welcome that reply and hope that good relations will soon again be established.

Dismissed Teachers

Mr. Bruce-Gardyne: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will take steps to reinstate forthwith teachers who were dismissed from teaching for failure to register with the General Teaching Council in respect of 1968–69, pending the outcome of his investigation into the number of teachers who are currently employed in schools and who have failed to reregister since 1st April, 1969.

Mr. Millan: No, Sir.

Mr. Bruce-Gardyne: Will not the hon. Gentleman now recognise that unless these teachers who were dismissed last year are reinstated forthwith and unless the attempt to bully others into registration by threats of dismissing them is abandoned, the General Teaching Council itself is in danger of collapsing?

Mr. Millan: No, I would not accept either of those propositions.

General Teaching Council (Registrations)

Mr. MacArthur: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland (1) if he will make a further statement about the position of teachers in teaching posts who have failed to re-register with the General Teaching Council;
(2) what further information he has now received from local education authorities regarding the number of teachers in teaching posts who have not re-registered with the General Teaching Council.

Mr. Millan: I have at present nothing to add to the Answer I gave to the hon. Gentleman on 21st May except that, according to the announcement of the General Teaching Council on 2nd June, 43,898 teachers had by then registered for the year starting on 1st April.—[Vol. 784, c. 85–6.]

Mr. MacArthur: Will not the hon. Gentleman now review the whole position? Will he consider simplifying the re-registration procedure and will he also consider the inequitable position of those teachers who were dismissed earlier this year?

Mr. Millan: The hon. Gentleman's first point could be taken up and no doubt will be taken up during the course of the review. Last year's registration is a separate matter and I have already given an answer about that.

Mrs. Ewing: Will not the hon. Gentleman now simply admit that the dismissal of qualified teachers who did not register was a mistake, and will he not have the courage to say so to everyone and get these teachers back where they are very much needed?

Mr. Millan: I do not think that it was a mistake.

Royal Commission on Local Government (Report)

Mr. Gordon Campbell: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what is his latest estimate of the date of publication of the report of the Royal Commission on Local Government in Scotland.

Mr. Millan: I have nothing to add to the Reply my right hon. Friend gave


the hon. Member on 15th April.—[Vol. 781, c. 229–30.]

Mr. Campbell: Since the Redcliffe-Maud Commission for England is supposed to be reporting on Wednesday, why is there such a hold-up with the Report of the Royal Commission in Scotland? Why is it not yet ready? Do the Government realise that a great deal of work is being held up in Scotland because many people are waiting for Wheatley?

Mr. Millan: The question of the finalisation of the Report is not a matter for the Government, it is a matter for the Royal Commission.

GIBRALTAR

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: (by Private Notice) asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether he will make a statement about the situation in Gibraltar.

The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Michael Stewart): The Spanish authorities have now completely closed the land frontier with Gibraltar. About 4,600 Spanish day workers with jobs in Gibraltar are now prevented by their own Government from following the employment they have had, in the majority of cases, for many years. I understand that the Algeciras ferry is still running.
The Spanish communiqué issued on Friday, 6th June, referred to the new Constitution of Gibraltar, published there on Friday, 30th May, as being in:
open disregard of United Nations resolutions and contrary to the Treaty of Utrecht".
The new Constitution, however, does not entail any change in Gibraltar's international status. It provides for the devolution of a greater degree of responsibility in domestic matters to Gibraltar Ministers.
We have, of course, been in close touch with the Governor over these latest developments. His reports indicate that the people of Gibraltar have remained calm.
The Governor is confident that essential services will be maintained. There are bound to be temporary difficulties, with the withdrawal of about 30 per cent.
of the labour force, but steps are being taken to deal with the shortage of labour in the private sector and hotels are expected to import staff.
I am glad to say that the report of Lord Beeching and Lord Delacourt-Smith on Gibraltar's manpower probems has now been presented to the Governor.
As the Governor has said, Gibraltar's watchword is "business as usual". It remains the declared policy of Her Majesty's Government to support Gibraltar and we will continue to sustain its people.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: The House will be glad to hear the last words of the Secretary of State. We all share his regret that the people of Gibraltar should be exposed to this experience.
Can the right hon. Gentleman make available the results of the Beeching mission on the employment problem to the House at some future date? I take it that the Governor is acting on them and that they are specific?
Will the right hon. Gentleman consider, when he is urged to retaliate, the effect that any retaliatory action would have on the people of Gibraltar? That must be the first consideration in our minds. Would he also consider whether new permits for Spaniards employed in Britain should be issued as long as these restrictions last?

Mr. Stewart: On the first point, the Beeching Report was available only at the end of last week. I have no doubt that I shall be able to find an opportunity to give the House further information about this, and, if necessary, about the progress of events in Gibraltar.
We have on several occasions considered the possibility of retaliation, but we believe that the test to be applied to any proposal of this kind is: Will it help the people of Gibraltar; will it influence the policies of the Spanish Government; and will it be such as not to do Britain and Gibraltar more injury than it might do Spain?
I am very reluctant to take measures which involve striking at people who cannot be held responsible for what the Spanish Government have done. It seems to me that the ignominy of damaging the interests of people whose only


wish is to do a useful job ought to be confined to the Spanish Government.

Mr. George Jeger: Is my right hon. Friend aware that reprisals taken to restrict the tourist traffic from Britain to Spain would not adversely affect Gibraltar? Would he consider that aspect of the situation? Further, to break the blockade would he not consider increasing the number of flights between Britain and Gibraltar, and between Gibraltar and Morocco, and institute new flights between Gibraltar and Portugal?

Mr. Stewart: The measures my hon. Friend has referred to at the end of his question will certainly be considered. There have been contingency plans ready for some time to deal with the labour problem that will arise in Gibraltar. As to British holiday traffic to Spain, I do not think that it is possible for the Government to tell British subjects that they cannot go to a particular foreign country for their holidays. I am bound to say that anyone in this country who has any sympathy with our fellow citizens in Gibraltar will, I hope, think twice and many times before in future making plans to go to Spain for a holiday. They might consider going to Gibraltar instead.

Mr. Sandys: Will the right hon. Gentleman consider further the possibility of action which will bring pressure to bear on the Spanish Government to lift this wholly unjustifiable blockade of the people of Gibraltar? Does he not agree that we really cannot take this aggressive and provocative action by the Spanish Government entirely lying down?

Mr. Stewart: We are certainly not taking this lying down. The really vital thing for the Government at this time is to make it quite clear that we shall take whatever measures are necessary to support the people of Gibraltar and to enable them to sustain their economy and their life during these difficulties.
I should perhaps add this: that in this whole matter our overriding concern is the Gibraltarians themselves, as human beings. The Spanish charge that we are in Gibraltar to defend military facilities is simply an attempt to obscure the truth.

Mr. Maclennan: While fully understanding my right hon. Friend's restraint in this matter, may I ask him to make it

plain to the Spanish Government that the British people are unalterably behind the Gibraltarians and that they are not dealing in this matter merely with the population of Gibraltar? Can he say whether he is satisfied that the plans for the development of the Gibraltarian economy will be able to go ahead without any set-back due to this loss of labour?

Mr. Stewart: On the last point, there are bound to be some difficulties with a reduction of 30 per cent. of the labour force, but with the plans which have already been made, and the advice we shall get from Lord Beeching, I believe that we shall be able to go ahead.
As to making our attitude clear to the Spanish Government, I do not think that there is any doubt about that at all. We have made it clear on a number of occasions and I do so again now.

Mr. Thorpe: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that in expressing his solidarity for the people of Gibraltar he speaks for the entire House? Has he considered discussions with the Government of Malta to see whether there could be a transference of labour from Malta to replace those who are lost from the dockyard?
Secondly, would he look at the number of British ships currently bunkering in the Canaries and other ports, to the benefit of the Spanish economy, so that that might be discontinued?
Thirdly, would he make it plain to the Spanish Government that although it is very difficult for a Fascist régime to realise these things, in democracies we do like people to live under régimes which they choose; and that is precisely what the people of Gibraltar have done?

Mr. Stewart: I can assure the right hon. Gentleman that I made that point clear to the Spanish Government on a great many occasions. I will examine the central part of his question. As for the first point, there are sources of labour in the neighbourhood of Gibraltar other than Spain. The contingency plans include encouragement of employers to recruit such labour if they have not done so already, and to help them with accommodation.

Sir Dingle Foot: Will my right hon. Friend continue to make it clear to the


Spanish Government, and to the whole world, that our obligations towards the people of Gibraltar are determined not by the Treaty of Utrecht, but by the Charter of the United Nations, which obliges us to have regard to the wishes and aspirations of the people themselves and that, if there be any conflicts between the Charter and the Treaty, under international law the Charter must prevail?

Mr. Stewart: Yes, Sir. I think that in law, in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht, and in justice, and in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, there is no doubt that we are right.

Sir A. V. Harvey: I appreciate the difficulties, but will the right hon. Gentleman explain what he means when he says that he has "made it clear"? He has said the same thing about Gerald Brooke and Mr. Grey in China. Will he, without saying anything about it today, think how we can make it abundantly clear to Spain that Britain will uphold its rights in this matter?

Mr. Stewart: I doubt whether the hon. Gentleman's attempt to bring in those other cases is helpful at present. I have no doubt whatever that the Spanish Government now know full well that Her Majesty's Government, with the full support of the House and the country, will do whatever is necessary to maintain the freedom and way of life of the people of Gibraltar.

Mr. Luard: Would my right hon. Friend consider starting discussions with the Government of Morocco to see whether it would be possible to replace some of the labour which has been prevented from going to Gibraltar with Moroccan labour? Would he not agree that we have a very clear common interest with Morocco here? While Spain declares that, in the case of Gibraltar, the principle of territorial integrity prevails over the wishes of the people, in the case of the cities of Ceuta and Melilla, she maintains exactly the opposite view We could expect some support from Morocco on this issue.

Mr. Stewart: I refer my hon. Friend to the answer which I gave earlier to the Leader of the Liberal Party.

Mr. Tilney: Could the right hon. Gentleman tell the House the possible cost financially of Spanish action both for Gibraltar and for this country? Could not part of this cost be met out of some of the very substantial remittances which go from this country to Spain?

Mr. Stewart: I could not give a cost figure offhand. I should like to consider, but I must say with some doubt, the second suggestion.

Mr. Molloy: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the Spanish Government are already claiming that British interest is based solely on the military interest in Gilbraltar? Would he make it transparently clear that, as far as we are concerned, the fundamental feature is the referendum recently carried out in Gilbraltar and the decision of the people? Would he consider not only making promises this afternoon to reassure the people of Gibraltar, but including in those promises some form of aid which might be necessary in the forthcoming months to beat the Spanish policy, which is simply one of spite born out of wrath?

Mr. Stewart: We should provide whatever aid is necessary for the people of Gibraltar. I reiterate that it is entirely true that the sole reason for the stand which we take in Gibraltar is the wishes of the Gibraltarians, which are not in doubt and which, as was pointed out in an earlier supplementary question, are by themselves, under the Charter of the United Nations, sufficient justification for the stand which we continue to take.

SOUTH AFRICA (MR. PHILIP GOLDING)

Mr. Longden: (by Private Notice) asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether he is aware that Mr. Philip Golding, a British citizen, has been held incommunicado without charge in a gaol in Johannesburg since 17th May and whether he will make a statement on the representations he has made.

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. William Whitlock): Yes, Sir. We have made representations to the South African Government about this case and we are hopeful that Consular access will be allowed in the very near future.

Mr. Longden: I thank the hon. Gentleman for that reply and for the co-operation which I have received from his Department during the last few days, but it is not enough that the Consul should be allowed to visit this man. It is essential that a charge, if any, should be made and that people should know why he is being held. This behaviour is common in certain quarters of the globe, but one had hoped that it was not so in the Republic of South Africa.

Hon. Members: Now you know.

Mr. Whitlock: Mr. Golding is held under the Terrorism Act, and presumably the South African authorities have grounds for assuming that Mr. Golding's activities fall within the purview of that Act.

Mr. Dickens: As the South African Government have nothing to learn from the German Gestapo in their treatment of prisoners held in custody without trial, will my hon. Friend note that we on this side of the House want most vigorous representations to be made to Pretoria on this matter?

Mr. Whitlock: The South African Government have been made very well aware of the strong feeling of people in this country about the Terrorism Act and about cases such as this. My hon. Friend can take it from me that very strong representations have been made to the South African Government.

Mr. Lubbock: Will the hon. Gentleman tell the South African Government that, while we can do very little about the application of the loathsome 180-day rule to their own citizens, we will not tolerate its application to people from the United Kingdom and that if they apply it to a British citizen, as they have done in this case, they must bear the consequences?

Mr. Whitlock: As I have said, the strong feelings expressed by people like the hon. Gentleman have been made very well known to the South African Government.

Mr. Biggs-Davison: Are the Press reports correct that Mr. Golding's case has in some way been prejudiced by the absence of a consular convention with the Republic of South Africa? Would he say what the position is about that?

Mr. Whitlock: It is true that, in the normal way, when we have concluded a consular treaty with a country, that country would notify us of the arrest of a British national and consular access would be promptly granted. In this case, despite approaches by Her Majesty's Government, the South African Government have not been ready to enter into negotiations to conclude a consular treaty between the two countries and, therefore, consular access is not readily available in this case.

UPPER CLYDE SHIPBUILDERS

Mr. Gordon Campbell: (by Private Notice) asked the Minister of Technology whether he will make a statement on the latest proposals which he has made to Upper Clyde Shipbuilders.

The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Technology (Mr. Gerald Fowler): In the absence of my right hon. Friend, in Bonn, I shall, with your permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, answer this Question.
My right hon. Friend had full discussions with Upper Clyde Shipbuilders Limited last Friday and explained that he had approved, after consultations with his colleagues, the Shipbuilding Industry Board's offer of further loans and grants to the company under the Shipbuilding Industry Act, 1967.
The Shipbuilding Industry Board had already told the company that it would be prepared at a later stage to discuss separately, under the normal procedure, loans of a further sum of £4·3 million for capital investment. Apart from this, and in addition to the assistance already given to the company, the board has now offered £5 million in grants and loans subject to assurances by the company of its readiness to accept the conditions set out by the board. These include changes in the structure of the U.C.S. board and senior management, full co-operation from the trade unions for the U.C.S. plan now being discussed, and a higher public shareholding in equity.
In making this offer the Shipbuilding Industry Board took account of the latest information received from the company, the various plans prepared by the company, and its own assessment of the prospects, in the confidence that the sums


offered would be sufficient, provided the necessary drive and faith in the future of the company were forthcoming from the management in full co-operation with the trade unions. The board also made the offer on the clear understanding that no further funds would be provided to the company under the Act for working capital.
The company is now considering this offer in consultation with the trade unions and in the light of discussions about the possibility of obtaining further funds from commercial sources.

Mr. Campbell: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that this statement and last Friday's statement leave a number of questions unanswered—for example, how much of the £5 million would be in loans and what the condition concerning the full co-operation of the trade unions implies? Perhaps the Minister prefers to leave this confidential for the negotiations, but can he say when he expects the negotiations to be completed, as a crisis situation has continued for several weeks which cannot be good for the industry? Can the Minister state that the main objective of these proposals is early achievement of viability by the group?

Mr. Fowler: To reply to the last part of the question first, I can confirm that that is the principal objective of the whole exercise.
As for the detail of the conditions and the split between loans and grant, I think that at this stage this would be better left to negotiation between the S.I.B. and the U.C.S. board. I ask the House at this difficult stage to show some restraint in this matter. We expect that the discussions of U.C.S. and the trade unions will be complete towards the end of this week. In the meantime, I may say that the trade unions have been showing a positive and helpful attitude in this matter.

Mr. Rankin: In accepting what my hon. Friend has just said, may I ask him to convey to his right hon. Friend that according to today's issue of the Glasgow Herald, Mr. Henson Moore, a well-known industrialist and shipbuilder in the United States, has just placed an order with the Clydebank Division of U.C.S. on the basis of his belief that U.C.S. is the finest body of shipbuilders in the world? Will that tribute give my right

hon. Friend sufficient confidence not to make the gap of £3 million in the money which is needed too big a handicap?

Mr. Fowler: I will certainly convey to my right hon. Friend the views of my hon. Friend and those reported in the Glasgow Herald as to the excellence of the U.C.S. I must, however, ask my hon. Friend to be careful when he speaks of a £3 million gap. The S.I.B. made its offer in the confidence that granted the conditions which I have set out, this would be an adequate sum for the purposes of U.C.S.
My right hon. Friend was greatly encouraged by the response on Friday and is convinced that, at last, it is realised that the solution to this problem does not simply lie in Whitehall or, indeed, in the disbursement of Government moneys, but also lies on the Clyde and calls for drive, guts and determination from all involved in U.C.S.

Mr. Edward M. Taylor: While I appreciate the difficulty of the problem facing the Minister, may I ask whether he can give an assurance that if the financial and other problems are resolved by the end of the week the full and known credit facilities of the S.I.B. and the Exports Credits Guarantee Department will be available to U.C.S. to enable it to get more orders and restore confidence, which is the vital issue?

Mr. Fowler: While I cannot properly speak for E.C.G.D., I am sure that I can give the hon. Member the assurance that once this crisis is over U.C.S. will be in exactly the same position as any other shipbuilder and, I would expect—and, indeed, hope—would go from strength to strength.

Mr. Small: While I am grateful for my hon. Friend's statement, I hope that he will recognise that it is now time to lay aside much of the criticism about the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders. No company in Britain has ever had to sustain so prolonged an attack in terms of exposure of its intimate details. At the weekend—

Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Member must ask a question.

Mr. Small: Is my hon. Friend aware that at the weekend there was a sense of the position being much more soluble


than it has hitherto been and that the full co-operation of the trade unions has been assured? It is interesting to note that for the first time they have had the opportunity of knowing publicly of the full affairs of the firm.

Mr. Fowler: We, too, have been much encouraged by the signs of movement in recent days and the signs that, at long last, the gravity of the position has been realised and the fact that this calls for the fullest co-operation from all sides of U.C.S. in the implementation of some quite painful measures. I take the point made by my hon. Friend about the weekend. That is our impression, too.

Mr. Grimond: Would it not be helpful if we could get away from the cliffhanging drama surrounding this matter and now realise that this group has one of the most efficient shipyards, Yarrow's, in the world and that if we can leave Mr. Hepper to get on with reorganisation the duty of the Government is primarily to ensure that if there has to be a reduction in the number of people employed they will be redeployed either lower down the Clyde or in other industries? Will the Minister give an assurance that the Government are taking steps to that end?

Mr. Fowler: I am glad that the right hon. Gentleman mentioned other job opportunities further down the Clyde. I understand that over, perhaps, 18 months or two years, up to 1,500 jobs may be created at Lithgow's and that there will be further job requirements at Yarrow's, to which the right hon. Gentleman rightly paid tribute.
As for the cliff-hanging aspect, perhaps I should say that the Shipbuilding Industry Board has reacted very quickly to the precise applications put to it by U.C.S. The difficulty—I well appreciate the firm's problems—has been that the costing and accounts of U.C.S. have not always enabled U.C.S. to be precise as to its essential needs and that in these difficult circumstances the company's need of S.I.B. assistance has frequently escalated.

Mr. Lawson: Will my hon. Friend convey to his right hon. Friend my thanks for the very great consideration and attention which he has shown to this problem affecting the Upper Clyde? Will he take it that the prevailing opinion in the West

of Scotland is that if management and men in the Upper Clyde shipbuilding industry are now prepared to get down to it the Clyde will once again show that it can build ships as economically and as well as any other part of the world?

Mr. Fowler: I agree entirely with the latter part of my hon. Friend's question. As for the actions of my right hon. Friend in this matter, the House might be interested to know that since 12th February this year he has had 13 meetings with local Members of Parliament, 15 with U.C.S. management, seven with the Scottish T.U.C. and many others, too.

Mr. Biffen: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that there will be much satisfaction that the commitment of public funds is limited to the £9·3 million referred to in his statement? Would he not further agree that if the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders are as efficient as has been suggested by the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond) and by the hon. Member for Motherwell (Mr. Lawson), they should have no great difficulty in raising further funds from the private capital market?

Mr. Fowler: I note what the hon. Member says about the limited commitment of public funds. I should explain that this is what we believe U.C.S. will require on the basis of the best assessment that we can make. It would be quite wrong to commit anything over and above that sum, not least because it would mean that U.C.S. was subsidised against other British competition as well as against foreign competition.

Mr. Hugh D. Brown: Will my hon. Friend make it clear that it is because of the past inefficiencies of private enterprise that public money is needed at this time to inject confidence into the enterprise? Will he also accept from me that our outstanding impression has been of the willingness on the part of the unions to co-operate and that in this context legislation along the lines of "In Place of Strife" has very little relevance?

Mr. Fowler: The latter part of my hon. Friend's question has very little relevance to the U.C.S. problem. It is accepted on all hands that some injection


of public funds is necessary, and this has been done. The argument has been about the precise total. I, too—I say it again—am much impressed by the co-operative spirit in which the unions are approaching this problem.

Mr. Whitaker: With the injection of so much further public money, should not there be more public directors to safeguard the public interest in the quality of management?

Mr. Fowler: That is a matter for discussion between the S.I.B. and the U.C.S. management. Let it be clear, however, that it is the quality of executive management rather than simply nominating a few extra men to the board that makes all the difference in the running of a firm.

H.M.S.O. PUBLICATIONS WAREHOUSE (SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTE)

The Chief Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. John Diamond): With your permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, I should like to make a further statement about the industrial dispute at the Cornwall House publications warehouse of Her Majesty's Stationery Office.
I am glad to say that a settlement has been reached and that the men returned to work this morning. The settlement was reached after the opening meeting of the committee of inquiry, of which I informed the House on 21st May.
I hope that service to hon. Members will now return to normal, but there will still be some delay in service to the public until the considerable arrears which have accumulated have been worked off. This is now being tackled.

Mr. Peyton: Could the right hon. Gentleman say something about the terms of the settlement? It is all very well to wave this away, but it has been a source of very great inconvenience to members of the public as well as to Members of this House and it has also been exceedingly humiliating.

Mr. Diamond: I am conscious of the fact that this was a possible source of considerable inconvenience, but I am sure that the whole House is glad, at all

events, that a settlement has been reached.
To answer the first part of the hon. Gentleman's question difficulty arose out of a productivity agreement which provided, on the one hand, for a bonus by the employer, and, on the other, additional production by the employee; and difficulty arose about controlling the amount of the additional production. That difficulty has been overcome.

Mr. Thorpe: Has the successful outcome—which we all welcome—of the dispute caused the Government to reflect whether they have now evolved the best system of settling disputes of this nature?

Mr. Diamond: The outcome of this dispute enables the inconvenience which hon. Members temporarily suffered to be removed.

Mr. Edward M. Taylor: Is the Minister saying that the settlement is because the employers have conceded, after a strike, what they refused before the strike? If this is the case, as we see it, is this not just a further incitement—that the only way to get what one wants is to go on strike?

Mr. Diamond: No. The hon. Gentleman completely misunderstood or misheard what I said. What I said was that a difficulty arose over controlling or monitoring of the amount of the additional production in respect of which a bonus had been agreed. The monitoring process, the controlling process, has now been agreed.

Mr. Patrick Jenkin: Would the Chief Secretary, in clearing up the backlog of material, seek to give priority to material which is necessary for considering legislation actually pending? I have in mind in particular such documents as the Income Tax Act, 1952, which is very necessary for drafting Amendments to the Finance Bill.

Mr. Diamond: I will certainly bear very carefully in mind what the hon. Gentleman has said.

UPPER CLYDE SHIPBUILDERS

Mrs. Ewing: I beg to ask leave to move the Adjournment of the House


under Standing Order No. 9 for the purpose of discussing a specific and important matter which should have urgent attention, namely,
the crisis in the shipbuilding industry in the Upper Clyde affecting the livelihood of 14,000 directly and 80,000 families indirectly and the future prosperity of Scotland".
The crisis is specific, obviously, in time, manner and place.
It is important because there are thousands of jobs involved, and many of the older age group would not easily be re-employed; because it has a depressive effect on supporting industries; because it has repercussions over the industrial belt and beyond in Scotland; and because of the vast social consequences, which would be bitter in the extreme if liquidation were to follow the Government's proposals, and failure of the Upper Clyde shipbuilders to exist.
It is important because the loss of confidence following the closing of the yards and the inability to meet orders would have serious consequences for the whole of the future of shipbuilding industry on the Clyde and all over the United Kingdom.
The crisis is urgent as each passing day adds to the loss of confidence and to the feeling of helplessness of all dependent on the yards, and the concern of the public who are wanting to get at the truth behind the variety of statements which have been made, many of them mutually contradictory, and adds to the suspense in the homes shadowed by the loss of future security, or by loss of a future in their own country. The Private Notice Question today underlines the importance of this, and that the concern is shared by others than myself.
It is urgent, because although we have had proposals from the Government we also know that U.C.S. has considered them and is basically unlikely to accept them, and we want an end to the uncertainty.
We want a solution urgently, because the words "Clyde built" are specific and

have an important and lasting value in the hearts of men far above the verdict of balance sheets. An urgent solution must be found before it is too late to keep these famous yards in existence.

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Lady the Member for Hamilton (Mrs. Ewing) was courteous enough to inform me that she intended to seek an application under Standing Order No. 9.
The hon. Lady has asked leave to move the Adjournment of the House for the purpose of discussing a specific and important matter that she thinks should have urgent consideration, namely,
the crisis in the shipbuilding industry in the Upper Clyde affecting the livelihood of 14,000 directly and 80,000 families indirectly and the future prosperity of Scotland.
As the House knows, under the revised Standing Order No. 9 I am directed to take into account several factors set out in the Standing Order, but to give no reasons for my decision. I have given careful consideration to the representations which the hon. Lady has made, and to all that happened after Question time, but I have to rule that the hon. Lady's submission does not fall within the provisions of the revised Standing Order No. 9.
I cannot, therefore, submit her application to the House.

NURSES BILL [Lords]

Referred to a Second Reading Committee.—[Mr. Concannon.]

MEDICAL BILL [Lords]

Referred to a Second Reading Cormmittee.—[Mr. Concannon.]

LAW OF PROPERTY BILL [Lords]

Referred to a Second Reading Committee.—[Mr. Concannon.]

Orders of the Day — CHILDREN AND YOUNG PERSONS BILL

As amended (in the Standing Committee), considered.


New Clause 1


RESTRICTIONS ON CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS FOR OFFENCES BY YOUNG PERSONS



(1) A person other than a qualified informant shall not lay an information in respect of an offence if the alleged offender is a young person.


5
(2) A qualified informant shall not lay an information in respect of an offence if the alleged offender is a young person unless the informant is of opinion that the case is of a description prescribed in pursuance of subsection (4) of this section and that it would not be adequate for the case to be dealt with by a parent, teacher or other person or by means of a caution from a constable or through an exercise of the powers of a local authority or other body not involving court proceedings or by means of proceedings under section 1 of this Act.


10
(3) A qualified informant shall not come to a decision in pursuance of the preceding subsection to lay an information unless—


15
(a) he has told the appropriate local authority that the laying of the information is being considered and has asked for any observations which the authority may wish to make on the case to the informant; and


(b) the authority either has notified the informant that it does not wish to make such observations or has not made any during the period or extended period indicated by the informant as that which in the circumstances he considers reasonable for the purpose or the informant has considered the observations made by the authority during that period;


20
but the informant shall be entitled to disregard the foregoing provisions of this subsection in any case in which it appears to him that the requirements of the preceding subsection are satisfied and will continue to be satisfied notwithstanding any observations which might be made in pursuance of this subsection.


25
(4) The Secretary of State may make regulations specifying, by reference to such considerations as he thinks fit, the descriptions of cases in which a qualified informant may lay an information in respect of an offence if the alleged offender is a young person; but no regulations shall be made under this subsection unless a draft of the regulations has been approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.


30
(5) An information laid by a qualified informant in a case where the informant has reason to believe that the alleged offender is a young person shall be in writing and shall—


35
(a) state the alleged offender's age to the best of the informant's knowledge; and


(b) contain a certificate signed by the informant stating that the requirements of subsections (2) and (3) of this section are satisfied with respect to the case or that the case is one in which the requirements of the said subsection (2) are satisfied and the informant is entitled to disregard the requirements of the said subsection (3).


40
(6) If at the time when justices begin to inquire into a case, either as examining justices or on the trial of an information, they have reason to believe that the alleged offender is a young person and either—



(a) it appears to them that the person who laid the information in question was not a qualified informant when he laid it; or



(b) the information is not in writing or does not contain such a certificate as is mentioned in subsection (5)(b) of this section,


45
it shall be their duty to quash the information, without prejudice to the laying of a further information in respect of the matter in question; but no proceedings shall be invalidated by reason of a contravention of any provision of this section and no action shall lie, by reason only of such a contravention, in respect of proceedings in respect of which such a contravention has occurred.


50
(7) Nothing in the preceding provisions of this section applies to an information laid with the consent of the Attorney General or laid or on behalf or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.


55
(8) It shall be the duty of a person who decides to lay an information in respect of an offence in a case where he has reason to believe that the alleged offender is a young person to give notice of the decision to the appropriate local authority unless he is himself that authority.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Speaker: I have posted, as is my wont, my selection of Amendments for Report. The House will note that I have grouped together with new Clause 1 the four Amendments to it in line 4, leave out from 'opinion' to 'that' in line 5; in line 7, leave out from 'constable' to first 'or' in line 8; in line 8, leave out 'or by means of proceedings under section 1 of the Act; in line 24, leave out subsection (4).
Amendment No. 17, in Clause 2, page 5, line 9, at end insert:
(11) Nothing in this section shall empower a local authority when making enquiries pursuant to subsection (1) of this section on receiving information suggesting that the condition mentioned in paragraph (e) of subsection (2) of section 1 of this Act is satisfied, to deprive a child or young person of his liberty, either with or without the consent of his parents other than by an order of a court.
And Government Amendments, which are linked, Nos. 24, 32, 33, 34, 38, 39, 41, 42;
Amendment No. 43, in Clause 9, page 11, line 27, leave out 'the justice or';
Government Amendments Nos. 44, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 95, 96, 110, 112 and 115.

4.12 p.m.

The Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Elystan Morgan): I beg to move, That the Clause be read a Second time.
When Clause 5 of the Bill was discussed in Standing Committee, the Government gave an undertaking to move on Report a revised version of the Clause which omitted the requirement for the consent of a juvenile court magistrate to the prosecution of a young person. This new Clause gives effect to that undertaking.
The essential object of Clause 5 as introduced was that Parliament should clearly establish the principle of dealing with offenders aged 14 and under the age of 17 outside the court so far as possible, and should provide for the laying down of criteria for the decision whether or not to prosecute in each case. The machinery for the achievement of that object involved the consent of a juvenile court magistrate to any prosecution of a young person.
Provision was also made for the local authority to have a right to be heard by the magistrate, thus ensuring that the police normally consulted the local authority before deciding to apply to the magistrate for consent to a prosecution.
The object of the original Clause 5 has been generally accepted both in this House and among interested bodies outside. The new Clause maintains that object. The argument has been about the best means of achieving that object. In particular, doubts have been expressed whether it is necessary or appropriate to involve a magistrate in decisions on prosecution. The new Clause proposes a different means of achieving aims that are generally accepted.
Comments on the original proposals in the White Paper "Children in Trouble" revealed divided views on what has come to be known as the "single magistrate" procedure. Some bodies accepted it, and these included the Association of Municipal Corporations, the County Councils Association, the Police Federation and the professional child care associations. Others criticised it, and these included the Magistrates' Association, a number of juvenile court panels, the Justices'


Clerks' Society and a majority of chief officers of police. In these circumstances, the Government decided that the right course was to put before Parliament the proposals as set out in the White Paper, including the single magistrate procedure, and to listen carefully to the views expressed in Parliament.
The general view put forward, both on Second Reading and in Committee, was that decisions on the prosecution of young persons can and should be left to the police, after consultation with the local authority. That, in brief, is what the new Clause provides, together with guidance to the police on the criteria they are to apply in taking their decisions.
In Committee, doubts were expressed whether legislation was required at all. Since important issues of social policy are involved, it would seem surprising if Parliament were to refrain from taking an interest in the matter. This is a question on which it is proper and desirable that the legislature should not only express views but should also ensure that these views are reflected in the law. In any event, there are strong constitutional and practical reasons why legislation is necessary.
As has been repeated in Committee and on Second Reading, the police, in enforcing the law in individual cases, are not subject to the directions of the Government or the Home Secretary. If a policy of dealing with juvenile offenders so far as possible out of court is to be established effectively, this policy must be embodied in the law itself. At present, because this is not so, because the police have been given no guidance by Parliament in this matter, the extent to which young persons are prosecuted varies widely from one police area to another. It is Parliament's job to remedy this situation. It will not be properly remedied unless Parliament itself acts. The new Clause contains appropriate proposals for the necessary parliamentary action.
Very briefly, the contents of the subsections are as follows: Subsection (1) provides that no one except a "qualified informant"—an expression that is defined in subsection (9)—may lay an information against a young person. It

was stated in Committee on 15th April that decisions on prosecution would be for the police; and this will be so in the great majority of cases. On practical grounds, however, it would be too restrictive to confine prosecutions strictly to members of police forces within the meaning of the Police Act 1964. There are other public servants and public bodies which may properly be entrusted with this responsibility, and subsection (1), read with subsection (9), provides for this.
Subsection (2) lays down the tests which a qualified informant is to apply in deciding whether to prosecute a young person. These are of two kinds. First, the informant must be satisfied that the case is of a description prescribed in subsection (4). In this respect, the new Clause follows the original Clause and the proposal in "Children in Trouble". The only difference, of course, is that it is the qualified informant, not the single magistrate, who has to apply the prescribed criteria. Secondly, the qualified informant must also be satisfied that it would not be adequate for the case to be dealt with in any of the other ways set out in the second half of that subsection. This is a new requirement, but it does no more than make explicit what was implicit in the original proposal.
Subsection (3) deals with consultations between the police and the local authority before a decision is taken whether to prosecute a young person.
4.15 p.m.
Subsection (4) is based on subsection (6)(a) of the original Clause 5, and empowers the Home Secretary to make regulations specifying the kinds of case in which a qualified informant may, if he is also satisfied as required in subsection (2), prosecute a young person. Such regulations will be subject to draft affirmative Resolution procedure.
Subsection (5) contains machinery provisions to ensure that a qualified informant complies with the requirements of the Clause before instituting proceedings against a young person.
Subsection (6) is based on subsection (8) of the original Clause 5, and it covers the possibility of a mistake about the age of a young person or a failure to comply with the requirements of the new Clause.
Subsection (7) excepts from the preceding provisions of the Clause proceedings instituted by or with the consent of the Attorney-General or the Director of Public Prosecutions.
Subsection (8) requires a qualified informant to notify the local authority when he decides to prosecute a young person. This notification will normally be the final stage of the consultation process, and it will ensure that the local authority is aware of impending prosecutions in cases where is was not consulted.
Subsection (9) defines the term "the appropriate local authority" which has to be consulted under subsection (3) and notified under subsection (8). The definition follows the existing Clause 5(3). There is also the important definition of a "qualified informant". Although the informant will normally be a police officer, who is defined in Clause 66(1) as a member of a police force within the meaning of the Polce Act 1964, it is desirable on practical grounds to include certain other police forces; for example, the British Transport Police; local authorities, for example, for bye-law offences: Government Departments, such as Customs and Excise; and other responsible public bodies which may have regular occasion to prosecute juveniles, for example the G.P.O. in its new form. There are a number of small police forces, for example, docks and harbour forces, and public bodies, statutory undertakers of various kinds, which might be suitable for inclusion in the list, but it is not possible to be certain of identifying all such bodies immediately.
The definition thus covers police officers and Crown servants, acting as such, and local authorities, and enables the Home Secretary to designate other police forces and public bodies, so as to ensure that other suitable forces and public bodies are not inadvertently or unnecessarily precluded from acting as qualified informants.

Mr. Marcus Worsley: Will the Under-Secretary be kind enough to say a little about the meaning of the phrase "a servant of the Crown" in this context? What precisely is covered by this phrase?

Mr. Morgan: Perhaps, Mr. Speaker, with your leave, I shall have the opportunity of dealing with that and other

matters arising particularly under the Amendments put down by the Opposition.

Mr. Speaker: It might be convenient if I observed at this point that Amendment No. 17 does not appear on some of the duplicated lists as being among those Amendments which I have selected for discussion with the new Clause. The necessary correction was made on the list in the "No" Lobby, but I thought I had better mention that Amendment No. 17 is among those which I have selected.

Mr. Mark Carlisle: This is a major new Clause and, in debating it, we are discussing a number of Government and Opposition Amendments. It is a major proposal because it radically changes what was a substantial part of the Bill in that it greatly amends the whole process affecting the prosecution of people aged between 14 and 17.
Although we are grateful to the Under-Secretary for the manner in which he explained the Clause, there remain a number of questions to be answered about how the proposal will work. I am also gravely concerned about some of its provisions. I wish to make it clear at the outset, however, that we are grateful that the Government have decided to remove Clause 5 and to do away with the original proposal, which was heavily criticised, that a magistrate should intervene before a prosecution was brought and that every case should go before a magistrate to decide whether or not proceedings should be instituted.
As the Under-Secretary said, that idea was criticised not only by my hon. Friends but by any body of people having anything to do with the administration of justice. It was criticised because it was cumbersome, because it would have caused delay and because it was believed to be undesirable. We undoubtedly welcome the fact that the Government have had second thoughts on this matter and have removed the necessity to obtain a magistrate's permission before bringing proceedings.
While we welcome that part of the new Clause, a great many questions about its operation remain unanswered. One need only consider the Amendments which we have tabled to the proposal to see that we have anxiety about it.


The Under-Secretary said that, on reflection, the Government believed that the question whether or not prosecutions of people between 14 and 17 should be brought was a matter that could and should be left to the police. With that we entirely agree. My criticism of the new Clause is that that is exactly what it does not do.
It proposes, in subsection (4), to limit the discretion of the police by laying down by regulations the type of offences for which a person aged between 14 and 17 can be charged. The Under-Secretary said nothing to justify that course. He said that there were strong constitutional and practical reasons for this decision, that the question of prosecuting people aged 14 to 17 raised important issues of social policy on which Parliament must have its say and that it was Parliament's job to remedy the variations which exist in the number of prosecutions brought by different police forces.
I remind the hon. Gentleman that Parliament's job is to lay down what are criminal offences, but that the necessary enforcement is not a matter for Parliament, any more than the judicial exercise of any sentences that may be imposed. Why, therefore, do we need regulations to specify the type of offences for which those aged from 14 to 17 can be prosecuted, any more than we need such regulations applying to people over 17? We only need the general principles of the criminal law, explaining that certain matters are crimes, and then it can and should be left to the police—in using their discretion, as the new Clause requires, to consult the local authority in cases involving people of 14 to 17, which I support—to consider whether there are other means by which the matter can be dealt with, rather than going before the court. However, the police should be able to decide whether to prosecute on the basis of what are crimes for the rest of the population, and not be limited to crimes of a particular description laid down by the Home Secretary.
We have not at any stage, on Second Reading or in Committee—for obvious reasons, since the Government undertook to redraft the Clause—been given any guidance about the type of regulations which the Home Secretary proposes to lay, as well as the type of offences for

which a person of this age can be charged, other than those suggested originally in the White Paper "Children in Trouble".
It is interesting to consider the types of offence which it is suggested in the White Paper the Home Secretary should lay down by regulation and which will apply to people aged 14 to 17. The first is that he should prescribe offences of homicide or other serious offences. Nobody will doubt that. However, it is intended that the actual offences will be stated, or that the regulations will merely says, "other serious offences?" If the latter, who is to interpret what is a serious offence?
The second group of offences for which, by regulation, a person is likely to be prosecuted contains offences of a type "causing much public concern." What does that mean? When does an offence become of such a type that it causes much public concern? In Committee, I gave what one might call a stupid example in this connection. I said that this idea reminds me of the story of two magistrates. When one appeared before his brother magistrate for a speeding offence he was fined £2. They changed places and for the same offence in identical circumstances the other magistrate was fined £5 by his brother magistrate. When asked why he had imposed a heavier fine he replied, "This offence is becoming too prevalent and I wanted to make an example of somebody."
Does an offence cause much public concern when it becomes so prevalent that the public are aroused, and then proceedings must be taken? Will people be charged with such an offence only when much public concern has been caused? For example, vandalism in telephone kiosks in Birmingham aroused great public concern when the matter was raised in the national Press. Will that type of offence be the subject of proceedings only when it has become so prevalent that much public concern has been aroused? If so, on what basis will the Home Secretary lay down regulations that decide matters of this kind, rather than leaving it to the good sense and discretion of the local police, in conjunction, for people of the age we are considering, with the local authority?
We are then told of the type of offence where the nature of the offence and the Home circumstances of the accused suggest that a court appearance and a simple deterrent would be appropriate. How on earth is a chief officer of police to interpret words of that kind in relation to any particular offence? Do the Government intend that the regulations which the Home Secretary will lay will mention offences of this kind and say that the police may prosecute if the nature of the offence and the home circumstances of the accused suggest that a court appearance and a simple deterrent would be appropriate?
If so, it seems obvious that the question whether a person between 14 and 17 shall be prosecuted will depend to a large extent on his home circumstances? If two people aged 16 commit a crime, will one be prosecuted because his home circumstances are such that it is thought desirable that he should be prosecuted while the other will not be prosecuted because his home circumstances are such as to suggest that it would be inappropriate to prosecute him?
4.30 p.m.
Finally, we have traffic offences carrying a likelihood of disqualification from driving or endorsement of the licence. But what about those driving offences which do not? Let us get away from traffic offences. What about riding a bicycle without lights? If that offence became so prevalent that it caused much public concern, presumably an example would be made of someone by prosecuting him. But are we to say that if a person aged 16 rides a bicycle without lights he cannot be brought before the court, but that if he commits a similar offence at the age of 17 he can?
Once an attempt is made to lay down by regulation the types of offences for which people of 15 and 16 can be prosecuted, one runs into trouble. It would be far better to leave such matters to the discretion of the police officers concerned. I hope that we shall hear a clear explanation of the type of offence which it is intended to prescribe by regulation and what the purpose of it is.
I agree entirely that it is right that the police should consult and decide whether or not there are other means of dealing with young people of this age. If they

feel in their wisdom that it is unnecessary to bring such a person before the court, I agree that they should not be obliged to. However, the Clause says that the qualified informant shall not prosecute unless he is satisfied that it would not be adequate for the case to be dealt with by a parent, teacher or other person or by means of a caution,
… or through an exercise of the powers of a local authority or other body not involving court proceedings …
What do those words mean? What are the powers of a local authority not involving court proceedings which the police officer is to deem to be adequate and so make it unnecessary to bring the young person concerned before a court? What is meant by these powers?
This raises again the spectre which we discussed in Committee, when the Under Secretary suggested that it would be possible for young people to be sent to attendance centres without ever appearing before courts. He said:
There will be those sent there under supervision orders made under Clause 1. There will be those who have transgressed and in respect of whom a caution has been issued, or those who have been detected at an early stage in their delinquent development … for whom it is thought that attendance would be beneficial."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee G, 27th March, 1969; c. 121.]
Is that what is envisaged when the hon. Gentleman talks about the powers to be exercised by the local authority? Is it intended that the local authority may decide that it would be beneficial for the individual to attend at an attendance centre and, therefore, that he will not be prosecuted? It is very dangerous to start talking about powers to be imposed by local authorities which will apparently avoid prosecution or be deemed to be adequate to make it unnecessary or inappropriate to prosecute.
This raises again the concern expressed about the original White Paper and the fear that tremendous persuasion may be brought to bear on a young person and his parents to admit his guilt and agree to attend at an attendance centre because it is said to be in the young person's interest, when it may be that if he was tried by a court he would be found to have done nothing wrong.
I come then to the words
… or by means of proceedings under section 1 of this Act …".


Is it the idea that care proceedings should be brought rather than prosecutions? As the Bill is worded, it seems that if a police officer things that care proceedings would be adequate, he cannot bring a prosecution. However, that is putting it the wrong way round. Surely we do not want more and more care proceedings brought which are unnecessary and can be dealt with in the case of young people of 15 and 16 by straightforward prosecutions.
If it is necessary to bring care proceedings against a young person of 16 who is in employment, since he cannot be fined for an offence or sent to an attendance centre, further work will be imposed on the child care officers by extending unnecessarily the number of young people put under supervision or care.
Having made my criticisms of the Clause and put forward our serious complaint that the Home Secretary should attempt by regulation to prescribe the type of offence for which a person can be charged, perhaps I might make one more general observation. One of our major concerns about the original Clause 5 was that it would lead to delay if there had to be the intervening stage of an appearance before a magistrate. However, when one looks at subsection (3) of the new Clause, one sees that the police officer concerned has a duty to ask the appropriate local authority if it has any observations that it wishes to make.
The subsection goes on to say that the officer cannot bring proceedings unless he has been notified that the local authority does not wish to make such observations or it has not made any during the period or extended period indicated by the informant as being, in his view, a suitable period. What period has the Home Office in mind? If a young person is to be prosecuted for an offence, it is very important that prosecution should follow as quickly as possible after the event which eventually brings him before the court.
Indeed, the Under-Secretary said as much in Committee. If police authorities have to look to local authorities for observations, I hope that there will be a limited period in which those observations can be put forward and that matters

will not drag on for months before it is decided whether or not to prosecute.
Undoubtedly, the new Clause is better than the original Clause 5. It is a substantial improvement in that it removes one of the most disquieting features of the original Clause 5. However, the unnecessary restriction on the prosecution of people of 15 and 16 still remains. We have to realise that people are worried about juvenile crime. People believe that if a young person of 15 or 16 is involved in crime and is caught he must expect to be punished for what he has done. Laving down regulations describing and limiting the type of offence for which a young person can be punished diminishes the deterrent to potential crime for people of that age. I hope very much that the Amendment to delete subsection (4) will be accepted.

Mr. Philip Goodhart: I accept the Under-Secretary's remarks about the desirability of the discrepancy between various parts of the country in police forces applying cautions to young offenders being to an extent being evened out. But this evening-out procedure can come at perhaps too high a cost.
The Chief Inspector of Constabulary at the Home Office has recently returned from a visit to America, where he rightly noted that the substantial delay between apprehending a subject and bringing him into court has hindered efforts to maintain law and order.
The procedures outlined in the new Clause, as my hon. Friend the Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) has mentioned, will increase the time between apprehending a suspect and bringing him into court. If the procedure means anything at all, it will bring about delay. At the same time, we know that children's departments throughout the country are suffering from the burden of substantial overwork. Again, if these procedures are to mean anything at all, they will considerably increase the amount of work that will have to be done by the children's departments in addition to all the other burdens that will be put upon them by the Bill.
In Committee, our main arguments on Clause 5 were devoted to getting rid of the examining magistrate's procedure which, fortunately, have been accepted by the Government. As a result of this concentration of arguing about the rôle


of the examining magistrate, we did not devote a great deal of time to discussing what sort of cases should be covered by the regulations that are to be made under subsection (4) of the new Clause. To guide us, as my hon. Friend has reminded us, we have only Appendix A of the White Paper "Children in Trouble". The Under-Secretary has so far not even been able to tell us whether the criteria mentioned in paragraph (2) of Appendix A as possibly forming the basis of the regulations will, in fact, be the basis of those regulations.

Mr. Elystan Morgan: I did not go into great detail about that matter as I thought it was understood that, although a further examination will be given to the detail of the matter, it is the intention that the broad structure set out in Appendix A will form the framework of the Regulations, with the exception of paragraphs (d) and (f) which are no longer necessary owing to the second leg of subsection (2) of the new Clause.

4.45 p.m.

Mr. Goodhart: I think that we should not only look at the broad structure, but also at some of its details. I have a list of the non-indictable offences from magistrates' courts in 1967, with the sex and age of those persons found guilty. I suppose that some of the mildest forms of offences listed here are the stealing of fences, trees and flowers. But I have some interest in this matter because, during the last two years, I have lost, through theft, a fence, some trees and some plants.
It may be that the person who took the fence from the top of my garden wall was young. It may be that the person who took the plants out of my front garden was young. After all, the road in which I live is on the way to a large school in the neighbourhood. It is possible that some of the people who took trees from some property that I own near Oxford were also young persons under the age of 17.
What will happen under the regulations? It may be that the case will be covered by paragraph 2(1)(c):
The young person appears not to be in need of sustained support or treatment, but the nature of the offence and his home circumstances suggest that a court appearance and a simple deterrent (e.g., a fine) would be appropriate.

But we have had no definite assurance that this is so. Unless this is so, it seems that if one finds a young person removing a fence, plant or tree—something that is not causing wide public concern and which cannot be considered a serious crime in itself—the position will be that I will merely say, "Please go ahead, because there is no way in which I can be protected by the law".
What happens in motoring offences that are not directly covered by subparagraph (e), where the traffic offence does not carry
a likelihood of disqualification from driving or endorsement of the licence that will remain effective after he has reached a minimum age for holding a driving licence"?
This can be a very substantial figure indeed. The number of young persons between the ages of 14 and 17 convicted of motoring offences in 1967 was almost 24,000.
Unless paragraph 2(1)(e) of the proposed statutory regulations is to be rewritten, there may be a privileged class of drivers and bicycle riders who will be able to park their vehicles in illegal places and commit minor traffic offences without being brought before a court. On the other hand, if the statutory regulations are made, shall we go through the other procedures laid down in the Clause and will there be a check on the family background of every young driver who leaves his car where he should not leave it? That will be a very cumbersome procedure.
I hope that the Under-Secretary will be able to tell us in detail what the statutory regulations will cover or, better still, accept the Amendment and allow subsection (4) to disappear.

Mr. Peter Archer: It appears from the speeches of all three hon. Members who have spoken so far that the screening magistrate having passed, no one remains to mourn his passing. I would not seek to add a note of mourning. The hon. Members for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) and for Beckenham (Mr. Goodhart) are a little worried lest, in consequence of the Amendments now proposed, the police may be unduly fettered in the exercise of what would otherwise be their discretion. I intervene only because I wonder whether that discretion ought not to have been fettered a little more.
I do not intervene because I wish to oppose the Amendments. I certainly should not dream of pressing the matter to a Division, but I should not like this occasion to pass without expressing some reservations which remain with me about this whole business. I certainly do not wish to cast any aspersions on the police force. It is amazing how a body of men who so regularly during the course of their work come into contact with the unbalanced, the perverted, the unscrupulous and the ruthless can, as to the great majority of them, remain so balanced, so normal, so scrupulous and so compassionate. I only wonder whether the burden which the operation of the Clause will impose upon them may not be rather more than they deserve to have imposed upon them, and whether the public will be convinced that this is the best way of handling the matter.
I do not believe that it follows, because we rejected what might at one time have been thought to have been the arguments in favour of the screening magistrate, that, therefore, there should be no authority intervening between the discretion of the police, even after discussions with the local authority, and the juvenile court, or perhaps even a higher court. I wonder whether there might not yet be an argument for an authority which can hold the balance between the public and the individual and, especially bearing in mind what the hon. Member for Beckenham has said, between the victim and the offender, an authority which can give undivided and objective attention to the justice and the merits of the matter and not be distracted by the necessity for investigation and administration.
The Standing Committee considered but rejected a proposal for introducing an examiner rather on the lines of the reporter known in the law of Scotland. I shall not seek to trespass through a gate which was closed in Committee. However, some of the objections to a screening magistrate might not prove to be insuperable if the proposal were to be altered. My objections were that it was wrong to impose what is essentially a judicial decision upon a single lay magistrate, that it would appear that the court was committed by a decision taken by a member of that court in advance of the hearing, that the decision which called

essentially for a positive investigation and the asking of questions—something like what is done by the juge d'instruction in many continental countries—was not possible for an examining magistrate here who had to accept what he was told; and that his function, as it was proposed, was to act as a brake and not as a motive power; that he could prevent the bringing of proceedings, but could not direct that they be brought.
I wonder whether there might not be the possibility of some intervention which did not lend itself to those objections. I do not propose to be more specific than that, simply because I have not given notice of any specific proposals. I merely wonder whether, in view of these reservations, it might be possible to re-examine the matter between now and the Bill's being considered again by another place.
If something along these lines is not done, could there not be criticisms that the Bill has not yet achieved a right balance from two sides? First, it might be said from the one side that a Bill which grounds itself quite properly in compassion for the child, and which seeks to benefit the public by reforming the offender and not by stamping on him, may at the end result in overlooking the interests of the victim, or may at least tempt the victim into believing that his interests have been overlooked. The victim may feel that there is no one with a duty to consider the trouble—sometimes the tragedy—imposed upon him and that everything turns exclusively on the interests of the young offender.
The victim may be left with a chip on his shoulder against the whole system, and may even be tempted to take the law into his own hands. I do not suggest that this would apply to every victim. I cannot imagine the hon. Member for Beckenham seeking to take the law into his own hands when he discovers that his plants have been damaged. However, I can well imagine a victim feeling completely frustrated at the whole system because he believes that all the emphasis is on the one side and that his interests have been overlooked.
On the other side, if the police are able to discuss the situation with the parents and to suggest the alternatives outlined in the Clause, may it not be felt by the parents and by the children,


as the hon. Member for Runcorn suggested, that the police are holding a pistol at their heads?
A very interesting report by Professor J. A. Mack, on Juvenile Liaison Officers in Scotland, was published in December of last year. The report, and particularly the very helpful foreword by the noble Lord, Lord Kilbrandon, suggested that there was a general feeling among parents, particularly amongst those of the kind who were often likely to be involved in such situations as these, that what was proposed was an alternative to prosecution—that they had the opportunity of submitting to supervision by a juvenile liaison officer and that, if they did not so submit the alternative was prosecution.
The Professor and Lord Kilbrandon took the view that it was undesirable that parents should view the matter in this way, because then it was not voluntary co-operation in the alternative way of dealing with the matter, but was co-operation under extreme pressure. If it is felt that there is no one but the police who can decide whether to prosecute, that no other authority can intervene, the family can often be forgiven if they feel that they are left with the alternative of acceding to the proposals of the police for dealing with the matter and of admitting the offence or of facing the consequences, which will be prosecution.
The hon. Member for Runcorn presented in Committee an argument which found favour with large sections of the Committee, namely, that if a further authority were introduced delays would result. I wonder whether there is not a difference in philosophy between us here. I do not accept that every administrative step which is introduced into any process necessarily entails a delay. I suspect that very often the fact that there is someone else looking at the matter and who may criticise delays which have taken place, may be a useful way of expediting proceedings at an earlier stage, because those concerned in the proceedings at an earlier stage may feel that unless they deal with the matter expeditiously they will be open to criticism.
I am not asking my hon. Friend to give a straight yea or nay to these proposals now, but I invite him to believe that some of us feel that eliminating the screening magistrate does not dispose of all the problems, and possibly even at

this late stage it might be looked at again.

5.0 p.m.

Mr. Percy Grieve: I support my hon. Friend the Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle), who, in welcoming the proposed Clause, proposed also what I suggest are very succinct and proper Amendments to it. I support him in those Amendments.
The House will, I think, agree that the most vital thing in the education and upbringing of young people is that at as early an age as possible they should be able to distinguish, and should be brought up to distinguish, between right and wrong. For a very large part of society—indeed, if not for the whole part of society—the way in which right and wrong are primarily distinguished is not only by moral teaching, but by what the criminal law tolerates or forbids.
I exercise judicial functions both in the borough and in the county and I have found that the great worry of almost all those who, by reason of their callings and vocations, have had to consider the Bill, is that for a large part of the population at its most impressionable age it does precisely the reverse of that which we all ought to do to distinguish between right and wrong. It blurs that distinction.
As many probation officers have said to me, the trouble about reducing criminal responsibility for those below the age of 14 and then making special provisions for the prosecution of those over 14, so that they may be prosecuted only in certain circumstances laid down and provided for by Parliament, instead of by the ordinary and due process of the law, is that it would blur the distinction between right and wrong.
Many who may be going out in gangs and may be tempted to commit crime may say, if they are under 14, "We can get away with it; we shall not be made responsible for this". Secondly, they may say, even if they are over 14, "We may not be prosecuted. Even if we are found out, this may not get us into trouble".
For that reason I welcome the new Clause as a considerable modification of the original proposals in the Bill. But I share the apprehensions of my hon. Friend the Member for Runcorn as to the danger of the interference by Parliament, in the ordinary and due process


of the law, and it is wholly wrong that the decision whether or not to prosecute in a proper case for prosecution should be hedged about by regulations made by the Minister. Over recent years there have been many cases in which Parliament has interfered with the discretion of the courts and of the authorities, both as to their dealing with the young and in their powers of sentencing.
I do not believe that the authorities or the courts who administer the law in this country are not imbued with exactly the same considerations of humanity and sympathy as imbue this House. It is wholly wrong and leads to great trouble in the administration of the law by those who try to do justice, to find that where they feel that a certain course is the right and only course to take with a young person, Parliament has said "You may not take it".
This arises on questions of sentencing. Now the suspended sentence must be imposed in a large number of cases—for instance, where a sentence of six months or less is imposed by the court. A young person under 21 may not now be sent to imprisonment unless it be for less than six months or more than three years, and in certain circumstances the rule is 18 months instead of three years. I and those of my colleagues on the bench and at the Bar have found cases where the right sentence has been one of over six months and under three years but Parliament has said "You may not impose it". This is the sort of danger which lies in legislation of this kind.
Similarly, in this Bill, the age for borstal training is to be raised. At present a boy of 15 can be sent to borstal. Under the Bill the age is to be raised to 17, although I understand—I had not the honour to serve on the Standing Committee—that the Minister indicated that certainly for the foreseeable future the age was unlikely to be raised beyond 16. Nevertheless, there are cases were borstal becomes necessary at the age of 15. It is difficult to see how we are to deal with young men whom the courts think require sentences of borstal training, but who have not passed the age of 15, once this Bill comes into effect.
I should like to indicate the sort of case which, as a matter of practical every day work, comes before the courts, and

which indicates the difficulty which would arise from this legislation unless it is mitigated to some extent as indicated by my hon. Friend. Last week—for obvious reasons I will not mention the name of the case—I had to deal at quarter sessions with a young man of 15 who had broken into a chemist's shop and stolen a large quantity of dangerous drugs, some of which he had disposed of on the market.
That boy had been in trouble since the age of 11. At that age he had been before the juvenile court for the first time for stealing ammunition and money. In the same year, in 1965, and at 12 years of age, for stealing an offertory box containing money he was put on probation for three years. In November, 1966, for housebreaking and stealing money, for attempted stealing from motor vehicles and stealing an offertory box and money he was sent for the first time to an approved school.
In February, 1958, for shopbreaking and stealing cigarettes and tobacco, he was given a conditional discharge for three years. In September that year, for house breaking and stealing property worth about £1,200, he went to a detention centre for three months. He was then 14. In January this year, at the age of 15, for burglary and taking and driving away a vehicle without consent and one case considered, he again went to an approved school.
It was hardly surprising that when he came before the quarter sessions the master of the approved school said that there was nothing more that an approved school could do for him. Perhaps some might say that had it been possible in law such action should have been taken earlier. At any rate, it was plain now that he had to go to a place where more discipline could be applied and firmer authority and more security were available. If the Bill is passed into law as it stands, the courts will be deprived of the power of sending such a boy to an institution such as borstal. I do not know what degree of security and discipline the Minister expects to put into selected community homes, if that is their title, to take the place of borstal for youths at that age?
It may be thought that I have strayed a little from the terms of the proposed Clause and the Amendments to mention


the difficulties which face the courts in dealing with boys like these when the courts have only one anxiety—to reform them if possible and turn them into decent citizens before it is too late. I mention the case to illustrate the danger which lies in Parliament's interfering with the powers of the court which hitherto—there are always exceptions—have been exercised with sympathy and understanding.
I cannot remember a previous occasion, certainly for many years, of sending such a young man to borstal, but there are occasions when that becomes necessary. There are occasions when the knowledge that strong measures may be taken, and the knowledge that the law says that something is wrong, may deter a young man—even though it did not deter this one—when he stands on the brink of a serious offence.
For this reason, I am very doubtful about the philosophy which lies behind the interference with the powers of courts and the administration of the law which the Bill makes possible, and I ask the House to support the Amendments to the new Clause.

5.15 p.m.

Mr. R. T. Paget: I had not intended to intervene in this debate. I shall do so only very shortly, largely to ask the hon. and learned Member for Solihull (Mr. Grieve)—whom I know well from my constituency, where he is greatly respected, not only by myself—this rather sad question. Does he think that his sentence of borstal will do that boy any good?
Here is a boy who, from 11 onwards, has been before the courts off and on. He has been to approved schools; everything has been done that the courts can do. Now he is going to borstal and in our hearts we all know that it will not do him the slightest bit of good. From borstal he will go on to prison. It is just that kind of tragic sequence that the Bill is trying to avoid.

Mr. Grieve: I appreciate the force of what the hon. and learned Member has said. One, alas, knows all too well from long experience that in many cases someone who has been to borstal will offend again—but that is not always true. It is not true in more than 50 per cent. of the cases. There are youngsters under

17, at 15 and over, for whom the security and discipline of borstal appears to be, and indeed is, the only measure which society thinks right. I ask the House to hesitate a long time before depriving the courts and society of that measure.

Mr. Paget: I do not in the least wish to decry borstal or the measure of success which borstal has. As the hon. and learned Member said, it has a measure of success in some of the better borstals of up to 50 per cent., but that is not after this kind of record. For this kind of boy I should think that the percentage is considerably under 10. With this kind of boy who has been in trouble from 11 onwards the damage has been done. Whether anything can help the boy at that stage, although I hope that I am profoundly wrong, I very much doubt. It is at the age of 11 when one begins to deal with this kind of case.
Another thing which the hon. and learned Member said seemed contrary to the spirit of the Bill. I do not know whether I have a precise note of what he said, but I think it was that it is important as soon as possible to bring home to children the distinction between right and wrong and that distinction for most children is between what is criminal and what is not criminal.

Mr. Grieve: I am grateful to the hon. and learned Member for saying that that is what he thought I said. Obviously, I do not say that for the bulk of children the criminal law explains the difference between right and wrong, but for those who are already going out in danger of doing a criminal offence the criminal law does bring home the distinction. This is not a view I have been able to form at first-hand; it is the view of many probation officers with whom I have discussed the matter.

Mr. Paget: I would not disagree that factually that may be so, but it is something we ought to avoid at almost any price. To get a child into the state that his idea of the difference between right and wrong is what he can suffer criminal consequences for—that it is wrong for him to park his bicycle in the wrong place, but not wrong to bully his little brother—seems to be producing a kind of atmosphere which we want to avoid.
We want to get away from the criminal distinction and come to the moral distinction. We wish to bring home that this is just one of the things which children must learn not to do. In the process of being brought up it should be dealt with by the same kind of machinery—the home, the school, or whatever it is—that deals with the other wrong things which the child may do, which have nothing at all to do with the criminal law but which, in ethical terms, may be a great deal more serious because they are more cruel and unkind.
Above everything the tremendous lesson is that perhaps the greatest distinction of all between right and wrong is the distinction between kind and unkind. It is very difficult to teach children who tend to be assertive and to feel that they express their growing virility by torturing and hurting, but this distinction we have to get into a child. To present him with a process which adopts the infliction of punishment and the infliction of pain as part of its method of asserting itself is in a large measure to invite the child to do that same thing and that is the very thing which he ought not to be doing.
One does find little villains. There are occasions when the stick is probably the only answer, but that is probably primarily because of the failure of the school and parent in letting the situation go that far. But it does happen, and it must be dealt with.
The Bill is on the right lines in teaching an ethical rather than a criminal difference; that is the principle behind it. It is also right in saying that probably the best people to decide whether a matter has become such a public nuisance that it must be dealt with by the courts are the police. To interpose the certifying magistrate, or whatever he was called, is to impose a worse judgment for a better one. I feel that what is proposed is roughly the right way. I apologise for intervening when I was not on the Committee, but I hope that the hon. and learned Gentleman will forgive me.

Mr. David Lane: I, too, have misgivings about the new Clause and should have felt happier if the Government had restricted their change to the simple deletion of the original Clause 5.
A great deal has been said today and earlier about the supposed lack of uniformity in police practice in cases of the kind with which we are concerned. But I wonder whether the Government, in their anxiety to restrict criminal proceedings for offences by young persons, have rather exaggerated the degree of this lack of uniformity. It may have been a more serious problem several years ago, but I suspect that increasingly, as police amalgamations take effect and police practice becomes more uniform in different parts of the country, it will become less and less of a problem. I do not believe that the Government have paid sufficient attention to what is already happening and will continue to happen as a result of the amalgamations.
I still see three main snags in the procedure, in spite of the Under-Secretary's explanation. The first is the danger of excessive delay. The more I look at the new subsection (3), the more puzzled I am by what its practical effect will be. If we carry through the procedure in subsection 3 (a) and (b) and the police consult the local authority, how long a period does the Under-Secretary envisage in those cases? Of course, it will vary according to the nature of the case, but we are entitled to more explanation than we have had.
The last four lines of the subsection, paraphrased, say that the police can disregard the obligation to consult, if they are satisfied that whatever the local authority may say will not make any difference. This is a confusing procedure, because the police either have a long delay to face—and we are not told how long it is likely to be—or they can say, on their own initiative, "We have read the Act. We do not think that the local authority's views will make any difference. We are going ahead." That takes away the point of the consultation entirely. We should hear more from the Government on why they have drafted the subsection in this double way and how they see it operating in practice.
The second snag I see is that we are in danger of making the procedure more complicated than it needs to be and consequently overloading the police. Surely, this is the last time when the House, by passing ill-thought-out legislation, as I believe certain parts of the new Clause


to be, should add still more to the burdens the police have to carry.
The third snag is the undesirability of subsection (4). We are already seeing too much done and decided by Ministers exercising then administrative functions, not always subject to adequate check by this House. To add again to the ability of the Home Secretary, whoever he may be, to tinker with the law in this case would be a bad thing for the House to do.
I believe that we have not yet got the procedure right. I hope that the Under-Secretary will think very carefully about the criticisms made this afternoon before the Bill passes into law.

Mr. Elystan Morgan: We have had an excellent debate so far, but this is one part of the Bill where there will be a great gulf and chasm between the Opposition and the Government, though I respect the absolute sincerity with which the views of hon. Members opposite are held and tendered and the great totality of experience that hon. Members who have spoken can amass in this context.
Subsection (2) is obviously a key part of the new Clause and, therefore, it is not surprising that the Amendments have concentrated on it. It is heartening that the Amendments accept the need to give guidance to the police in deciding whether or not to prosecute a young person. However, their collective result would be to make the guidance proposed in subsections (2) and (4) much less comprehensive and effective. The possibility of alternative action by a parent, a teacher or other person, or of a police caution, would be considered, and nothing else.
If the Clause were reduced to that substantial extent, it would operate, but in a much less satisfactory way. It is constructed on the basis that a qualified informant should consider both the positive reasons for prosecuting and the possibility of alternative action. It is important that both sides of the coin should be covered by subsection (2). The first and fourth Amendments, by eliminating the prescribed criteria for prosecution, would eliminate one side of the coin and, therefore, leave an unequal test to be applied by the qualified informants.
The criteria envisaged were set out in paragraph 2(1) of Appendix A of the White Paper. In the light of subsection (2), criteria (d) and (f) are no longer necessary, but the others remain as a suitable basis for the regulations. The function of the regulations would be to give guidance to qualified informants on the exercise of discretion. It is right and inevitable that such guidance should be in reasonably general terms. But if it were excessively general, it would not serve one of its main purposes, which is to rectify the gross discrepancies of police practice which now exist in relation to the prosecution of juveniles.
This I feel, as I felt on Second Reading and in Committee, is the heart and kernel of the whole situation, and it has not been disposed of by the argument of right hon. and hon. Members opposite. No Member would say that he or she is content with a situation in which the caution rate may run at 2, 3, or 5 per cent. in one part of the Kingdom and at 65, 67, or 70 per cent. in another part.
In our debates on the Bill we have had excellent and sincere speeches on the need to remove discrimination. It is inevitable that distinctions will be drawn when one is dealing with such cases as these, each on its own merits, bearing in mind what the needs of the young person might be. But provided these distinctions are drawn on proper criteria, the discrimination in itself is not improper. The fact that a court has discretion to deal with a case in a variety of ways of necessity means that there is the possibility of discrimination. What we are concerned with is wrongful discrimination.
5.30 p.m.
It is argued by hon. Members opposite that it would not be proper to set out a code which would give broad guidance for senior police officers in deciding whether or not a prosecution should take place, but none has suggested that such guidance should be given in any way other than by legislation. Obviously, it would not be proper for the Home Office, and it would have no effect in law, if it were to publish a circular to be issued to senior police officers. No one would want to see a Home Secretary going on a legislative frolic of his own in such a context.
Granted that that is the case, what are we left with? Either that we have this complete lack of uniformity that is so abhorrent to all of us; or we might hope that, in some pious but impractical way, by some process of intuition or clairvoyance, senior police officers will happen to hit upon a proper approach to the problem and the proper guidelines; or we are left with the situation as it is.
The caution rate for the whole range of indictable and non-indictable offences for children and young persons up to the age of 17 is about 25 per cent. Without the Bill, quite irrespective of what we are now discussing, the figure might well rise to 40 or 50 per cent. in 10 years' time. Despite what the hon. Member for Cambridge (Mr. Lane) has said about amalgamations, it is inevitable that there will be grave discrepancies as between one police force and another and, indeed, between one area and another within the territory of one police force.
Discretion without guidance must of necessity give a clear idea to the ordinary layman that it is exercised in an arbitrary and capricious way. That is no attack upon the senior officers concerned. They are sensible men carrying out their duties as they see proper. Each one depends upon his own views, his own bent. It was said of equity many centuries ago that it varied according to the length of the Chancellor's foot. Is it right and proper that a discretion exercised in this context should vary according to the length or breadth of a chief constable's foot? We want to see a uniform pattern. Is there any other way of getting nearer to uniformity than to have the criteria suggested in subsection (4) of new Clause 1?

Mr. R. H. Turton: Will the hon. Gentleman explain how the adoption of the vague wording in the Appendix will avoid these different interpretations by police officers?

Mr. Morgan: I do not pretend that this provision will bring about a perfect uniformity. What I do say is that it will bring us much nearer to a system of uniformity than the situation which now obtains.
The second and third Amendments to new Clause 1 relate to lines 7 and 8, which are the latter part of subsection (2).

The whole object of the second half of subsection (2) is to give a comprehensive description of the kind of possible alternative action which might adequately deal with a case without the need for prosecution. The result of the Amendment to lines 7 and 8 would be that this part of subsection (2) would cease to be comprehensive and alternative methods which obviously should be taken into account would not be mentiond.
Taking, first, the exercise by a local authority or other body of its powers, some examples may be given as follows—and this was the point raised by the hon. Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle). The first and most obvious power is in Section 1 of the 1963 Act, which requires the local authority to make available
… such advice, guidance and assistance as may promote the welfare of children by diminishing the need … to bring children before a juvenile court;
It would be extremely odd and unsatisfactory, in view of this clear statement of one of the objects of action taken under Section 1 of the Act, if a qualified informant were not required to take into consideration whether such action would result in the case being dealt with adequately.
Secondly, there is Section 1 of the Children Act, 1948, which places upon the local authority a duty in defined circumstances to receive a child into care. This power might be relevant where an offence arises out of family difficulties and the parents ask that a child be received into care, not necessarily for a long period, and this is clearly an appropriate course which removes any need to consider court proceedings in respect of the offence. The other examples include references to a child guidance clinic or admission to a special school. The examples are comprehensive and illustrate why local authority powers must be mentioned in subsection (2). It seems almost self-evident that the qualified informant should be required to take account of matters of this kind before deciding whether or not to prosecute.
The apparition of delay has once again presented itself. The hon. Member for Cambridge and others asked how it is intended that the system of consultation should work and what delay is envisaged in this connection. The procedure will work broadly speaking as follows: While consultation between police and local


authorities will be normal practice there will be some cases where it is clear, without such consultation, that there should be a prosecution—for example, where the offence is a very serious one or is a driving offence of a kind where the court would have the opportunity to consider imposing a disqualification.
In such cases, a qualified informant will be entitled to initiate a prosecution without prior consultation with the local authority. In any other case, he will be required to tell the authority that he is considering whether to prosecute the young person and, unless it indicates that it does not wish to do so, to allow it reasonable time in the circumstances of the case in which it may express any views it may have, and to consider such views before deciding to prosecute.
It is, of course, impossible to make a calculation of exactly what the time lapse will be. The best guide we have is that of experience. In relation to the juvenile bureaux which have been set up in the metropolitan area, I understand that, where such consultations take place with the local authority, the average delay or lapse of time is nine days. I am sure that hon. Members will agree that that is a reasonable period and a price well worth paying in order to have all the information that is relevant and material to the case and enabling the court therefore to come to the best possible decision.
Mr. Speaker was kind enough to indicate a group of Amendments which we are discussing with new Clause 1. I propose formally to move them later, but perhaps I can take the opportunity now to assure the House that they are all consequential. Many technical matters are involved, but I do not propose to deal with these unless, of course, hon. Members wish me to do so.

Mr. Worsley: We are discussing a very important matter and there is nothing wrong in discussing it at some length. We are discussing nothing less than the application of the criminal law to all those under the age of 17. My hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Mr. Goodhart) made a good point when he said that in Committee, when we were discussing the Clause which the new Clause replaces, we concentrated our attention on the issue of the single

magistrate, and we are grateful to the Government for making that issue disappear.
We are discussing this matter at a time when there is an increase in juvenile crime, when there is an increase in public concern about this matter and what we do therefore matters greatly. I am inclined to think that were we to ask the people whether they wished to make the criminal law easier for young people under 17, they would not come down on the same side as the Government.
We are not talking only about children; we are talking about young persons who have been in employment for about two years, about young persons who are now within a year of exercising their right to vote, about young persons who by every evidence mature earlier, about young persons who sometimes, alas, although as a generation they are splendid, have shown a deplorable sense of viciousness, gang warfare and the rest. We look at this with a critical eye to ask whether the Government are making the task of those who have to enforce law and order easier or more difficult.
If we wish to promote humane treatment, to break the tragic sequence, to use the phrase of the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget), we must carry public opinion with us or we are doomed to failure. I cannot believe that a restriction on the ability of the police to bring criminal actions, particularly against 16-year-olds, is the best way forward.
It is, first, on those broad general grounds that I believe it to be wrong to restrict the ability of the police to bring criminal actions where they believe that to be necessary. Most of us, certainly those of us who served on the Standing Committee, would like an increase in the use of care and control proceedings, particularly for the younger end of this age group, but also for the older end. However, I agreed with my hon. Friend the Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) when he questioned whether short, sharp criminal action, against 15 and 15-year-olds particularly, was not likely to be the best course. I do not go so far as to say that the ultimate goal which we all seek is to transfer all cases of this sort from criminal to care and control proceedings.
We are discussing what guidance should be given to the police in these circumstances. I accept that others are involved, but we are concerned mainly with the police. This brings me at once to the nub of the argument. The Under-Secretary constantly spoke about guidance and about broad guidance. But what he proposes is more than guidance; he is proposing dictation. He is not allowing the decision in these matters to remain in the hands of the police. He is attempting to take it from the police and to put it in Whitehall. It is no good calling that guidance.
5.45 p.m.
Over and over again he mentioned the enormous divergences between individual police forces in the use of cautions. I accept that if we argue against subsection (4), as we do, we must attempt to deal with that difficulty. I agree that these variations are much too wide, but, as my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Mr. Lane) said, increasing amalgamations will reduce these figures. The guidance which would remain in the new Clause would of itself impose a certain restriction on this discretion. Secondly, and more important, to attempt to regulate from Whitehall the criteria to be used by the police is the wrong way. The right way to give guidance is to spread abroad the concepts of the best practice, and that can be done by sending circulars to police authorities.
The hon. Gentleman appeared to think that to do that would be something like a piece of legislative private enterprise, a frolic. Every Department constantly sends out a spate of paper of advice and guidance for every local authority in the country.

Mr. Elystan Morgan: I was saying that in these circumstances the use of circulars to do the work of legislation would amount to a legislative frolic, although it would not in most other cases.

Mr. Worsley: Surely that is not so. What we are seeking to do in all these things is to allow a local authority, or in this case a local police force, to use its own discretion, but to do so in an informed way, informed by what is regarded as the best practice. There is a

world of difference between that sort of guidance, that sort of educative process, and the sort of hard and fast restrictions which, presumably, regulations would lay down.
Apart from that, police forces are always discussing these matters. The police do not merely live in their own localities and discuss these things inside their own forces. Particularly with the mergers which are going on and the increase in training, these things will be discussed more and more widely. Rather than the necessarily restrictive conditions which would be laid down by Whitehall, would it not be better to allow the police themselves, with guidance from the Home Office and by mutual discussion, to reach what they regarded as the best way forward?
This at least is what we feel and why we seek to take out this regulation-making power. The more I look at Appendix A of the White Paper the more I am confirmed in my view that this will be either ineffective or needlessly restrictive, and I suspect that the latter will be the case. Let me instance this by taking some of the headings from Appendix A. Item (b) says:
the offence is of a type causing much public concern".
Things that excite public concern vary enormously from one part of the country to another.
Very often there may be an outbreak of hooliganism in one town, perhaps connected with football matches or perhaps something quite different, when the police would like to come in and prefer a few criminal charges in the hope that the courts will make an example of the individuals concerned. This may have no relevance at all to a town 20 miles away, yet this will have to be based on national criteria. What concerns Torquay will have to concern Newcastle.

Mr. Niall MacDermot: Why does the hon. Gentleman say that? Surely the advantage of the procedure proposed is that it will leave it to the discretion of the local senior officer to decide whether this is an offence in his locality which public concern requires that there should be a prosecution. That is the advantage of laying down criteria rather than trying to specify offences in regulations.

Mr. Worsley: My understanding of the way this would work was that offences which are regarded as being of public concern would be laid down by the Home Office. I am grateful if I am now corrected by the Under-Secretary and the hon. and learned Gentleman.
Secondly, item (c) deals with circumstances which vary with the individual. Surely this is much better left to the discretion of the individual police officer rather than imposing criteria from Whitehall which could easily be irrelevant? Most extraordinary of all is the subject of traffic offences. Presumably we are dealing with motorcycle offences exclusively, because a juvenile under 17 driving a car without authority would be caught in other circumstances.
I want to be clear about what is intended here. A lot of us, staid drivers of motor cars, regard young motor cyclists, who sometimes come up on both left and right of one as one drives along, with considerable aversion and alarm. We would not want anything done in the Bill that would in any way allow those persons to get away with anything for which they should be charged.
As I understand the criteria laid out in Appendix A, they will only be allowed to be charged if there is a likelihood of disqualification from driving or an endorsement of the licence that will remain effective after they have reached the minimum age. There will, therefore, be offences under the Traffic Acts which cannot be charged.
For all these reasons we feel that, rather than the Home Office seeking to lay down criteria centrally for the guidance, to use the Under-Secretary's word, of the police authorities, it would be very much better to allow them a discretion. The Under-Secretary said that he had no prejudice against the police, but he used the word "capricious". With all respect this is a pejorative word.

Mr. Elystan Morgan: What I said was that if no guide-lines are laid down and

each senior officer decided in his own mind, honourably and according to his experience, it would give an intelligent layman the impression of being arbitrary and capricious. Those were my exact words.

Mr. Worsley: Nevertheless, there is latent in the attitude of the Home Secretary and the Under-Secretary towards the police a lack of trust and confidence. I know that it is not their conscious intention, but we would be much wiser to leave this issue in the hands of the police.

Mr. Paget: If we take a case, leaving aside whether it is capricious or not, suppose that down one side of a street juveniles are prosecuted for parking their bicycles and they are not so prosecuted on the other. This would be an unsatisfactory state of affairs. Surely the question of minor traffic offences, whether juveniles should be prosecuted like everyone else for parking offences, should be the subject of guidance?

Mr. Worsley: Under these criteria it will not be possible to prosecute on either side of that street, so the question would not arise. We are not convinced of the necessity for subsection (4) and we would ask, if it is possible, to divide on the first of the Amendments to the new Clause.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Sydney Irving): Order. May I inform the House that Mr. Speaker has agreed to a Division on the first of the Amendments in the name of the right hon. and learned Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg) if the House so wishes.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time.

Amendment proposed to the proposed Clause: In line 4, leave out from 'opinion' to 'that' in line 5.—[Mr. Carlisle.]

Question put, That the Amendment be made:—

The House divided: Ayes 141, Noes 203.

Division No. 233.]
AYES
[6.0 p.m.


Alison, Michael (Barkston Ash)
Berry, Hn. Anthony
Boyle, Rt. Hn. Sir Edward


Astor, John
Biffen, John
Brinton, Sir Tatton


Baker, Kenneth (Acton)
Biggs-Davison, John
Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. Sir Walter


Batsford, Brian
Birch, Rt. Hn. Nigel
Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)


Bell, Ronald
Black, Sir Cyril
Buck, Antony (Colchester)


Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay)
Boardman, Tom (Leicester, S. W.)
Bullus, Sir Eric


Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gos. &amp; Fhm)
Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hn. John
Burden, F. A.




Campbell, B. (Oldham, W.)
Hornby, Richard
Pym, Francis


Campbell, Gordon (Moray &amp; Nairn)
Howell, David (Guildford)
Ramsden, Rt. Hn. James


Carlisle, Mark
Hunt, John
Rees-Davies, W. R.


Channon, H. P. G.
Iremonger, T. L.
Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon


Clark, Henry
Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)
Ridley, Hn. Nicholas


Clegg, Walter
Jenkin, Patrick (Woodford)
Rippon, Rt. Hn. Geoffrey


Cooper-Key, Sir Neill
Jopling, Michael
Rodgers, Sir John (Sevenoaks)


Corfield, F. V.
Joseph, Rt. Hn. Sir Keith
Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey)


Costain, A. P.
Kershaw, Anthony
Royle, Anthony


Craddock, sir Beresford (Spelthorne)
King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)
Russell, Sir Ronald


Crouch, David
Kitson, Timothy
Scott-Hopkins, James


Cunningham, Sir Knox
Knight, Mrs. Jill
Sharples, Richard


Dance, James
Lane, David
Shaw, Michael (Sc'b'gh &amp; Whitby)


Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F. (Ashford)
Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry
Silvester, Frederick


Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)
Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)
Sinclair, Sir George


Elliott, R. W. (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, N.)
Lloyd, Rt. Hn. Selwyn (Wirral)
Smith, John (London &amp; W'minster)


Errington, Sir Eric
Longden, Gilbert
Speed, Keith


Eyre, Reginald
Lubbock, Eric
Tapsell, Peter


Fortescue, Tim
McAdden, Sir Stephen
Taylor, Edward M. (G'gow, Cathcart)


Fraser, Rt. Hn. Hjugh (St'fford &amp; Stone)
MacArthur, Ian
Taylor, Frank (Moss Side)


Glover, Sir Douglas
Mackenzie, Alasdair (Ross &amp; Crom'ty)
Temple, John M.


Godber, Rt. Hn. J. B.
McNair-Wilson, Michael
Thatcher, Mrs. Margaret


Gower, Raymond
McNair-Wilson, Patrick (New Forest)
Thorpe, Rt. Hn. Jeremy


Grant, Anthony
Maginnis, John E.
Turton, Rt. Hn. R. H.


Gresham Cooke, R.
Maude, Angus
Vaughan-Morgan, Rt. Hn. Sir John


Grieve, Percy
Mawby, Ray
Vickers, Dame Joan


Griffiths, Eldon (Bury St. Edmunds)
Miscampbell, Norman
Waddington, David


Hall, John (Wycombe)
Monro, Hector
Wainwright, Richard (Colne Valley)


Hamilton, Lord (Fermanagh)
Montgomery, Fergus
Walker, Peter (Worcester)


Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)
Morgan, Geraint (Denbigh)
Walker-Smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek


Harrison, Brian (Maldon)
Morrison, Charles (Devizes)
Walters, Dennis


Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)
Mott-Radclyffe, Sir Charles
Ward, Dame Irene


Harvey, Sir Arthur Vere
Munro-Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh
Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William


Hastings, Stephen
Murton, Oscar
Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)


Heald, Rt. Hn. Sir Lionel
Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael
Wood, Rt. Hn. Richard


Heath, Rt. Hn. Edward
Onslow, Cranley
Woodnutt, Mark


Higgins, Terence L.
Page, John (Harrow, W.)
Worsley, Marcus


Hiley, Joseph
Pearson, Sir Frank (Clltheroe)



Hill, J. E. B.
Percival, Ian
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Hogg, Rt. Hn. Quintin
Pink, R. Bonner
Mr. Jasper More and


Holland, Philip
Pounder, Rafton
Mr. Humphrey Atkins.


Hordern, Peter






NOES


Abse, Leo
Darling, Rt. Hn. George
Haselaine, Norman


Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)
Davidson, Arthur (Accrington)
Hazell, Bert


Alldritt, Walter
Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)
Heffer, Eric S.


Anderson, Donald
Davies, Dr. Ernest (Stretford)
Herbison, Rt. Hn. Margaret


Archer, Peter
Davies, Ifor (Gower)
Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas


Ashton, Joe (Bassetlaw)
Delargy, Hugh
Howell, Denis (Small Heath)


Atkins, Ronald (Preston, N.)
Dell, Edmund
Howie, W.


Atkinson, Norman (Tottenham)
Dempsey, James
Hoy, James


Bacon, Rt. Hn. Alice
Diamond, Rt. Hn. John
Hughes, Roy (Newport)


Bagier, Gordon A. T.
Dickens, James
Hunter, Adam


Barnes, Michael
Doig, Peter
Hynd, John


Barnett, Joel
Dunnett, Jack
Irvine, Sir Arthur (Edge Hilt)


Bence, Cyril
Dunwoody, Dr. John (F'th &amp; C'b'e)
Jackson, Colin (B'h'se &amp; Spenb'gh)


Bidwell, Sydney
Eadie, Alex
Jackson, Peter M. (High peak)


Binns, John
Edwards, William (Merioneth)
Jeger, George (Goole)


Blackburn, F.
English, Michael
Jenkins, Rt. Hn. Roy (Stechford)


Booth, Albert
Ennals, David
Johnson, James (K'ston-on-Hull, W.)


Bradley, Tom
Ensor, David
Jones, Rt. Hn. Sir Elwyn (W. Ham, S.)


Bray, Dr. Jeremy
Evans, Fred (Caerphilly)
Jones, T. Alec (Rhondda, West)



Evans, Ioan L. (Birm'h'm, Yardley)
Judd, Frank


Brooks, Edwin
Fernyhough, E.
Kelley, Richard


Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.
Fitch, Alan (Wigan)
Kenyon, Clifford


Brown, Rt. Hn. George (Belper)
Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)
Kerr, Dr. David (W'worth, Central)


Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan)
Foot, Michael (Ebbw Vale)
Kerr, Russell (Feltham)


Brown, Bob (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, W.)
Fraser, John (Norwood)
Lawson, George


Brown, R. W. (Shoreditch &amp; F'bury)
Freeson, Reginald
Leadbitter, Ted


Buchan, Norman
Gardner, Tony
Lee, Rt. Hn. Frederick (Newton)


Buchanan, Richard (G'gow, Sp'burn)
Garrett, W. E.
Lee, Rt. Hon. Jennie (Cannock)


Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)
Ginsburg, David
Lipton, Marcus


Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)
Greenwood, Rt. Hn. Anthony
Loughlin, Charles


Callaghan, Rt. Hn. James
Gregory, Arnold
Lyon, Alexander W. (York)


Carmichael, Neil
Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)
Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson


Carter-Jones, Lewis
Griffiths, Eddie (Brightside)
McBride, Neil


Coe, Denis
Griffiths, Rt. Hn. James (Llanelly)
McCann, John


Coleman, Donald
Griffiths, Will (Exchange)
MacColl, James


Concannon, J. D.
Hamilton, William (Fife, W.)
MacDermot, Niall


Conlan, Bernard
Hamling, William
McGuire, Michael


Crawshaw, Richard
Harper, Joseph
Mackenzie, Gregor (Rutherglen)


Grossman, Rt. Hn. Richard
Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)
Maclennan, Robert


Dalyell, Tam
Hart, Rt. Hn. Judith
MacMillan, Malcolm (Western Isles)







McNamara, J. Kevin
Parkyn, Brian (Bedford)
Spriggs, Leslie


Mahon, Peter (Preston, S.)
Pavitt, Laurence
Taverne, Dick


Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)
Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred
Thomas, Rt. Hn. George


Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.)
Pentland, Norman
Thomson, Rt. Hn. George


Manuel, Archie
Perry, George H. (Nottingham, S.)
Thornton, Ernest


Marks, Kenneth
Prentice, Rt. Hn. R. E.
Tinn, James


Mayhew, Christopher
Price, Christopher (Perry Barr)
Tuck, Raphael


Mellish, Rt. Hn. Robert
Price, Thomas (Westhoughton)
Urwin, T. W.


Mendelson, John
Price, William (Rugby)
Varley, Eric G.


Millan, Bruce
Probert, Arthur
Wainwright, Edwin (Dearne Valley)


Miller, Dr. M. S.
Rankin, John
Walker, Harold (Doncaster)


Mills, Stratton (Belfast, N.)
Roes, Merlyn
Wallace, George


Mitchell, R. C. (S'th'pton, Test)
Roberts, Gwilym (Bedfordshire, S.)
Watkins, David (Consett)


Molloy, William
Rodgers, William (Stockton)
Watkins, Tudor (Brecon &amp; Radnor)


Moonman, Eric
Roebuck, Roy
Wellbeloved, James


Morgan, Elystan (Cardiganshire)
Ross, Rt. Hn. William
Whitaker, Ben


Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)
Rowlands, E.
Whitlock, William


Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)
Ryan, John
Willey, Rt. Hn. Frederick


Moyle, Roland
Shaw, Arnold (Ilford, S.)
Williams, Alan (Swansea, W.)


Neal, Harold
Sheldon, Robert
Williams, Alan Lee (Hornchurch)


Newens, Stan
Shinwell, Rt. Hn. E.
Williams, W. T. (Warrington)


Ogden, Eric
Shore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney)
Willis, Rt. Hn. George


Oram, Albert E.
Short, Rt. Hn. Edward (N'c'tle-u-Tyne)
Wilson, Rt. Hn. Harold (Huyton)


Orbach, Maurice
Short, Mrs. Renée (W'hampton, N. E.)
Wilson, William (Coventry, S.)


Orme, Stanley
Silkin, Rt. Hn. John (Deptford)
Woof, Robert


Oswald, Thomas
Silverman, Julius



Owen, Will (Morpeth)
Slater, Joseph
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Paget, R. T.
Small, William
Mr. Ernest G. Perry and


Pannell, Rt. Hn. Charles
Snow, Julian
Mr. Ernest Armstrong.


Parker, John (Dagenham)

Clause added to the Bill.

New Clause

LEGAL AID

(1) Part IV of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 (which relates to legal aid in criminal proceedings) shall have effect subject to the provisions of Schedule (Modifications of Part IV of Criminal Justice Act 1967) to this Act (being provisions for applying the said Part IV to certain proceedings under Part I of this Act and for modifying the said Part IV in certain minor respects in relation to juveniles).

(2) Legal aid in pursuance of the Legal Aid and Advice Act 1949 shall not be given in respect of any proceedings in respect of which legal aid may be given by virtue of the preceding subsection.—[Mr. Elystan Morgan.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Elystan Morgan: I beg to move, That the Clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: We can discuss at the same time Amendment No. 86, in page 30, line 33, after 'remand', insert 'or legal aid', the new Schedule entitled "Modifications of Part IV of Criminal Justice Act 1967", and Amendment No. 127, in page 90, line 49, column 3 [Schedule 5], at end insert:
'In section 77(1), the words "on his means"'.

Mr. Morgan: The new Clause is a paving provision for the new Schedule which amends Park IV of the Criminal Justice Act, 1967, which deals with legal aid in criminal proceedings.
The Amendments have two objects. The first is to fulfil the undertaking given in Committee on 27th March to consider whether the criminal legal aid system should apply to care proceedings. The Government have come to the conclusion that it should, and the Amendments so provide.
The second purpose is this. Section 78 of the 1967 Act, dealing with legal aid in criminal proceedings, empowers the Secretary of State to make regulations providing that in the case of infants the resources and commitments of other persons may be taken into account. In the Legal Aid in Criminal Proceedings (Assessment of Resources) Regulations, 1968, the Secretary of State has made such regulations. The persons whose resources and commitments may be taken into account are persons liable to maintain the infant, or who would be so liable if he were under the age of 16, and other persons having charge or control of him except local authorities and persons having charge or control for a temporary purpose, or by reason of any contract. The 1967 Act, however, makes no provision for the court to require such a person to complete a statement of his means before legal aid can be given to the applicant and no provision for requiring him to make a contribution or enforcing it against him.
The Government are of the opinion that in the case of children under the age


of 16, it should be possible to enforce a contribution against the parents, if their means permit, in both criminal and care proceedings. The Amendments so provide. The reason why the age of 16 has been chosen and not 17, which is the upper age for juvenile proceedings, or 18, which will be the new age of majority, is that it seems reasonable to be able to enforce a contribution against the parents only where they are legally liable to maintain the child. Under Section 22 of the Ministry of Social Security Act, 1966, that liability comes to an end at the age of 16. The effect will be that between 16 and the new age of majority, the parent's resources and commitments may be taken into account as under the existing law, but there will be no power to enforce a contribution against a parent.
The provisions applying the criminal legal aid system to care proceedings apply also where there is an appeal to quarter sessions in those proceedings; where the child or young person is the subject of an application under Clause 15, under which the supervisor may bring a supervised person before the court; where the child or young person is the subject of an application under Clause 21(1), which enables the local authority to apply for a care order to be extended from 18 to 19 years of age, or under Clause 21(2), which deals with applications for the discharge of a care order: and also where there is an application under Clause 29, under which an order may be made removing a young person in care to borstal. Subsection (2) of the new Clause takes legal aid in care proceedings out of the civil legal aid system.
The new Schedule—Amendment No. 114—and the other Amendments grouped with the new Clause are consequential.

Mr. Carlisle: Since the new Clause is in response to an Amendment which I moved in Committee, I am grateful to the Government for looking at this matter and for deciding that criminal legal aid rather than civil legal aid should apply in care proceedings.
It is somewhat surprising, but I am sure that it is a necessary form of drafting, that an Amendment which I succeeded in putting down in two and a half lines in Committee now appears as a Schedule which occupies two pages as

well as several other Amendments. I assume, however, that it is all correctly drafted, and I am grateful to the Government.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause No. 3

INFORMATION CONCERNING CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS OF PEOPLE SEEKING TO WORK IN COMMUNITY HOMES, &C.

Chief officers of police as defined in section 62 of the Police Act 1964 shall have power to divulge to local authorities and to their officers such information as they may possess concerning the criminal convictions of any person seeking to work in a community home or wishing to undertake the care of a child either as a foster child or by way of adoption.—[Mr. Hiley.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

6.15 p.m.

Mr. Joseph Hiley: I beg to move, That the Clause be read a Second time.
I feel that the Home Secretary and the Under-Secretary will be grateful to us for the new Clause. When anything goes wrong—things have gone wrong in the past and they may do so again—the authorities are always liable to be shot at and severely criticised for any shortcomings in this respect. It is true that once a man has been convicted and has served his sentence, that should be the end of his punishment. That is in accordance with the traditions of the country. The paramount interest, however, should be that of the child.
I am particularly thinking of people with psychological or sexual abnormalities who fairly often find themselves associated with young people. I do not seek to excuse or justify their actions. There are those, including, perhaps, many in this House, who say that such people cannot help this form of misdemeanour. Be that as it may, the first interest should be that of the child rather than of one who, unfortunately, has been in conflict with the police on former occasions.
I am certain that if the Clause were added to the Bill, it would be operated in such a way as not adversely to affect one who had previously been convicted,


except as regards employment in a community home. If people of this nature are subject to these abnormalities, it is the Home Secretary's duty to write the new Clause into the Bill. For his own sake, I hope he will accept it.

Mr. Norman Miscampbell: I support the new Clause. One of the most distressing experiences when going to court to defend people who have been involved in offences against children is how frequently it has occurred before and the information either has not been passed on or has not been available to those who have employed them on a second occasion. It is a frequent and distressing occurrence in schools and institutions.
I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Pudsey (Mr. Hiley) that some would take the view that these offences are not just matters for punishment but are also matters which can be excused on medical grounds. I do not want to enter into that controversy. These offences are clearly different from other types of offence, when one can certainly say that once the person has served his sentence it is over and done with.
The person himself has to be protected from getting into temptation. Therefore, his protection must continue long after his sentence has been served. The children with whom he will come into contact on other occasions must be protected, and I am sure that this House will see that they are protected.
For these reasons, I hope very much that the spirit of the new Clause, even if the precise terms of its drafting are not acceptable, will be accepted. It would give valuable and much-needed protection to those who work in the new community homes which we are setting up, to those who run the community homes and have responsibility for the children in their care and, last but by no means least, to the children whom we send there and to whom we have an overriding responsibility to make sure that they are not subject to assaults of a disgusting and disgraceful kind.

Mr. Archer: First, let me apologise to the House for not having been here when the debate began on this new Clause. The expedition with which the previous new Clause was dealt with took me by surprise.
This is an occasion when there is a conflict of fundamental principles. I would normally be very reluctant to seek to infringe the principle that when a prisoner has served his sentence he is entitled to his opportunity of rehabilitation without being constantly confronted by his past. Where he is seeking employment in a post of great responsibility or of great temptation, then, in my submission, it is an arguable proposition that his employer, however generous we should encourage him to be, should be informed of the position so that he should not be generous by being kept in ignorance of the relevant facts, and where those at risk are children, the right of the offender to a fresh start should not override the right of the authority to have available the information necessary to the proper carrying out of its functions and the exercise of its discretion. Where there is present some of the kind of offences mentioned by the hon. Member for Blackpool, North (Mr. Miscampbell), then, in my submission, it would be wrong to say that the right of a prisoner to a completely fresh start should override the right of the authority to be completely in the picture as to the exercise of its discretion.
Clearly, of course, the information which is available should be treated with the utmost confidentiality, and one can, one hopes, rely on the discretion both of police forces and of local authorities, but one does feel that it should not depend on informal tip-offs but should be through, if not statutory, at least formal official channels that this information can be given.
It may be that the power to give this information exists already. I see that my hon. Friend is nodding. I was not able certainly to discover any serious inhibitions on that power. If my hon. Friend can advise the House that this new Clause is unnecessary for that reason I would not seek to carry the matter further, but I hope that, if that is the position, my hon. Friend will take the opportunity to advise the House that in the view of his Department police forces ought to be at least ready to avail themselves of the powers which they have and ought not to feel inhibited in exercising them.

Mr. Elystan Morgan: I have the fullest sympathy with the sentiments expressed by


the hon. Members for Pudsey (Mr. Hiley) and Blackpool, North (Mr. Miscampbell) and my hon. Friend the Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. Archer), but the short answer is that this new Clause is superfluous. Chief officers of police are able at present to divulge to local authorities, and to other persons who have a legitimate need to know, information concerning the criminal convictions of a particular person. The extent to which in any particular case this information is divulged is, of course, a matter entirely within the discretion of the police, but I have no doubt that in exercising that discretion they bear in mind the particular duty which they have in the circumstances described by my hon. Friend.
Discussions have been held with the local authority and other associations about the risks involved with children in care by their coming into contact with persons who are known to have previous convictions for, say, sexual offences. Of course, these risks are inherent in the community home system which is being created by this Bill. It is the widely accepted view which emerged from those discussions that it must remain the responsibility of employers to make proper inquiries into the references and backgrounds of persons who wish to be employed with children.
Similarly, a local authority or other responsible organisation would make such inquiries, including inquiries of the police, as it thought necessary about a person who wished to become a foster parent of children boarded out under the Children Act, 1948, or fostered privately under the Act of 1958, or who wished to adopt a child. In the case of a person wishing to adopt a child, the second schedule to the Adoption (Juvenile Court) Rules, 1959, also charges the guardian ad litem with certain duties, including the duty to ascertain information about the suitability of the applicant. Similar provision exists in the County and High Court Rules. In all the three circumstances—care, fostering and adoption—the police are able at present, and will remain able in future, to disclose information at their discretion about criminal convictions to inquiring authorities and other persons, and the new Clause would add nothing to these existing powers.

Mr. Hiley: In view of that explanation, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Motion.

Motion, and Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 1

CARE PROCEEDINGS IN JUVENILE COURTS

Mr. Carlisle: I beg to move Amendment No. 2, in page 2, line 2, leave out from the beginning to "then" in line 4.
The Amendment raises again one of the major issues of controversy on the Bill, one which was referred to by my right hon. and learned Friend and many others of those who took part in debate on Second Reading, a matter which took up one full sitting of the Committee on the Bill. It is this. We are moving over, for those of younger age, from criminal proceedings as such to care proceedings instead. The question is whether it is necessary, before we make such an order, to prove that the child has committed an offence and also is in need of care and control which he is unlikely to receive; or whether, as the Ingleby Committee recommended, that the commission of the offence in itself should be ground for bringing a child before the courts.
I appreciate that the Bill has changed in certain important matters since the Second Reading debate, and, of course, I appreciate that in Committee a major Amendment was made, or was undertaken to be made, and that the Government now propose to limit the inability to prosecute under the Clause to children up to the age of 12, rather than 14, and that any further rises above the age of 12 to the age of 14 will be done by affirmative Resolution of both Houses. So in the very short term we are now, on Clause 1, talking only about children of 10 or 11; but the House must take cognisance of the fact that the Bill envisages the raising of the age of criminal responsibility up to 14, and it will then be not only those of 10 or 11 but also those of 12 and 13 in respect of whom proceedings will be open to be taken under Clause 1. Therefore, although in the immediate future the importance of the Amendment will be of less significance than it was at the time we moved


it in Committee, it is still a matter of principle and still a matter of major importance.
I regret that, unfortunately, the hon. Member for Oldham, East (Mr. Mapp), who was here earlier, is now absent—I hope for only a short while. I regret it because he was the one hon. Member on the Government side who on Second Reading expressed great criticism of Clause 1, and he attempted to become a member of the Committee on the Bill so that he could express that criticism again in Committee. Unfortunately, for reasons which I need not go into now but which were gone into thoroughly, even if it was out of order to do so, in Committee, he was in the end excluded from the Committee and could not take part in that debate.
This is the Amendment which raises the question which has been described as that between the child who comes from the good home and the child who comes from the bad home. For reasons which I expressed in Committee, I do not necessarily believe that the conflict is best described by distinguishing between a good home and a bad home. I would prefer to say that there is a grave danger of distinction between a child from what appeared to be a satisfactory home and a child from what appeared to be an unsatisfactory home.
6.30 p.m.
It would be necessary under the Bill as it stands, before taking proceedings against a child, to show that the child has committed an offence and also that he is in need of care and control which he is unlikely to receive unless the court makes an order in respect of him. The Under-Secretary knows that this double burden of proof is something which is wholly opposed by the Magistrates Association and, I believe, by all those who are involved in the administration of justice. It is also, in my experience, substantially opposed by a great many members of the probation service and by the chief probation officers.
The basic ground of objection is that if the Bill is passed in its present form it will bring a sense of injustice into the administration of the criminal law as it affects young children. I do not propose to go over at length the arguments which have been adduced on two previous occasions, but I remind the House of the example that has been given to show the

danger that may arise. Two children from different homes who go out jointly and commit an offence are caught committing that offence. If one of them apparently comes from what might be described as a satisfactory home, he will not be brought before the court because it could not be proved that he was in need of care and discipline which could not be enforced within his home; whereas if the other child comes from what might be described as an unsatisfactory home, which might be unsatisfactory only because his father has been away and has not been able to exercise discipline, then that child will be brought before the court.
To bring one child before the court and not bring the other will produce a sense of injustice in the child brought before the court which will far outlive any sentence or form of treatment the court may impose upon him. It will also produce a sense of injustice in the parents, and it will make the child, at an age when he is sensitive to justice, quite possibly for the rest of his life, feel that there is injustice in the laws of this country.
This argument has been criticised by those who say that there is bound to be a distinction in the way in which different children are dealt with. This criticism, which has been made particularly by the child care officers, comes from a complete misunderstanding of the injustice which we believe will be caused by the Bill.
Of course it is true, and has always been accepted, that if several children appear before the court for the same offence they may not necessarily all be dealt with in the same way. The hon. Member for Watford (Mr. Raphael Tuck) nods; as a practising member of the legal profession he well knows that day after day in the courts persons, whether they be adults or juveniles, who have committed the same offence have been dealt with differently because their backgrounds and previous records are different and different sentences are appropriate. Everyone, whether it be an individual, or in the case of a child, a parent, accepts the rightness of that. What parents do not accept, and what they will not appreciate, is the rightness of a system whereby little Johnny, their child, is brought before the court but little Billy, the other person's child, does not come before the court. It is a wholly different type of injustice. There is a difference


between treating children differently and one child being brought before the court and the other not.
It is because we feel that this requirement to prove the offence and then to go on to prove something further will lead to this distinction in bringing children before the court and to the danger of injustice that we have attempted on many occasions to remedy it.
This is what the Ingleby Committee recommended. That Committee sat between 1956 and 1960. It was a highly skilled committee and it considered the whole matter of dealing with children through the courts. The committee recommended to a large degree what the Government have here done. It recommended doing away with criminal prosecutions against younger children and, instead, bringing care and control proceedings; but the committee made it abundantly clear, and it was a recommendation, that if that was done, the committal of an offence must in itself be evidence of a child not being properly in care and control, thereby avoiding the danger of the injustice inherent in the Bill. There will be the feeling that one child has managed to get away with it whereas another child is punished. I know the Under-Secretary hates the word "punishment" when dealing with children; he prefers to talk about means of treatment, or that horrible phrase "method of disposal by the courts".
Second, the requirement to prove both guilt of the offence and that the child is in need of care and control which he will not otherwise receive will inevitably lead to the stigmatisation of the parents in front of the child. Evidence will have to be called in court in front of the child that the parent is not an adequate parent. What more stigmatism, what more danger, could there be in bringing before a child the fact that his parent has failed him and is to a large extent responsible?

Mr. Peter Mahon: Would not the hon. Gentleman consider that a parent who is so reprehensible as to neglect his child so that the child has the misfortune to indulge in wrongdoing should be castigated even before his own child?

Mr. Carlisle: In answer to the hon. Gentleman, I do not think that parents wherever possible should be castigated before their own children, because I do not believe that this can ever do good to the parent-child relationship. Of course, there may be cases of appalling neglect. I am referring not to those but to cases where it is necessary to prove that there is lack of care and control in the home. The parent may not be morally reprehensible; it may be that, because of the father's occupation, he is called away from home and discipline has fallen down. It may be that the parents do not exercise the adequate care and control that they should. This does not mean that a child cannot be brought before the court unless there is reprehensible moral conduct by the parents, and, even if it did, I still would not like to see castigation in front of the child.
In Committee I pointed out that difficulty might arise if one part of the process were proved but not the other. I referred, in other words, to the case of the child who had been brought before the court on the belief of the local authority that there were grounds for making an order but after evidence had been called to the effect that the child was in need of care and control the magistrates said that they were not satisfied with that claim. In those circumstances the child, who might be 11 or 12 years old, would hear that he had been found guilty of an offence but that, for various reasons which he might not understand, the court was unable to do anything about him. He would get the impression that although he has committed, and had been told by the court that he had committed, a wrong, he was able to get away with it.
There are, therefore, three objections to the Government proposal as drafted which would all be met by the acceptance of the Opposition Amendment. The major point which causes concern to all those concerned with the administration of justice, including the hon. Member for Oldham, East, is the possibility of injustice being bred between children.

Mr. Raphael Tuck: It is with considerable regret that I intervene to make my position clear, for I have certain remarks to make about the new


Clause and I trust that the Under-Secretary will carefully heed the remarks of the hon. Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle).
Not only a child but any citizen should be brought before the court for an offence alone and not for an offence coupled with the fact that he is in need of care and control. As the hon. Member for Runcorn said, the fact that a youngster is in need of care and control can be dealt with by the court at a later stage. That should not be the deciding factor when considering whether or not to bring somebody before the court, and I fear that, if it is, a sense of unfairness and differentiation will be created in the minds of youngsters in respect of perhaps the same offence.
The deciding factor in bringing somebody before the court should not be a good or had home. If two juveniles are jointly charged with the same offence and one is in need of care and control while the other is not, the child from the good home will go home with no action having been taken against him while the child from the bad home will have had action taken against him, and the sense of grievance on the part of that child and his parents cannot be over-emphasised. These double criteria applying to joint offenders are bound to create an undesirable state of affairs. The temptation to yield to corruption might be great, and this must be borne in mind.
If this matter is taken to a Division, I fear that I shall not be able to vote for the Government. In informing my hon. Friend that I shall abstain, I urge him to remember that magistrates, who have great experience of these matters, can, having considered the offence, then consider whether a juvenile is in need of care and control. Care and control should not be the deciding factor. The deciding factor should be the offence.

6.45 p.m.

Mr. Miscampbell: For a number of hon. Members this is the third time that we have debated this subject. For that reason I intend to be brief, although I feel it important that my views should be stated for the third time.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) pointed out, we recognise that a very different point now arises in view of the indication which

was given in Committee by the Under-Secretary on this matter. We know that the Government regard the age of 12 as being an age at which to strike a balance, moving to 14 as and when facilities are available. Nevertheless, we know that it is the intention to move to 14 as quickly as possible. In addition, we must consider the Seebohm recommendation that 15 would be the right age, with 16 as a possibility later. I suspect that when we have got to 14 it will not be long before there is agitation to move to 15 and then 16. Certainly we shall arrive at the age of 14 as quickly as possible.
We are, therefore, dealing with a group of young persons aged 12 to 14 who are, unfortunately, capable of committing serious offences. One need only visit a magistrates' court in any part of the country to see that this is so. This is agreed among all those with experience of this subject, including most of the probation officers with whom I have talked, as well as those who practice in the courts.
It is a pity that, as a result of the Clause, we shall lose the principle of certainty in the criminal law. It is a pity that the distinction between right and wrong is not being firmly held, so that when a person commits a criminal offence—I accept that he may be very young—he must be brought before the court and be dealt with.
I agree with what has been said about the Clause giving rise to a feeling of injustice. This feeling is likely to arise largely because the decision whether there is need for care and control will be an administrative one. It will not be left entirely to the local authority, which must prove the matter before the court. There will be reports from a number of officers, and the family and its background will be investigated. This will, therefore, be largely an administrative decision, and I fear that we are not imposing it in the realm of the law and the court. Because investigating officers must consider the family's circumstances, injustice is bound to be felt and there will be a feeling of unfairness between different young persons.
For these reasons I question whether the advantage, which we acknowledge, of keeping people away from the court


will, in the present climate of opinion—the feeling that we must do something about offences at all levels—outweigh the clear disadvantages which will result from the Government proposal.

Mr. Charles Mapp: The form of words which we are considering has always troubled me, and I fear that it will trouble the courts in future. I say that having had some years' experience of sitting in courts. It is being said, in effect, that nine out of 10 youngsters will, having gone through the machinery of scrutiny and study, not appear before the courts whereas in the past they would have appeared. This means that we are dealing with the very difficult type of case that has always troubled the bench.
We are suggesting that if a child or young person aged up to 17—it is the young person aspect that particularly worries me—is guilty or is likely to be guilty of one of five offences and is unlikely to receive proper care and control from his parents, certain things should happen. I wonder how many magistrates sitting in juvenile courts over a period of time feel sure in their minds when deciding whether children appearing before them have had the kind of parental control which those of us in this Chamber would exercise. There is often a split form of control, where the father is absent from his duties and responsibilities and the mother tries desperately hard to put her child on the right road but lacks leadership. That is bad enough in ordinary cases, but we are concerned now with the more difficult ones.
Unless magistrates know their districts extremely well, how can they say whether a home is the right sort of background for a boy or girl appearing before them? They can pay the closest attention to the reports that they receive, but there must always be an area of doubt in their minds about whether there is an absence of care or control.
To make matters worse, when there is a series of boys and girls appearing before a magistrate having acted together in an offence, one of the difficulties of the magistrate is that, having found the leader of the escapade, he must then make sure that justice appears to be done in his final decision. What happens then

if the boy comes from what is called a good home, as distinct from a home where there is an absence of parental leadership?
As matters now stand, the magistrate will be faced with a difficult decision. He will try to deal with such cases in the light of the law and in the light of the humanities of the world in which we live. There will be occasions when magistrates will feel that the proposed words make the chances of recovery of a boy or girl to society much more difficult than would otherwise be the case. Because of that, once a juvenile court has satisfied itself that the boy or girl appearing before it is guilty of one of four or five offences and is in need of care and control, I feel that certain events should follow. What do magistrates do with a boy from a good home who has apparently had all the parental care and control possible but who is completely out of hand? Do they necessarily have to find some other treatment? What about the cases which one meets frequently where a couple of boys from good homes go to a football match and join up with two or three hooligans and, in the excitement, behave just as badly as those hooligans? Are the magistrates to discriminate between them?
These words will hamper magistrates, and I feel that this is not the kind of Clause to which I can subscribe. When I say that, I reiterate what I said on Second Reading, and my view arises from my experience of dealing with this kind of case in the courts.
When children and young persons are involved in offences, it is vital that magistrates, armed with the law and legislative powers, should still have a measure of discretion. In the long run, they should never take refuge in what the law allows. In my experience, magistrates always try to find the answer and then see whether the law lets them take that course. Magistrates want first to ask themselves, "What is the answer to the problem which is before us as magistrates?" and then, "Will the law permit us to do it?" Having decided that the law permits them to do it, they act with humanity.
I think that this wording will be found to hamper magistrates, and it would be advisable to withdraw it. I shall not vote on this matter for reasons that I have


explained to my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State. I am in fact "paired" today. However, I feel that it is right to express my view that, as they stand, the proposed words would be better deleted from the Clause.

Mr. Goodhart: The hon. Member for Oldham, East (Mr. Mapp) speaks with forthrightness and a great authority on this subject. He and my hon. Friend the Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) both assume that the reports which will be received from children's officers on children brought before courts will be full and thorough. However, I wonder whether that will be the case in the future, in view of the increased case load which is to be put on the children's department by the provisions of this Bill.
Some years ago a research worker in Greater London made a study of the amount of time that the average children's department could give to problem families in its area. The answer was 27 minutes a week. I have made a study of what the children's department of the Greater London Borough of Bromley can do in one week. The department has a staff of 16 children's officers, of whom 12 are trained. In a recent week, it had to cope with 19 cases of after-care from approved schools, with 157 children supervised under care and protection regulations, with 43 children pending adoption, with 33 inquiries in connection with the adoption agency, with 34 children supervised fir other authorities, with giving advice and guidance under the Children and Young Persons Act, 1963, to no fewer than 471 families, and with supervising eight children under court orders. That is the sort of work load carried by a children's department of 16, and it is reckoned that in order to cope with the increased pressure of work stemming from the proposed legislation, the number of children's officers will have to double.
In Committee, the Under-Secretary of State gave us some figures of the increased flow from the training school. I appreciate that the number is increasing, that it will double next year and substantially increase the year after that. But, with the additional work which the Bill will impose, children's officers will not have sufficient time to give the detailed amount of investigation necessary if magistrates are to have adequate material on which

to work. It is likely that young girls coming from university, with a sociology degree perhaps, will be flung willy-nilly into trying to unravel the most difficult complex family situations. Inevitably, they will be influenced by the material circumstances of the home and the superficial appearance of the relationship between the child and his parents, and they will not have the experience or time to probe deeply into these cases.
7.0 p.m.
One other problem worries me. The old idea that delinquency stems from bad home conditions is breaking down under the impact of drugs. Just as the introduction of the motor car brought large sections of the middle class who in the past would never have been likely to come into conflict with the police, directly into conflict with the law on a number of occasions, so the spread of drugs in the juvenile world will bring to the attention of the police a lot of children who would not otherwise come to their notice.
Recently, I went to the United States of America and visited my old school—one of the best in the United States. I was appalled to find that a drug ring had been uncovered there two terms ago with children not only using drugs but selling drugs to their fellow pupils. The daughter of a friend of mine asked not to go back to her school—again one of the best schools in that part of America—

Mr. Speaker: Order. I hesitate to interrupt, but we are getting a little wide of the Amendment, which seeks to do a specific job.

Mr. Goodhart: I am seeking to show that in all these cases the children using the drugs came from families where there could be no doubt that the parents, in the normal course of events, were well capable of providing good care and discipline over their children.
With this new circumstance of drugs in America—which I fear will happen here—I am coming lower down the age scale with children of 12 and 13 becoming habitual drug users. It may happen that parents, well capable in the normal course of events of providing for their children, will have within their home children who have become delinquents in this area. So we shall find that the old classification, whether a home can provide


adequate treatment, will go by the board, and I do not think that the children's officers that we shall get in future will be able to unravel this problem.
Therefore, I hope—but I do not expect—that the Government will give ground on the Amendment. I know that the Government wish to keep children out of court as much as possible, but here we have a clash with the higher interest of keeping children not only out of court but out of trouble.

Mr. Arthur Davidson: I agree with some of the arguments which have been advanced against the Clause. As has been said by the hon. Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) and others who have spoken, this is the third time that we have discussed the pros and cons of the Clause.
I agree that there is likely to be a sense of resentment by the parents of a child who is brought before the court, as there will indeed be a sense of relief felt by the parent whose child is not brought before the court. That is a strong argument against the Clause. It would be an even stronger argument if there was no sense of resentment already among parents and, indeed, among those who have ever appeared before a court in this country. But there is this sense of resentment. There is always a sense of resentment and of injustice when apparently two different sentences are meted out for what appears to be the same crime. There is a sense of resentment and of injustice about the disparity of sentences between one court and another for what appears to be the same crime.
I cannot see why the sense of resentment brought about by the Clause will be any greater than the sense of resentment which already exists among the parents of children appearing before the courts. For my part, I hope that my hon. Friend will stand firm on the Clause. The opponents of the Clause appear to be saying that, just because there is or may be a sense of resentment or injustice felt in one quarter, we must willy-nilly bring before the court a child who could reasonably be kept out of the court and whose name could reasonably have been kept out of any sort of criminal record. This seems to be an argument in favour of

the equality of injustice rather than the equality of justice.

Mr. Raphael Tuck: My hon. Friend mentioned the child who could reasonably be kept out of court who comes from a good home. Suppose that child has committed larceny, has beaten up another little child and has run amok Because he comes from a good home, would my hon. Friend say that he could reasonably be kept out of court?

Mr. Davidson: Of course not. I do not think that is a very pertinent intervention. If the child is as bad as my hon. Friend says, I should hope that he would be brought before the court and punished heavily, as he would deserve, if the necessary care and control was not there, as no doubt it was not in the case postulated by my hon. Friend. I therefore hope that, despite the arguments which have been advanced against this provision, the Government will stick to their guns.

Sir Eric Errington: I am greatly attracted by the technical point of view. I sit as a magistrate. I see difficulty arising from the effect of the Clause as it stands, unless the Amendment is accepted. It involves, first, the difficulty of proving that the person
is in need of care or control which he is unlikely to receive unless the court makes an order'.
My hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Mr. Goodhart) spoke of the considerable amount of work which inquiries along this line will entail.
It involves, second, the fact that there are two offences rolled into one. The effect might well be that, if the bench did not accept that the evidence was sufficient to prove that he was
in need of care or control which he is unlikely to receive
the case might fall, because there would then be no second half to the facts coming before the court. If this is so, the silly position arises where somebody may think that it will be possible to prove to a court the question of the exercise of care and control by the parents. If he fails to do so, the case falls.

Mr. Edwin Brooks: I want first to refer to the intervention made by my hon. Friend the Member for Watford (Mr. Raphael Tuck) in the speech of


my hon. Friend the Member for Accrington (Mr. Arthur Davidson). As I heard my hon. Friend the Member for Accrington, he said that in a case where the offence was manifestly a serious one—I now quote him—"no doubt the care and control will not be there". If I correctly understand the wording of the Clause, there is no supposition that these two things will so automatically be related.
This is one of the aspects of the Clause on which for some time I have had great anxieties. For example, I have never quite understood, although no doubt the members of the Committee, who are far more learned than I, satisfied themselves of the logic of this, why homicide should be excluded. If it is argued that homicide is a particularly serious offence—none of us will dispute that—in these days of votes at 18 and puberty at 12 or 13 one can envisage other offences of considerable gravity being committed by comparatively youthful children.

Mr. Speaker: Order. We are not amending that part of the Clause.

Mr. Brooks: With respect, we are discussing the basic criterion which will enable us to decide, irrespective of the nature of the offence, whether the child concerned shall be brought to court. My point is that it is possible for a child to have committed very serious offences, but because of the disqualification involved in this wording that child might never see the inside of a court.
What my hon. Friend the Member for Accrington said—no doubt on reflection he will wish to qualify his remarks—has gone to the heart of our anxieties. Whether we like it or not, those who are assessing whether the child needs care or control will take into account not only the home and environmental circumstances generally but also the nature of the offence. I strongly suspect that the commission of a severe offence will be taken as prima facie evidence that the child is beyond the care and control of his parents.

Mr. Arthur Davidson: I was replying to a specific intervention on a mythical and hypothetical case. I accept that in certain circumstances a child who has committed a reasonably serious offence might well not be brought before a court.

7.15 p.m.

Mr. Brooks: I am not quite sure that I am much comforted by the fact that my hon. Friend was apparently referring to an allegedly mythical and hypothetical situation. The sorts of situation which were envisaged by my hon. Friend the Member for Watford are the very situations which the courts and the girls with social science degrees will have to investigate in some detail.
If this matter goes to a Division, I shall be unable to support this form of words. I have at least a qualification to speak on this subject which was apparently used by those who justified their interventions on Second Reading. I have five children. My wife is a juvenile court magistrate. I have for some time been concerned about this problem of children appearing before any court unnecessarily. Although the endeavour to prevent this is a very laudible objective, I am not sure that it is necessarily better as an alternative to have a queue of social workers turning up at the door of the home where the child lives.
I have a vision at times of children who are involved in some way with the arm of the law being subsequently pestered, and their parents being pestered, for long months by people trying to ascertain whether the parents are competent to act as parents. It will be small consolation to the child to know that perhaps at the end of the day he will not appear in court if in the meantime his parents have to suffer the possible humiliation of having their credentials investigated in depth.
Apart from these practical difficulties, I do not believe that the fundamental point of principle which arises has been satisfactorily answered in the numerous exchanges which have occurred. It has been asserted that resentment and a sense of injustice are caused when different courts mete out different punishments for apparently the same offences. We all know that at the moment there is ample pretext for this sense of injustice in the administration of justice. However, it is not sound to argue that this in some way favours perpetuating and institutionalising a new type of injustice and one built into the very machinery of the legal process.
We are inevitably discussing the question whether a child shall be brought


before a court at all, not how he shall be subsequently dealt with by the judicial process. It is thoroughly misguided to say that a child, because of what must necessarily be a subjective judgment about the care or control which might be exercised upon him in the future, shall not be brought before a court at all for an offence, no matter how serious.
The hon. Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) rightly referred to the difficulties which might arise if, after a child had been brought before a court and found guilty, it was then found that he should not have been brought before the court in the first place because further examination disclosed that he was in any case subject to proper care and control. Such ambiguities and possible differences of opinion by different institutional bodies are intrinsic to this form of words.
My view is that there will be difficulties here in defining what we mean, not only because of the problem which is usually touched upon of parental control, but because, clearly, this is not the end of the matter. The wording is:
that he is in need of care or control which he is unlikely to receive unless the court makes an order …".
This should obviously include the care and control which he receives at school. It should, clearly, involve the care or control which it is possible for his parents to exercise in a given social environment.
If it is know that the parents are living in a poor and squalid area of the town in which there are hordes of drug addicts in the all-night café bars, I should have thought that with the best will in the world those parents, no matter how devoted they were to the child, would find it difficult to exercise due care and control. It might then properly be said, "We should take this child away from that environment because his parents are willy-nilly unable to exercise care and control. This is not a reflection upon them; things are too much for them to cope with."
But will not the general public interpret the situation as one where the parents are defined as incapable of exercising care or control because of their own inadequacies? I was speaking about this to my local children's officer during the weekend. I am reminded that the views of the associations are not necessarily views

which are shared by all hon. Members, but she herself drew attention to the very serious point that we shall have women or men, with or without degrees, having to make judgments about the competence of parents on what will inevitably be subjective criteria. To give local government executive officers this sort of power in circumstances where the decision will depend upon whether the child goes to court at all is a most sombre blurring of the distinction between the Executive and the judiciary.
I am sorry that I have spoken for so long, but I hope my hon. Friend realises that it is not only those who served on the Committee who feel great anxieties about this part of what in general I regard as a Bill which is helpful and certainly of good intent.

Mr. Grieve: It is always difficult to intervene in a debate in which almost all that can and should be said on both sides has been said. But it is sometimes helpful if one makes one's point if only because one makes it in a slightly different way which may affect the judgment of those who are making up their minds about the point at issue.
I found myself in complete agreement with the sentiments expressed and the reasoning behind them of the hon. Member for Bebington (Mr. Brooks). The Clause at present erects into a condition precedent to the administration of justice something which is properly taken into account and should be taken into account when justice has been administered and the time has come to decide what shall be done with the person who is found to have committed an offence. It is no good saying that when a court has to decide between three or four people who have committed the same offence and disposes of them differently, the impression of injustice may be created. It may, but injustice has not been done, or at least the court has done its best to see that injustice has not been done. The court has taken into consideration all the mitigating circumstances, the background and the record of those concerned and has decided what is the appropriate treatment in each case. That is one thing.
I cannot believe that the Minister will now be able to tell us that there is a juvenile court in the country which, in deciding what is the right course to take


with a juvenile who is found to have committed an offence, does not now consider what kind of home he has and what are his needs in care and control. Of course, the courts takes those matters into consideration. They have been working admirably in that way for a long time. They should be permitted to continue in that way and to have regard to those important factors in deciding what the sentence shall be and what shall be done with any erring person, be he juvenile or adult. But to erect that into a condition precedent to the administration of justice, which is what this is doing, is to interfere with the intention of justice.
Instead of a person being brought before the court and dealt with by the court because he has committed an offence, extraneous factors have to be taken into consideration as a result of this Clause. I think that is wholly wrong. It is striking at the foundations of justice itself. For those reasons, I hope very much that the Minister will listen to what has been said and will accede to the Amendment.

Mr. Elystan Morgan: Although I cannot agree with the sentiments of hon. Members who have supported the Amendment, I have the greatest respect for them.
I think the first thing I should do is to seek to correct the misconceptions that might have arisen from the speech of the hon. Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) who suggested that there appears to be a very substantial consensus of opinion against the provisions of Clause 1. It is only proper in the circumstances that I should point out that these bodies have expressed their support of Clause 1: the Association of Municipal Corporations, the County Councils Association, the Police Federation, children's officers and child care officers—with reluctance in their case, because they felt that they would like to make it even more difficult for this type of case with which we are dealing to be brought to court.
I should like to put to the House three main arguments in support of the contention that this Amendment should be rejected. The first turns on the principle of dealing with young offenders outside the courts, wherever that is possible. I am sure that nearly everyone in this House, whether or not he agrees

with all the provisions of the Bill, has expressed agreement with the aim of dealing with young offenders outside the courts whenever that is possible. Yet it is the very words which this Amendment would delete which would achieve this aim in the cases covered by Clause 1. The deletion of these words would be inconsistent with the main principie of Part I of the Bill. It is inconsistent to profess a belief in the object which these words would achieve and yet to propose their omission, without suggesting any alternative whatsoever.
Secondly, the question of the need for guidance. The words proposed to be deleted provide the necessary guidance to the police and local authorities in deciding whether a child should be brought before a juvenile court. All they said is this: If court proceedings are necessary because the child's situation or behaviour is such that it cannot be dealt with adequately without a court order, then court proceedings may be taken and an order may be made. If, on the other hand, the situation could be dealt with adequately without an order, then there is no need for court proceedings at all. If the child is, nevertheless, taken to court, no order should be made. That is all that these words say. It is difficult to understand why so many people are worried about a provision which is no more than a declaration of simple common sense.

Mr. Raphael Tuck: Does it not boil down to this? It is not very nice to say, but if a child is brought before the court and, because his father has enough money, he comes from a good home, he will not be proceeded against. But if he is brought before the court and, because his father does not have so much money, he does not come from such a good home, he will be proceeded against. It is a question of money.

7.30 p.m.

Mr. Morgan: No, Sir. I think that is a very narrow and wholly distorted view of the situation.
By the third argument it is alleged to be unfair that some children should be taken to court for an offence while others involved in the same or similar offence should not. Yet those who argue this case agree that it is right and proper for courts to distinguish in the treatment of


children after a finding according to the circumstances and the background of each child. Everyone agrees that there must be discrimination at some point. If it is also agreed, as seems to be the case, that not all children in trouble should be taken to court, it follows automatically that someone other than a court must make the choice of who should go to a court and who should not. This is discrimination in the favourable sense of the word.
Those who disagree with such pre-court discrimination are simply saying that they do not agree with Part I of the Bill and that all children without exception should be dealt with by the courts. That is not a tenable proposition. Over one-third of all indictable and non-indictable offences by children are dealt with by caution, not to mention the many offences dealt with informally by parents and others which do not appear in the statistics. There is no question of it being sensible or practicable to take all those children to court.
I shall deal with the good homes and the bad homes. This perhaps the most important point of all. It should be remembered that the positive side of keeping children out of court is the encouragement of parental responsibility and the giving of more help to parents in doing their job. Those who suggest that subsection (2) of Clause 1 will mean that children from bad homes will be taken to court have totally mistaken its effect.
There is no reference to good or bad homes in the Bill. This provision will keep out of court many children who now are taken to court. Most of the children kept out of court will be children from unsatisfactory backgrounds. This is because under the present system children from poorer backgrounds are most likely to be taken to court.

Mr. Peter Mahon: Does my hon. Friend agree that the stigma of delinquency is just as great whether a child goes to court or not and whether he comes from a bad home or not? In trying to solve this problem we are endeavouring to bring about a set of circumstances where there will be less delinquency than at present.

Mr. Morgan: I could not disagree with my hon. Friend. Once an act has been

committed and once any other person is aware of the fact that the act has been committed, a stigma attaches to the person who committed the act. There could not be two views about that.
This subsection seeks to reduce discrimination by offering more help and support to dealing with children out of court. I do not think hon. Members have paid sufficient attention to the one central fact that of 120,000 offences committed by children and young persons under the age of 17 every year—indictable and non-indictable—over 30,000 are dealt with by way of caution. The Magistrates' Association, in a very closely argued memorandum, has stated quite categorically its wish never to see a case taken to court unless it is necessary that that should be so. Everyone agrees with that, but how do we arrive at a standard of determination—by guesswork, by intuition, or by drawing up some set of criteria?
Everyone who thinks carefully about this question—police, magistrates and persons concerned with the welfare of children—has a rough criterion in this connection. The criterion is whether or not the child or young person will get the care and control he needs. The basic question is not the background of the child but the needs of the child. In considering the case we must consider why the child committed the offence and in that context his home background will be relevant. Again, in the context of the assistance and guidance he will get, his home background is relevant. Having decided what his needs are, we apply our minds to finding the best way in which we can help him.
By including these words in subsection (2), which the Amendment seeks to remove, we have done nothing more than to set out plainly the criterion which most reasonable men have in mind in deciding whether or not it is necessary for a child to be brought to court. Therefore I hope that this Amendment will be rejected.

Mr. Quintin Hogg: I wish I could persuade the Under-Secretary that he is wrong about this. I have been puzzling myself all this afternoon and when I read the reports of the Standing Committee as to why the Government should have made such a point of their


objection to the criticisms that have been offered.
I am not going to argue about what organisations have said or have not said—some are for this proposal and some against it—but I shall deal with the arguments presented to the House. Apart from one intervention, which I suppose was helpful to him, by his hon. Friend the Member for Preston, South (Mr. Peter Mahon) and the speech which was certainly intended to be helpful by the hon. Member for Accrington (Mr. Arthur Davidson), the Under-Secretary has had a thoroughly disagreeable reception in the House, because no one else has spoken a word in favour of the Government's view. On this occasion I side with the majority, not because it is a majority but because I think it right.
I realise that probably the Under-Secretary has considerable limits to his instructions such as Under-Secretarys have to stick to. I am not therefore intending this as a personal criticism when I say that he was speaking to a brief. The Home Secretary explained to me that he could not be present this afternoon. This rather engenders in my heart the hope that when the Under-Secretary reports to the Home Secretary he may be giving rather different advice to his colleague than he has given this afternoon to the House. I should like to put the matter in rather plainer language than he put it.
Of course, no one on either side is saying that children ought to be prosecuted every time they commit offences. There is common ground between both sides on this. But I do not at all agree with the Under-Secretary that the only criterion of whether a child should be prosecuted is whether a care and control order should be made. That seems a crude over simplification. If I were giving guidance to a police officer about what should govern him in starting a prosecution, I should say first the seriousness of the offence has a great deal to do with it, and secondly whether it is one of a series or an isolated incident, and thirdly the strength of the evidence if the matter is in dispute on which the prosecution is founding its case. Those are all matters which a wise police officer would take into account before taking proceedings. I agree that one of the factors would be the appropriateness of an order, but it

is not the only factor. I do not see why it should be elevated into the only factor by this Clause.
Let us see how it will work on the ground. I was tremendously struck by a document sent to my hon. Friend the Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) by the Clerk to the Warrington Justices. The Under-Secretary should consider this concrete case sent by the Clerk to the Warrington Justices to show that a similar situation to that which will arise under the Clause unamended can already arise under ordinary care and control proceedings. What he wrote strikes me as tremendously cogent. He said:
If you think my comments are exaggerated, let me give you an example of some care and protection proceedings which took place when I was in Gloucestershire, and there have been similar examples here in Warrington.
Some police cadets committed serious indecent assaults on some girls in the Gloucestershire area. A number of the cadets were under 17, and care and protection proceedings were taken. You have here an identical position to Section 1 of the new proposed Bill. They had been 'guilty' of a serious offence and on the face of it were unlikely to receive the necessary care or control unless the court made an appropriate order. All the cadets, however, came of good background"—
and this is where the Clerk agrees with the hon. Member for Watford (Mr. Raphael Tuck)—
and their parents simply said that (a) they did not know that it was happening, (b) they were giving, and had given, adequate instructions on matters concerning sex, (c) that they were previously of exemplary character, and (d) they would instruct them in the future. The High Court held that no order could be made by the justices because they were receiving proper care and guidance. Suppose that,"—
says the Clerk to the Justices as a comment—
in similar circumstances, under Section I of the new Bill an identical situation ensued. No order is made because the court is prohibited from making such an order because of good or reasonable home surroundings and, prima facie, adequate care or control. Then the boy goes out and, as I have said, commits another serious offence. Someone has then been injured, a situation which could and ought to have been avoided. One of the golden principles of criminal law is the protection of the public, a principle which may in certain circumstances only be followed after a second injury is caused.
Where the Under-Secretary is wrong about this is that he seems to think that by putting these words into the Bill, or keeping them in it, he is giving useful


guidance to police officers and local authorities so as to enable people to know when children should be brought to court or not. Now I disagree with him about that on principle as I have said because I think that he is elevating one factor out of others. But not only do I disagree with him about that, but he is wrong about what the Clause does. It does not give guidance; although it is true that it is introduced into the Bill by subsection (1) as guidance to the prosecuting authority, its use in this connection which we are discussing is not as guidance to prosecuting authorities before proceedings are brought but as a limitation on the powers of the court. It is precisely there that we fall foul of the hon. Gentleman.

Mr. Elystan Morgan: Would not the right hon. and learned Gentleman agree that up to now he has put the case as if the only possibility in the circumstances was a care and control order, and that in the case he mentioned there is the concurrent and eminently reasonable alternative of proceedings under new Clause 1 or the old Clause 5? There is no reason in the circumstances he described why those concerned should not be prosecuted, since they were over the age of 14.

Mr. Hogg: Of course, if they were of the appropriate age. But that begs the whole question. We are dealing with the commission of a serious offence by people of the appropriate age. It is true that the police cadets were of the wrong age to be affected by the Clause, but that case was given as an example of what can happen.
7.45 p.m.
The answer to the hon. Gentleman, therefore, is that the age here is irrelevant. One must suppose, in order to apply the Clause at all, that the offence is of an appropriate character committed by boys of the appropriate age. The basic vice of the Clause was well pointed out by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Solihull (Mr. Grieve), and it was expressly the ground upon which the Ingleby Committee came to the opposite conclusion. It said in paragraph 86 of its Report:
In cases coming within category (iii)"—
that is the case where an offence has been proved—
the parents' position would fall to be considered when the court came to decide the

method of treatment, if any, to be ordered; if the case were proved, the child would be found to be in need of protection or discipline', and subject to be dealt with, and the court would then have to satisfy itself that It was necessary to make an order to ensure that the child would receive the treatment that he needed.
In other words, the time at which the court should be asked to inquire whether some form of order is the appropriate method of dealing with it is not before it deals with a case, but after it has found the case proved.
I would point out to the Under-Secretary the extraordinary situation which would arise in practice if he insists on what seems to me to be an unreasonable position. It is elementary, whether one is dealing with a child or an adult, that if guilt is disputed the record cannot be taken into account until the order is made. Let us consider the case of a child of the appropriate age proceeded against under the Clause for a serious offence, the fact being that a previous series of offences of the same kind has been committed. Everybody in the House who has heard the debate will realise that to establish that the child was in need of some kind of order one would have to bring those previous offences into account before the magistrates, in order that the magistrates could deal with the case at all, because this would be the evidence that the child was in need of care and control. This means that in cases of disputed guilt the hon. Gentleman is undermining the fundamental principle of British justice that one cannot bring in previous offences where guilt is disclosed before conviction. In order to give the magistrates jurisdiction to deal with the case at all, they will have to be shown this.

Mr. Elystan Morgan: I would be grateful if the right hon. and learned Gentleman would direct his attention to Clause 3(1)(c). He will see there that the offence will not be assumed to have been committed. It says:
disregarding Section 4 of this Act he would if charged with the offence be entitled to be discharged under any rule of law relating to previous acquittal or conviction.

Mr. Hogg: That means that he can only plead autrefois acquit or autrefois convict. It does not mean anything in relation to the point which I have been making. The hon. Gentleman must face it. In order for the court to have jurisdiction to deal with a juvenile


of the appropriate age, it must be satisfied of two things: first, that the offence has been committed, and, second, that the child is not receiving the supervision it requires. That is what the Clause says.
If the only evidence which establishes the second point is a series of previous offences, it follows that as a matter of certainty the court will have to apprise itself of the previous series of offences so as to give it jurisdiction to deal with the case. The hon. Gentleman cannot ride away with a lot of Home Office briefs when he is dealing with an important point.

Mr. Elystan Morgan: In my impetuosity I quoted the wrong words, which are almost identical. I should have quoted the following words in Clause 3 (3) which describe the offence condition is proved
… disregarding section 4 of this Act, it would have found him guilty of the offence if the proceedings had been in pursuance of an information duly charging him with the offence…
In other words, every rule of evidence is exactly the same with regard to the finding of an offence as if it were in criminal proceedings.

Mr. Hogg: But see where that brings the hon. Gentleman. Now he says—and this makes it even less acceptable, at any rate to me—that in cases where a serious offence is committed and in which the evidence of want of proper supervision consists in a previous series of convictions, the court cannot take account and, therefore, must discharge the person altogether because it will not have jurisdiction to deal with it under Clause 1. That is a much more harmful horn of the dilemma for the hon. Gentleman to impale himself upon but if he chooses to sit upon that horn, then let it enter deeply into his soul.
We must face the fact that, although no one wants children to be prosecuted in every case of an offence they have committed, and although it be true that, before an order is made, the court should satisfy itself that the order is appropriate, if necessary by looking at the record, the moment to do that is after it has found guilt or innocence on the question of whether the offence is proved, and the

fallacy of introducing this idiotic system, which is designed as a limitation upon the jurisdiction of the court under the plea that it is really only intended under subsection (1) as a guidance to police oflicers and local authorities as to when to prosecute, shows the extraordinary confusion of thought into which the Home Office and its advisers have fallen.

The result of this will be a feeling of injustice. I am unimpressed by the argument of the hon. Member for Accrington that in some cases people feel injustice as it is. Why that should be a reason for adding to the feeling of injustice he never explained. But I will explain to him the difference. It is that in the case he supposed, when two people are given different sentences because their cases are different, the feeling of injustice is thoroughly undeserved and unreasonable. In this case, where one child who happens to have an unfortunate family background is brought to court while another, who may have been the instigator, cannot be brought to court at all, the feeling of injustice is well founded and would perhaps receive complete support, if it were not for the Home Office, from almost every hon. Member.

I do not want to score off the Under-Secretary of State, although he provokes me into indiscretion, perhaps, by intervening, although I am glad that he does so. We are not trying to make him feel that he has made a mistake about this. I merely beg him to take back this debate to the Home Office and use his power and influence upon his colleagues and civil servants to say, "We had a bad debate about this. Let us look at it again." If they beat us in the Division which we must now have, the Government should put forward an Amendment in another place in the sense that perhaps their critics on this issue are right. If they do so, I shall not taunt the hon. Gentleman—not more than is reasonable, at any rate, and certainly without rancour—with having changed his mind and having shown wisdom in abandoning a thoroughly unworthy cause.

Question put, That the Amendment be made:—

The House divided: Ayes 125, Noes 182.

Division No. 234.]
AYES
[7.54 p.m.


Astor, John
Bell, Ronald
Berry, Hn. Anthony


Atkins, Humphrey (M't'n &amp; M'd'n)
Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay)
Biffen, John


Balniel, Lord
Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Glos. &amp; Fhm)
Biggs-Davison, John




Black, Sir Cyril
Hill, J. E. B.
Pounder, Rafton


Boardman, Tom (Leicester, S. W.)
Hogg, Rt. Hn. Quintin
Prior, J. M. L.


Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hn. John
Holland, Philip
Ramsden, Rt. Hn. James


Boyle, Rt. Hn. Sir Edward
Hordern, Peter
Rees-Davies, W. R.


Brinton, Sir Tatton
Hornby, Richard
Renton, Rt. Hn. Sir David


Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)
Howell, David (Guildford)
Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon


Buck, Antony (Colchester)
Hunt, John
Rodgers, Sir John (Sevenoaks)


Bullus, Sir Eric
Iremonger, T. L.
Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey)


Burden, F. A.
Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)
Russell, Sir Ronald


Campbell, B. (Oldham, W.)
Jenkin, Patrick (Woodford)
Scott, Nicholas


Campbell, Gordon (Moray &amp; Nairn)
Jopling, Michael
Sharples, Richard


Carlisle, Mark
Joseph, Rt. Hn. Sir Keith
Shaw, Michael (Sc'b'gh &amp; Whitby)


Clark, Henry
King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)
Silvester, Frederick


Clegg, Walter
Knight, Mrs. Jill
Sinclair, Sir George


Costain, A. P.
Lane, David
Smith, John (London &amp; W'minster)


Cunningham, Sir Knox
Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry
Speed, Keith


Dance, James
Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)
Stainton, Keith


Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F. (Ashford)
Longden, Gilbert
Tapsell, Peter


Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)
Lubbock, Eric
Taylor, Edward M. (G'gow, Cathcart)


Elliot, R. W. (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, N.)
McAdden, Sir Stephen
Taylor, Frank (Moss Side)


Errington, Sir Eric
MacArthur, Ian
Temple, John M.


Eyre, Reginald
Mackenzie, Alasdair (Ross &amp; Crom'ty)
Thatcher, Mrs. Margaret


Fortescue, Tim
McNair-Wilson, Michael
Turton, Rt. Hn. R. H.


Glover, Sir Douglas
McNair-Wilson, Patrick (New Forest)
Vaughan-Morgan, Rt. Hn. Sir John


Godber, Rt. Hn. J. B.
Marten, Neil
Vickers, Dame Joan


Gower, Raymond
Maude, Angus
Wainwright, Richard (Colne Valley)


Grant, Anthony
Mawby, Ray
Walker, Peter (Worcester)


Grant-Ferris, R.
Miscampbell, Norman
Walters, Dennis


Gresham Cooke, R.
Montgomery, Fergus
Ward, Dame Irene


Grieve, Percy
More, Jasper
Weatherill, Bernard


Hall, John (Wycombe)
Morgan, Geraint (Denbigh)
Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William


Hamilton, Lord (Fermanagh)
Morrison, Charles (Devizes)
Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)


Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)
Munro-Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh
Winstanley, Dr. M. P.


Harrison, Brian (Maldon)
Murton, Oscar
Wood, Rt. Hn. Richard


Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)
Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael
Woodnutt, Mark


Harvey, Sir Arthur Vere
Onslow, Cranley
Worsley, Marcus


Hastings, Stephen
Page, Graham (Crosby)



Heald, Rt. Hn. Sir Lionel
Page, John (Harrow, W.)
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Heath, Rt. Hn. Edward
Percival, Ian
Mr. Timothy Kitson and


Hiley, Joseph
Pink, R. Bonner
Mr. Hector Monro.




NOES


Abse, Leo
Dell, Edmund
Hughes, Roy (Newport)


Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)
Dempsey, James
Hunter, Adam


Alldritt, Walter
Diamond, Rt. Hn. John
Hynd, John


Anderson, Donald
Dickens, James
Irvine, Sir Arthur (Edge Hill)


Archer, Peter
Dobson, Ray
Jackson, Peter M. (High Peak)


Armstrong, Ernest
Doig, Peter
Johnson, James (K'ston-on-Hull, W.)


Ashton, Joe (Bassetlaw)
Dunnett, Jack
Jones, Rt. Hn. Sir Elwyn (W. Ham, S.)


Atkins, Ronald (Preston, N.)
Dunwoody, Dr. John (F'th &amp; C'b'e)
Jones, T. Alec (Rhondda, West)


Atkinson, Norman (Tottenham)
Eadie, Alex
Kelley, Richard


Bacon, Rt. Hn. Alice
Edwards, William (Merioneth)
Kenyon, Clifford


Bagier, Gordon A. T.
Ellis, John
Lawson, George


Barnett, Joel
English, Michael
Leadbitter, Ted


Bidwell, Sydney
Ennals, David
Lipton, Marcus


Binns, John
Ensor, David
Loughlin, Charles


Blackburn, F.
Evans, Fred (Caerphilly)
Luard, Evan


Booth, Albert
Evans, Ioan L. (Birm'h'm, Yardley)
Lyon, Alexander W. (York)


Bradley, Tom
Fernyhough, E.
Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)


Bray, Dr. Jeremy
Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)
Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson


Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.
Fowler, Gerry
McBride, Neil


Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan)
Fraser, John (Norwood)
McCann, John


Brown, Bob (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, W.)
Freeson, Reginald
MacDermot, Niall


Brown, R. W. (Shoreditch &amp; F'bury)
Garrett, W. E.
McGuire, Michael


Buchan, Norman
Ginsburg, David
Mackenzie, Gregor (Rutherglen)



Gregory, Arnold
Maclennan, Robert


Buchanan, Richard (G'gow, Sp'burn)
Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)
McNamara, J. Kevin


Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C)
Griffiths, Eddie (Brightside)
Mahon, Peter (Preston, S.)


Callaghan, Rt. Hn. James
Griffiths, Rt. Hn. James (Llanelly)
Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)


Carmichael, Neil
Hamilton, James (Bothwell)
Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.)


Carter-Jones, Lewis
Hamilton, William (Fife, W.)
Manuel, Archie


Coe, Denis
Hamling, William
Marks, Kenneth


Coleman, Donald
Harper, Joseph
Maxwell, Robert


Concannon, J. D.
Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)
Mellish, Rt. Hn. Robert


Conlan, Bernard
Haseldine, Norman
Mendelson, John


Crawshaw, Richard
Hazell, Bert
Millan, Bruce


Crossman, Rt. Hn. Richard
Heffer, Eric S.
Milne, Edward (Blyth)


Dalyell, Tam
Herbison, Rt. Hn. Margaret
Mitchell, R. C. (S'th'pton, Test)


Davidson, Arthur (Accrington)
Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas
Molloy, William


Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)
Howell, Denis (Small Heath)
Morgan, Elystan (Cardiganshire)


Davies, Dr. Ernest (Stretford)
Howie, W.
Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)


Davies, Ifor (Gower)
Hoy, James
Morris, Charles Rt. (Openshaw)


Delargy, Hugh
Huckfield, Leslie
Moyle, Roland







Neal, Harold
Probert, Arthur
Thomas, Rt. Hn. George


Newens, Stan
Rankin, John
Thomson, Rt. Hn. George


Ogden, Eric
Rees, Merlyn
Tinn, James


Oram, Albert E.
Roberts, Gwilym (Bedfordshire, S.)
Varley, Eric G.


Orbach, Maurice
Rodgers, William (Stockton)
Wainwright, Edwin (Dearne Valley)


Orme, Stanley
Roebuck, Roy
Walker, Harold (Doncaster)


Oswald, Thomas
Ross, Rt. Hn. William
Wallace, George


Owen, Will (Morpeth)
Rowlands, E.
Watkins, David (Consett)


Paget, R. T.
Shaw, Arnold (Ilford, S.)
Watkins, Tudor (Brecon &amp; Radnor)


Palmer, Arthur
Sheldon, Robert
Whitaker, Ben


Pannell, Rt. Hon. Charles
Shore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney)
Whitlock, William


Parker, John (Dagenham)
Short, Rt. Hn. Edward (N'c'tle-u-Tyne)
Wilkins, W. A.


Parkyn, Brian (Bedford)
Short, Mrs. Renée (W'hampton, N. E.)
Williams, Alan Lee (Hornchurch)


Pavitt, Laurence
Silkin, Rt. Hn. John (Deptford)
Williams, W. T. (Warrington)


Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred
Silverman, Julius
Wilson, Rt. Hn. Harold (Huyton)


Pentland, Norman
Slater, Joseph
Wilson, William (Coventry, S.)


Perry, George H. (Nottingham, S.)
Small, William
Woof, Robert


Prentice, Rt. Hn. R. E.
Snow, Julian



Price, Christopher (Perry Barr)
Spriggs, Leslie
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Price, Thomas (Westhoughton)
Steele, Thomas (Dunbartonshire, W.)
Mr. Alan Fitch and


Price, William (Rugby)
Taverne, Dick
Mr. Ernest G. Perry.

Mr. Elystan Morgan: I beg to move Amendment No. 4, in page 2, line 17, leave out from beginning to end of line 20.
I take it, Mr. Deputy Speaker, that it would be convenient also to discuss Amendment No. 19, in Clause 3, page 6, line 12, at end insert:
(6) Where in any care proceedings the court finds the offence condition satisfied with respect to the relevant infant and he is a young person, the court may if it thinks fit and he consents, instead of making such an order as is mentioned in section 1(3) of this Act, order him to enter into a recognisance for an amount not exceeding twenty-five pounds and for a period not exceeding one year to keep the peace or to be of good behaviour; and such an order shall be deemed to be an order under section 1 of this Act but no appeal to quarter sessions may be brought against an order under this subsection.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Harry Gourlay): That is agreed.

Mr. Morgan: These Amendments replace an Amendment made in Standing Committee added to the orders which a court may make in care proceedings an order requiring a young person to enter into a recognisance to be of good behaviour and to keep the peace. The hon. Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) accepted that power to make such an order should be limited to cases when the offence condition in Clause 1(2)(e) had been proved and that one year would be the appropriate maximum period for such a binding over. The Amendments provide accordingly.

Mr. Carlisle: I am grateful to the Under-Secretary for this re-drafting. This is the Amendment which in a way we kindly got from the Home Secretary almost to celebrate his birthday. On that occasion he was magnanimous.
As the Government have accepted this Amendment, however, why have they tucked it away in Clause 3? This is a matter of some importance. In Clause 1 it was clearly laid down as one of the orders which a court could make. I appreciate the argument about the offence condition, but now it is to be in Clause 3 and the chances are that when a court considers what orders it can make, it will look at Clause 1 but never think of looking at Clause 3(5). It would be better to leave the change in Clause 1, accepting that certain words have to be changed, than to tuck it away in Clause 3.
I notice that in future a person will be able to be bound over only with his consent. I am not sure what the present position is. I suppose that with a certain offence committed by certain ladies who from time to time spend short periods in prison there undoubtedly has to be consent. However, despite what the Bill says, under the Children and Young Persons Act, 1933, a parent does not have to consent to be bound over. I should have thought that it would be more useful to bind over the person who was recalcitrant rather than only the person who consented.
I notice that the limit is to be £25. Are the Government happy with that figure in all the circumstances?

Mr. Elystan Morgan: By leave of the House, we shall deal later with the figure of £25.

Amendment agreed to.

Mr. Worsley: I beg to move Amendment No. 5, in page 2, line 20, at end insert "or
(g) if the court is of opinion that the condition in paragraph (e) of subsection (2)


of this section is satisfied and the offence is an indictable offence within the meaning of the Magistrates' Court Act 1952, an order under section 19 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1948, as amended by section 10(2)(a) of the Criminal Justice Act, 1961, requiring him to attend at an attendance centre".
Before our last Division we were discussing what happened before the decision of the court. We are now discussing the powers of the court. We have suggested a power which we think the courts ought to have and which we invite the Government to consider again. We have heard something of the Home Secretary's birthday spirit on a previous occasion and perhaps it may overflow a little to the Report stage, because this would be a useful, although not broad, power.
We appreciate that attendance centres will continue to exist under the new dispensation, but it would be simpler and neater if, instead of a supervision order being needed for a child to go to an attendance centre, the court had a right in an individual case to say that it was clearly an attendance centre case and that it need not bother with the whole machinery of a supervision order, that it was not necessary at that stage to bring in the children's officer, for children's officers were overworked and scarce, so that the court had the right to use the attendance centre machinery at once and without further ado.
Flexibility was much discussed in Committee and by the Home Secretary on Second Reading. I appreciate that in many ways the Bill increases the flexibility of the facilities at the disposal of the courts and of the children's officers. Here is a case where the system is relatively inflexible. The court has either to use a supervision order or a care order, or something of that sort, when if we put into the Bill the simple provision an attendance order could be put into effect straight away.
In 1967 this method was used in 9·5 per cent. of all cases of conviction on indictable offences for children under 14. It is a procedure which has been found extremely useful and it would be worthwhile to continue. I say this all the more strongly because of the Government's apparent intention in a later Amendment to put back into the hands of the children's officers the power not to carry out

the instructions of the court. If the Government had accepted the good commonsense of the Committee and struck those words out I should feel considerably less enthusiastic about this Amendment. It would be an advantage for the court to be able to say that an attendance centre was the right treatment, there could be no doubt about it, no other choice, and there would be no question of the children's officer not carrying it out or doing something different. It would be another useful weapon for the courts and I commend the idea in the Amendment, that we should keep the power of the courts to award attendance orders.

Mr. Elystan Morgan: Under Clause 7 (3) the powers of the court to make attendance centre orders in respect of young persons found guilty of offences will be gradually withdrawn as suitable alternative facilities become available in schemes made under Clause 19. It is difficult to think of any good reason why attendance centres should remain available to children and young persons dealt with for offences under Clause 1 but should not remain available for young persons prosecuted in accordance with new Clause 5.
Any arguments for one are equally arguments for the other. In 1967 3,309 attendance centre orders were made in respect of young persons aged between 14 and 17 and 3,047 orders were made in respect of children under 14. Under the Bill it is likely that a high proportion of these young persons who break the law and are taken to court would be prosecuted rather than dealt with by way of care proceedings under Clause 1. Thus the effect of the Amendment would be to preserve the attendance centre system for about half its present clientele at the most.

Mr. Carlisle: Under which Clause is the attendance centre order being withdrawn?

Mr. Morgan: Clause 7. In practice it is unlikely that the use of the attendance centres will shrink much more than this. The Opposition will probably argue, as they have done in Committee, that there will be cases where there is no need for a supervision order but the court thinks that attendance at a centre not combined with supervision would be appropriate. This was a main ground on which it was


suggested that attendance centre orders should be retained as a separate system in their own right, distinct from the facilities included in schemes under Clause 19.
8.15 p.m.
Under Clause 1 it is not likely that many children will be taken to court at all in circumstances where no continuing supervision is required. The courts will be reserved for situations in which a child is unlikely to receive the care or control which he needs unless an order is made. The Opposition Amendment would result in retaining the attendance centres for perhaps no more than one-tenth of their present customers, nearly all of them children under the age of 14. On merits the Government do not see any justification for this course. In the great majority of cases where court proceedings have to be taken in respect of children under 14 so as to secure compulsory powers, a period of supervision would be needed, and a few periods of attendance on Saturday afternoons clearly would not suffice.
It is far better therefore to concentrate available resources on schemes in Clause 19, and this is what the Government propose. Schemes of this kind should be able to operate on a more varied and flexible basis than at present, for example operating over the whole weekend and not necessarily tied to one centre. They should also form part of a wider system in which the local authorities, probation service, magistrates and voluntary organisations all have a part to play, as well as the police. This would be possible under Clauses 12 and 19. It is not possible under the present law, and that is the very system on which the Amendment seeks to preserve. For that reason I hope that hon. Gentlemen opposite will not feel constrained to press the Amendment to a Division.

Mr. Carlisle: We certainly do not propose to press this Amendment to a Division, but I must reply to what the Under-Secretary has said. His argument was incredibly weak. What he said was that because we have not got an Amendment down to retain attendance centres in offence cases, therefore they should not be retained for those who appear in care proceedings under Clause 1. My reaction to that is to say that I hope very much

that when the Bill goes to another place an Amendment will be tabled to Clause 7(3) which will retain attendance centres.
I admit to having been under a complete misapprehension. Until 1 read the Clause I thought it was detention centres which Clause 7(3) removed, not detention centres and attendance centres. I knew that the Home Secretary was intending to do away with detention centres for the younger offenders, and I had wrongly thought that Clause 7(3) was limited to achieving that object. I find it all the harder to understand what is the objection to attendance centres, which I thought had been generally accepted as being a good means of punishment available to the court for people who were non-sophisticated criminals. It is a great pity that this power is being removed.
It could be a term of the supervision order, but if we then give the supervising officer a power to ignore an order of the court then the effect of doing it that way is very small. The Under-Secretary may have heard, if he has time to listen to the wireless, an interview that I heard a day or two ago, I think on "The World At One" with Mr. Alan Hardacre, the Secretary of the Football League. He complained bitterly about football hooliganism and the way in which the courts dealt with this. He said, "I am not saying that it is the fault of the courts. If the powers of the courts are defined by Parliament, then Parliament should change the law".
I am afraid that the Bill does just that, because Mr. Hardacre's argument was that the best way to deal with young hooligans was to prevent them from going to football matches and to send them to attendance centres for two hours on the six following Saturdays. Mr. Hardacre's fears are confirmed by the fact that by not being prepared to accept the Amendment the Government are taking from the courts the power to order a young football hooligan of 13 or 14 years of age—and there are football hooligans of that age—to undergo what would probably be the most appropriate sentence, namely, attendance at an attendance centre for the next four Saturdays rather than making nuisances of themselves at football grounds.

Amendment negatived.

Mr. Miscampbell: I beg to move Amendment No. 6, in page 2, line 32, leave out paragraph (a).

Mr. Deputy Speaker: It will be convenient to discuss at the same time Amendment No. 15, in page 4, line 38, after 'infant', insert 'or his parent or guardian'.

Mr. Miscampbell: Amendment No. 6 seeks to remove the requirement that when the court wishes to make a binding over the parent or guardian should consent, to enter into a recognisance to take proper care of the child. I hope that we shall have an answer from the Under-Secretary of State, because an answer was sought in Committee but was not forthcoming. The hon. Gentleman missed the opportunity of giving an answer on the Government Amendment which we dealt with a moment ago.
The point simply is this. Why is it necessary to have the parents' consent? Section 62 of the 1933 Act gives power for binding over but requires no consent. Why is it necessary to have it in the Bill? If the parent consents in any case, it would appear to be almost unnecessary that he should enter into a recognisance. Section 91 of the Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952, empowers a court to impose a six-months' sentence on a person who does not enter into a recognisance when asked to do so. In Committee it was thought that this might be too severe. There is no reason why that sentence should be imported into the Bill. That can be got over by a technical change. We should like to know why it is necessary to have these words in the Bill.
We were promised in Committee that all would be vouchsafed to us. That promise was given on the Home Secretary's birthday, but in the euphoria of the moment perhaps we did not give much thought to whether it would be fulfilled. We were told two days later that it was the birthday of the Under-Secretary of State. We were told that by the Whip on duty, so it was not necessarily right. But in neither case has it been of assistance to use. We hope that today we shall be told why these words are in the Bill.
Amendment No. 15 is consequential on the success of Amendment No. 6. If the parent or guardian is bound over unwillingly, Amendment No. 15 raises the

possibility of his appeal. If the Government were to accept Amendment No. 6, would Section 84 of the Magistrates' Courts Act allow a guardian to appeal if he was bound over unwillingly? I suspect that it would. I emphasise that that arises only if the Government accept Amendment No. 6.

Mr. Elystan Morgan: The reasons for retaining the requirement that the parent should consent are twofold. First, the court is likely to exercise its power to bind over parents where there is not much wrong with the parental care or control but the parents have got a bit slack and the court considers that they need to be reminded of their responsibilities. In these circumstances, the parents are likely to agree to be bound over. Indeed, if they refused, it would probably be an indication to the court that something more was required—for example, a supervision order.
The second reason is that the Amendment would have no teeth unless a provision was added to attract Section 91 of the Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952, to enable parents who refused to be bound to be committed to prison for six months or until they sooner complied with the order. This power is not often used with adult offenders, and if it were used in relation to parents refusing to enter into recognisances it would hardly improve the family situation. It would probably be necessary to commit the child to care or receive him into care. It is doubtful whether, in the event of refusal by a parent to be bound over, the court would actually send him to prison. It would be more likely to make some other order. Thus, while in theory binding over under the present law is compulsory, in reality it is virtually voluntary. Clause 1(5)(a) simply recognises this reality.
The Opposition have not put down an Amendment to provide for committal to prison for refusal to be bound over; they may think that there would be advantage in the court having power to make an order but not power to enforce it if the parents refuse to sign the recognisance. The act of binding over calls for the signing of the recognisance sheet by the person agreeing to be bound over. I invite the House not to accept the Amendment. If it were accepted it would create the anomalous situation that the court


would have power to order a person to sign the sheet, but if he blandly refused to do so it would have no sanction against him.

Mr. Miscampbell: In view of the explanation of the Under-Secretary of State, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 2

PROVISIONS SUPPLEMENTARY TO S. 1

The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. James Callaghan): I beg to move Amendment No. 8, in page 3, line 11, leave out from 'unnecessary' to end of line 14.
This Amendment is similar to one which was moved in Committee by the hon. Member for Cambridge (Mr. Lane), who thought that the words were unnecessary. I have looked at them. I agree that the words are unnecessary. There is no need to put them in. Therefore, as both sides are agreed, I hope that we can get on.

Amendment agreed to.

Mr. Callaghan: I beg to move Amendment No. 9, in page 3, line 20, leave out 'not in his interests' and insert:
'neither in his interest nor the public interest'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this Amendment we can take also Amendment No. 10, in page 3, line 21, at end insert:
'or to charge him with an offence'.

Mr. Callaghan: This Amendment owes its birth to the hon. Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) on my birthday. The hon. Member suggested that we should have regard to the interests of society. He preferred the words "public interest"; he thought that. "protection of society" was putting the case a bit high. On the whole, I think that the two things are likely to go together. On the other hand, both considerations should be borne in mind. I am happy to move the Amendment to meet the hon. Member.

Mr. Carlisle: I hope that the Home Secretary will not think that I am taking up time unduly if I simply say "Thank you".

Amendment agreed to.

Mr. Callaghan: I beg to move Amendment No. 10, in page 3, line 21, at end insert:
'or to charge him witth an offence'.
There is a sentence or two which I should add. The Amendment arises from the previous one. It would be inappropriate to lay upon a local authority a duty to bring care proceedings in a case where the authority knew that the police intended to prosecute. The Amendment makes clear that the local authority has no such duty in that case.

Amendment agreed to.

8.30 p.m.

Mr. Callaghan: I beg to move Amendment No. 11, in page 3, line 38, after 'subsections', insert '(1),'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: I understand that with this Amendment it will be convenient also to discuss the following Amendments:
No. 12, in page 4, line 1, leave out 'it is proved that'.
No. 13, in line 3, at end insert 'it is proved that he'.
No. 37, in Clause 9, page 11, line 13, at end insert:
'or a local education authority'.
No. 46, in line 28, leave out 'local'.

Mr. Callaghan: Again, these are Amendments by the Government to meet the wishes of the Committee. The Amendments which I have moved achieve that end because their principle was accepted in Standing Committee. Amendment No. 11 provides that in the reference to a local authority in Clause 2(1), the duty to make inquiries falls upon the local education authority in education cases. Amendments Nos. 37 and 46 will have a similar effect in relation to the duty to make investigations and provide information for the courts.
These Amendments meet a point raised by the Inner London Education Authority. In London, as is well known, the education authority and the children's authority are distinct bodies. The Amendments make it clear that in education cases the local education authority has a duty to make any necessary inquiries and provide the court with any necessary information on the children's background.

Amendment agreed to.

Further Amendments made: No. 12, in page 4, line 1, leave out 'it is proved that'.

No. 13, in page 4, line 3, at end insert:
'it is proved that he'.—[Mr. Callaghan.]

Mr. Callaghan: I beg to move Amendment No. 14, in page 4, line 17, at end insert:
(6) If on application under this subsection to the court in which it is proposed to bring care proceedings in respect of a relevant infant who is not present before the court it appears to the court that he is under the age of five and either—

(a) it is proved to the satisfaction of the court, on oath or in such other manner as may be prescribed by rules under section 15 of the Justices of the Peace Act 1949, that notice of the proposal to bring the proceedings at the time and place at which the application is made was served on the parent or guardian of the relevant infant at what appears to the court to be a reasonable time before the making of the application; or
(b) it appears to the court that his parent or guardian is present before the court

the court may if it thinks fit, after giving the parent or guardian if he is present an opportunity to be heard, give a direction under this subsection in respect of the relevant infant; and a relevant infant in respect of whom such a direction is given by a court shall be deemed to have been brought before the court under section 1 of this Act at the time of the direction, and care proceedings in respect of him may be continued accordingly.
The object of the Amendment is to enable care proceedings to be brought in the case of a child under the age of five without the child being brought before the court. This, again, was moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Accrington (Mr. Arthur Davidson), and I thought that his case sounded a sensible one. Therefore, the Amendment is put down to meet it.
The Amendment enables the court to give a direction. The effect will be that a child under the age of five who is not before the court will be deemed to have been brought before it. The direction may be given only if the parents are present or, if they are not present, if it is proved that the notice of proceedings was served upon them at a reasonable time before the making of the application for the direction.
The Amendment also provides for the parents, if they are present, to be given an opportunity to be heard. The power to give a direction is permissive and not

mandatory. There is no question of the court being obliged to deal with the case in the child's absence unless it is satisfied that it is proper to do so. There could be cases—I hope that there will not be many—where it is alleged that the child is being ill treated, when the court might well think that the child's physical presence would be essential. Then it would be entitled to call for the child to be present. That is the major effect of the Amendment.

Amendment agreed to.

Mr. W. F. Deedes: I beg to move Amendment No. 17, in page 5, line 9, at end insert:
(11) Nothing in this section shall empower a local authority when making enquiries pursuant to subsection (1) of this section on receiving information suggesting that the condition mentioned in paragraph (e) of subsection (2) of section 1 of this Act is satisfied, to deprive a child or young person of his liberty, either with or without the consent of his parents other than by an order of a court.
Behind this Amendment lies the anxiety which has been felt, and not wholly allayed, ever since the early days of the first White Paper, "The Child, The Family and The Young Offender". This is quite simply a fear that under the Bill we may move into a situation whereby many more young offenders are sent to remedial treatment by voluntary agreement without the process of the court. Right from the start of the first White Paper this has been generally regarded as a very serious issue, and in my view rightly. As the reaction to the first White Paper, "The Child, The Family and The Young Offender", made quite clear, any notion that local authorities should be able to persuade the parents of young offenders to submit them to remedial treatment without the process of the courts was widely—one could say unanimously—opposed and condemned. What lies behind this Amendment is our wish not to see that notion return by a side wind, as it were, through this Clause in the Bill.
Our fears are not wholly imaginary. What, I think, first gave rise to them were some words by the Under-Secretary of State, who, I am glad to see, is taking a deserved rest from these proceedings. He said them in Committee on the Bill. My hon. Friend the Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) has already quoted them, but I think I must repeat the words because they go to the heart of


our anxiety and are the reason for this Amendment. The hon. Gentleman said:
There will be those who have transgressed and in respect of whom a caution has been issued, or those who have been detected at an early stage in their delinquent development—if I may so describe it—for whom it is thought that attendance would be beneficial. That would be a part of the voluntary process. Third, there will be another group who have not transgressed at all, but under Section 1 of the 1963 Act they will be regarded as being in need of certain care, guidance and supervision. The attendance of the second two categories I mentioned will be on an informal and voluntary basis. I hope that clears up the matter."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee G, 27th March, 1969; c. 121.]
That gave rise to fears among my hon. Friends that there was no limit to the point to which the arrangements the hon. Gentleman had in mind might take this proposal. I will come in a moment to the words later used by the Home Secretary, who did have a certain effect on our thinking, but I should like to treat that separately.
I recognise that the motives behind the wish that local authorities should be able to act in this way are wholly benign. It does not reduce my disquiet about the proposal. Nevertheless, I acknowledge that. These are, of course, motives which are not limited to the Home Office. The memorandum of the Association of Child Care Officers, on which I pass no general comment, leave me in no Doubt that there are a number of people who feel with passionate sincerity that children should be kept out of court at almost any cost, that almost any arrangement is preferable to one which requires a child to appear in court.
With that general approach, the Home Secretary will agree, we have gone some way. That is, after all, partly the thinking behind the Bill, and part of the Bill which we accept; we share the desire to reduce the number of unnecessary court appearances by children. But there is a price above which we are not prepared to pay, and that is granting, to local authorities, however benignly motivated, a degree of control over young lives which should not be exercised without the authority of the court.
It is fair to add that later in the proceedings the Home Secretary added some remarks to those of the Under-Secretary which went some length towards allaying

the anxieties. I will not quote them because they are extensive, but they appear in columns 181–187. The Home Secretary was very persuasive here, and I do not speak ironically. He rehearsed the courses open for those not going to court, and he enumerated quite fairly the many attractive facilities—again, I do not use the word "attractive" ironically—available to the child and the parents and always with the parents' consent. The adventure camps and so on are no doubt in the child's interests and in the parents' interests and no harm could come. He added an important proviso, which I would like to hear reiterated on this Amendment, that it was not his intention that children should be removed, even with the parents' consent, for residential purposes. He said this:
It is certainly not my intention that children should be removed, even with their parents' consent, for residential purposes elsewhere."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee G. 1st April, 1969; c. 186.]
That strikes me as an important limitation on what we are apprehensive about.
In the development of the range of facilities which may occur—and we obviously reached no limit to them—it is difficult to determine just what that includes and what it excludes. Clearly, as was mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Runcorn, it includes the attendance centre.
The right hon. Gentleman later said that it really depends on where one draws the line. That is precisely the point that we here have in mind. It does indeed rest on where one draw's the line, and on that I hope that the Home Secretary on this Amendment will be able to give us some further assurances tonight.
We do not doubt or question the motives and the benevolence of the local authorities, who feel strongly on this issue, and of the professional workers, who also feel strongly and wish to do what is best for the child, but who carry with them the conviction of many professional bodies that they will know better even than the courts what is in the best interests of the young person. I do not doubt that these views are sincerely held, I do not deride them, but I have no doubt where Parliament's duty lies here and I have no doubt,


reflecting on the reactions to the first Government White Paper, since withdrawn, where the general public view and indeed the general view of professional bodies lie on this issue.
Voluntary agreements which occur anyway under the Children's Act, 1948, in case of the sickness or imprisonment of the parent should not lead to an extension of courses of treatment for children without the court process. It is on that that we wish to set clear limits. It is on that that we want to hear limits defined, and that is the motive behind the Amendment.

Mr. Callaghan: I am glad to give the hon. Gentleman the assurance which he seeks. The Amendment is based evidently on a fundamental misconception of the purpose and effect of Clause 2(1). It is entirely otiose and unnecessary, I assure the hon. Gentleman, because the local authorities are given no extra powers in this regard by the Bill than they had before. They are not given powers to do anything that was not done before. There is nothing which enables a local authority to do that which the Amendment says it shall not do.
8.45 p.m.
I hope that the right hon. Member for Ashford (Mr. Deedes) will accept my assurance that there is no need for the Amendment. There is nothing in Clause 2 which empowers a local authority to deprive a child or any person of his liberty, either with or without his parents' consent, other than by an order of the court. That is the only way in which one may proceed.
This is a clear case of considering where to draw the line and the degree of parental control over a child. When I was a child I was, I regret to say, sent to a juvenile choir. I hated it, but my mother insisted that I went, and I went. However, there was nothing that could have compelled me to go if I had refused, even though my mother wanted me to go. If I had been strong enough willed to say "No", I could not have been forced to go. Equally, there will be nothing, if a child refuses to go to an adventure camp for a weekend, to physically compel him to go, even if his parents say that he should go.
Obviously it is to be hoped that with a child of 10 or 11 parental persuasion will be important. I am sure that hon. Members will not wish to stand in the way of that happening, particularly if the appropriate authority considered this to be a sensible course. I was influenced in this by the remarks of the hon. Member for Pudsey (Mr. Hiley), who is either chairman or a member of the board of an excellent institution in the north of England to which children, similar to those whom we are discussing, go for a weekend at a time. He gave an account which, I understand from my officials, was not only accurate but which somewhat under-estimated the good impact of that place to which children go, no doubt with their parents' consent and after discussion, and I would not want to stop that sort of thing from happening. This is, therefore, purely a matter of where one should draw the line.
I emphasise, in repeating that the Amendment is unnecessary—because local authorities are given no power under the Bill, except by order of the court—that it would be a misfortune if we were to prevent anything from being done, except by order of the court, when clearly parental persuasion is an important element in dealing with children of this age, and provided that parents come to this conclusion freely and voluntarily, I hope that they will be allowed to persuade their children. However, if a child was sufficiently strong willed, mature and adult to say, "No, I will not go", then nobody, local authority or anybody else, can say, "You must go", and I trust that the right hon. Member for Ashford will, with this explanation, not press the Amendment.

Mr. Carlisle: I am afraid that if a fundamental misconception has occurred, it was largely caused by the background of the White Paper, which indicated the exact powers mentioned by my right hon. Friend the Member for Ashford (Mr. Deedes), and perhaps by a speech of the Under-Secretary in Committee which was open to misinterpretation because he implied that there would be far wider powers than the Home Secretary indicated.
The right hon. Gentleman said—we were delighted to hear his remarks—that the Bill does not give any power to a


local authority to in any way interfere with the liberty of the individual. However, when the Under-Secretary was interrupted in Committee—at the time he was speaking about attendance centres—he maintained that he believed that he was correct in saying that local authorities would be given powers under Section (1) of the 1963 Act. However, that provision is limited to advice, guidance and assistance and is in no way related to the matter under discussion.
I hope, therefore, that the Home Secretary will appreciate that it was a genuine desire to get his assurance repeated on the Floor of the House that led to the Amendment being tabled. We wanted the right hon. Gentleman to repeat his assurance, given in Committee following his hon. Friend's remarks, that there was no possible means of going beyond what we now know to be in Clause 2. Many people will be assured by his remarks and I hope that my right hon. Friend the Member for Ashford, having achieved the object of getting the right hon. Gentleman to repeat his assurance, will not press the Amendment.

Mr. Deedes: I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 3

FURTHER SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS RELATING TO S. 1(2)(e)

Mr. Callaghan: I beg to move Amendment No. 18 in page 6, line 12, at end insert:
(6) Where in any care proceedings the court finds the offence condition satisfied with respect to the relevant infant in consequence of an indictable offence within the meaning of the Magistrates' Court Act 1952, then, whether or not the court makes an order under section 1 of this Act—

(a) section 34 of that Act (which relates to compensation for loss of property or damage to it) shall apply as if the finding were a finding of guilty of the offence and as if the maximum amount of an award under that section were one hundred pounds: and
(b) the court shall if the relevant infant is a child, and may if he is not, order any sum awarded by virtue of this subsection to be paid by his parent or guardian instead of by him unless it is satisfied that the parent or guardian cannot be found or has not conduced to the commission of the offence

by neglecting to exercise due care or control of him, so however that an order shall not be made in pursuance of this paragraph unless the parent or guardian has been given an opportunity of being heard or has been required to attend the proceedings and failed to do so; and
(c) any sum payable by a parent or guardian by virtue of the preceding paragraph may be recovered from him in like manner as if he had been convicted of the offence in question;

but where the finding in question is made in pursuance of the preceding subsection, the powers conferred by this subsection shall be exercisable by the court to which the case is remitted instead of by the court which made the finding.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this Amendment we are discussing the sub-Amendment after '1952', insert 'or of an offence under section 14 of the Criminal Justice Administration Act 1914';
Amendment No. 20, in line 26, at end insert; and a person ordered to pay compensation by virtue of the preceding subsection may appeal to quarter sessions against the order; and
Amendment No. 21, in line 27, after first 'of', insert 'the preceding subsection or'.

Mr. Callaghan: This is an important Amendment which provides for the payment of compensation in certain circumstances. It is in response to a discussion which took place in Committee, when my hon. Friend promised that we would look at the matter again. We have done so, and the Amendments are the result of the Government's reconsideration.
The new subsection (6) which I am proposing to insert provides that where what is called "the offence condition" is satisfied in care proceedings and the offence is an indictable one, Section 34 of the Magistrates Courts Act, 1952 shall apply, subject to a maximum of £100. That Section is the provision which enables magistrates' courts to make compensation orders in criminal proceedings.
The effect of this Amendment is to enable the court, in care proceedings for an indictable offence, to make compensation orders in the same circumstances and for the same offences as in criminal proceedings. The Amendment provides for a maximum of £100, which was the figure suggested by the Opposition when they moved their Amendment. I have


accepted that figure. There is a good case for saying that in these circumstances the limit of £400 which was provided in the Magistrates Courts Act is too high.
It provides for compensation to be made payable in care proceedings for offences by children under the age of 14. In the great majority of cases, any compensation that was ordered by a court would have to be paid by the parents, and it seems right therefore to fix a limit of £100 for the vicarious liability of the parents for an act committed by their child. The Amendment enables the court to make an order for compensation whether or not it makes an order under Clause 1. That is an important point.
The last three lines of the Amendment provide that where, under subsection (5), the court finds the offence condition satisfied and remits the case to the home court, the power to order compensation shall rest with the court to which the case is remitted, because it is undesirable that two courts should make separate orders in the same case.
The second Amendment gives a person ordered to pay compensation the right of appeal to quarter sessions. The third Amendment provides that where there is an appeal against a compensation order following a finding of guilt in one court and remittal to another court, an appeal against the compensation order shall be heard by the same court of quarter sessions as appeals against a finding or any other order made.
It is the Government's intention that a juvenile court shall be able to order the payment of compensation in care proceedings where it finds the child or young person guilty of an offence under Section 14 of the Criminal Justice Administration Act, 1914; that is, malicious damage to property.
This is an Amendment which the Opposition felt would help the Bill. I can see the arguments for it, and I accept them. It will bring an added sense of responsibility to parents in certain cases. It will be for the court to judge whether it thinks that it is appropriate, and I think that that is right. I hope, therefore, that the House will accept this Amendment.

Mr. Goodhart: In Committee the Home Secretary, replying to the debate on the principle of compensation, said:

I am glad to accept the principle of the Amendment, and perhaps we could have a go at drafting it."—[OFFICIAL, REPORT, Standing Committee G, 27th March. 1969; c. 103–4.]
I was not very impressed by the result. In 1967 malicious damage cases on indictment numbered a mere 154 for children under the age of 14 and 120 for children under the age of 17, while malicious damage cases dealt with in the magistrates' courts on non-indictable offences were, in both instances, more than 10 times as great. Therefore, the Sub-Amendment, after "1952" insert
or of an offence under Section 14 of the Criminal Justice Administration Act 1914
was put down because it seeks to increase substantially the number of malicious damage cases to which this applied.
I was not wholly clear from his speech whether the Home Secretary had accepted our Amendment. Had the Home Secretary accepted the Amendment?

Mr. Elystan Morgan: Briefly, the position is that the Opposition Amendment to the Government's Amendment cannot be accepted, since it gives rise to a complex question of law, the full effects of which are being considered. Nevertheless, it can be stated categorically that it is the Government's intention that a juvenile court shall be able to order the payment of compensation in care proceedings where it finds the child or young person guilty of an offence under Section 14 of the Criminal Justice Administration Act 1914, which is malicious damage to property. If it was necessary for an Amendment to be put down, it would be put down in another place.

Mr. Goodhart: I am grateful to the Under-Secretary. I am sure that improves the position greatly. Clearly, in the larger number of non-indictable cases of malicious damage it is right that compensation should be paid. I am glad that the spirit of the Opposition Amendment to the Government Amendment will be accepted, at least in another place.
As we made plain in Committee, this is a form of treatment of malicious damage cases which accords with the natural sense of justice of the child and is accepted by a substantial number of parents, too, as being a right way of dealing with comparatively minor cases


of damage perpetrated by their children. I am grateful to the Government for having fulfilled their pledge in Committee.

Mr. Peter Mahon: I should not wish to increase the amount of £100 by any large figure, but it will be considered by and large, in view of the circumstances of malicious damage committed by many young people, to be rather a derisory figure. Desecration and serious damage is often done by children of 12 to 14 years of age to their own schools. When children leave school, they return again and again to their alma mater and do tremendous damage.
We must set a limit in these cases, but I am pleased that reconsideration of this aspect can be given in another place, because it is a serious situation which is by no means diminishing. Whether fines will have the salutory effect for which we all hope, I do not know. This situation is sorely trying to people who are doing the best they can in the sphere of education.

9.0 p.m.

Mr. Carlisle: I did not understand the Home Secretary to say that the Government would necessarily be reconsidering the maximum amount in another place. Although we all have sympathy with the point of view expressed by the hon. Member for Preston, South (Mr. Peter Mahon), a balance must be struck somewhere. Although children often do damage to an amount greater than £100, a moment's consideration shows that it would be unreasonable to give through the criminal courts what would in effect be power to fine to a higher sum. If the child was an older child, the fact that compensation was awarded through the courts would in no way inhibit a civil action from being taken by the authorities against someone who could be successfully sued.
I want to understand exactly what the Under-Secretary meant in his intervention. We are glad to hear that he accepts the spirit of our Amendment to the Amendment. As the Home Secretary said, this provision is intended to cover malicious damage. For malicious damage in amounts less than £100, proceedings are normally taken under Section 14 of the Criminal Justice Administration Act, 1914. Therefore, this seemed to me to be a necessary Amendment. I could

not understand what the Under-Secretary meant by his statement that the Government would amend the Clause if it was necessary to do so. The point is that the Clause provides limits to where the offence has been proved and the offence is an indictable one under the Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952. The whole point of the Amendment is that an offence under the Criminal Justice Administration Act is not, as I understand it, an indictable offence within the meaning of the Magistrates' Court Act, 1952.
All that I am asking the Under-Secretary to say is that it means that an Amendment must be necessary. An offence under the Criminal Justice Administration Act is not included within the words
indictable offence within the meaning of the Magistrates' Courts Act".
It may be that the Amendment is in the wrong terms, but surely an Amendment is needed if an offence under the 1914 Act is not included under the term
indictable offence within the meaning of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1952
which it cannot be, because the maximum punishment is three months' imprisonment.
I am glad that in Committee the Secretary of State willingly conceded the point on compensation. This was a matter of genuine concern which was raised by several of the bodies interested in the Bill. They believed that there was a gap in the law. I believe that the Home Secretary will agree that there is a strong feeling that courts should where possible have wider powers to grant compensation to the victim of crime rather than the reverse. I hope that merely putting the power to grant compensation into the Bill will not be the last we shall hear of extending the provisions of compensation in the criminal courts during the next few years.

Mr. Elystan Morgan: The hon. Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) has asked me to explain exactly what I had in mind. Under Section 14(1) of the Criminal Justice Administration Act, 1914, malicious damage to property not exceeding £100 may be dealt with summarily and the magistrates' court is empowered to order the payment of compensation to the party aggrieved. There is, therefore, a special power to order compensation and the


precise relationship between this and the power relating to indictable offences generally in Section 34 of the Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952, is now being considered.
The position is complicated by Section 14(2) of the 1914 Act which amends Section 51 of the Malicious Damage Act by repealing the limitation to cases of damage in excess of £5 but goes not to provide that a person shall not be committed for trial except where the damage exceeds £5. This is not necessarily the case in law. It is necessary to consider the possibility, which I admit is theoretical rather than real, of a bill of indictment being preferred, and what for all practical purposes is only a summary offence may, therefore, in law be a hybrid offence. It is on account of that complication that we are unable to say at the moment whether or not it will be necessary for an Amendment to be moved at a later stage.

Amendment agreed to.

Further Amendments made: No. 19, in page 6, line 12, at end insert:
(6) Where in any care proceedings the court finds the offence condition satisfied with respect to the relevant infant and he is a young person, the court may if it thinks fit and he consents, instead of making such an order as is mentioned in section 1(3) of this Act, order him to enter into a recognisance for an amount not exceeding twenty-five pounds and for a period not exceeding one year to keep the peace or to be of good behaviour; and such an order shall be deemed to be an order under section 1 of this Act but no appeal to quarter sessions may be brought against an order under this subsection.

No. 20, in line 26, at end insert:
';and a person ordered to pay compensation by virtue of the preceding subsection may appeal to quarter sessions against the order'.

No. 21, in line 27, after first "of", insert 'the preceding subsection or'.—[Mr. Callaghan.]

Clause 4

PROHIBITION OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS FOR OFFENCES BY CHILDREN

Mr. Carlisle: I beg to move Amendment No. 23, in page 6, line 36, after 'homicide', insert:
'or any other offence which is committed by an adult would be punishable with imprisonment for fourteen years or more'.

Clause 4, as we know, prohibits the prosecution for criminal offences of people under the age of 14. I repeat what I said in moving the Amendment to Clause 1: I realise that we are concerned only with children up to the age of 12, and, therefore, the immediate relevance of our Amendment is of less import than it would have been were we concerned with children at the age of 14.
The Bill envisages the prosecution of all people up to 14, and, therefore, in that light it must be considered. Are we right in saying that nobody should be charged with anything that he did while under that age? We make an exclusion. It is specifically made in cases of homicide, murder or manslaughter. But whether or not an offence is murder or wounding with intent may well in the end depend on the brilliance or otherwise of a surgeon.
Are we, therefore, right to say that a person can be prosecuted for murder or manslaughter but that in no case can he be prosecuted for wounding with intent when, as I say, the line drawn in between may be one more of chance than of any intent on the part of the young person concerned?
What we have attempted to do in this Amendment is to widen the power to bring criminal prosecutions against people under 14 to those which might be called the most grave offences; namely, those which, if committed by an adult, would be punishable with imprisonment for 14 years or more. I do not propose to attempt—it would not be of assistance to the House—to list the offences concerned and I am sure that the Under-Secretary can tell me, when he replies, that the list probably includes some which would be highly unsuitable for the purposes we have in mind, but the normal dividing line when looked upon as offences which are of grave intent and those which are of lesser seriousness is whether or not they carry maximum imprisonment of 14 years or more.
If the Government had accepted our Amendment to Clause 1—on which we had a Division—so that the offence itself was sufficient to bring care proceedings, there would probably have been no need to put this Amendment. The Government did not do so and we are back at the stage where a child who commits an offence can be brought before the court


only if he can be shown to be in need of care and control. The example quoted by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg), the example sent to me by the Clerk of the Warrington County Bench, is even more relevant to this Amendment than to the Amendment on Clause 1.
What is the position of a child who commits a really serious offence such as that of wounding with intent or deliberate arson of a substantial building? On the face of it, it may be an isolated offence. If one quotes the case of the cadets referred to by my right hon. and learned Friend, it may be found on inquiry that the parents did not know that the child was committing that type of offence. They normally kept good control of the child and the court could not say that the child was in need of care and control but was not receiving it.
There may be a child of 13 committing a really serious offence as a deliberate act, but it will not be possible to take proceedings against him. Often it is not only in the public interest but in the child's interest that proceedings should be taken. The sudden act of violence which leads to wounding with intent may be an outward expression of something badly wrong with that child. The Under-Secretary rightly nods. I think he would accept that there is force in that argument, but under this Measure what action could be taken unless it could be shown that within the law care and control was lacking and the child was in need of care and control and was unlikely to receive it? Action could not then be taken.
Because we believe that so long as there is the two-tier burden of proof under Clause 1 there should be an alternative method of dealing with occasional cases of serious crime committed by young children, we put forward this Amendment. It has been said several times today that this House should not forget the concern that is expressed outside about the rate of juvenile crime. I think it is highest at the ages of 13 and 14. This Bill will remove those who are 13. At a time when, as was said in an earlier debate by my hon. Friend the Member for Chelsea (Mr. Worsley), we are reducing the age of majority to 18 when we accept that, as the hon. Member for Bebington (Mr. Brooks) said, children are maturing

earlier and that 13 is an age at which there is a very high rate of crime, with the exceptions of manslaughter and murder we are preventing any form of prosecution, however wicked the act of the child.
9.15 p.m.
We must accept from our experience, and I ask the Under-Secretary to look back upon his experience before he entered the House, as members of the legal profession that there are occasions when children who outwardly appear to come from respectable homes, with good care and control, can commit some such act as an act of arson. There was a letter from one of the leading magistrates which suggested that such an act may sometimes be almost a cry for help from the child, showing that something is wrong. But we could not bring them before the court under Clause 1 without showing that there was a lack of care or control and that an order was necessary.
It would be unwise before we see how the Act works in practice to exclude completely the right to prosecute children under 14 for serious crimes. I accept that there may be arguments against the use of the words "for fourteen years or more" as a definition, but it is one normally used to describe the most serious types of offence. I hope that we shall hear from the Under-Secretary that he feels there is validity in the argument and is prepared to accept the Amendment.

Mr. Elystan Morgan: The hon. Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) has lucidly presented his arguments in favour of retaining prosecution for what he calls serious offences. The difficulty is that offences punishable with imprisonment for 14 years or more may be very serious or very trivial, according to the circumstances. Likewise, offences punishable by less than 14 years' imprisonment may in certain circumstances be very serious. Snatching a bottle of lemonade from a fellow schoolboy and drinking it is robbery punishable with life imprisonment. Under the existing law the powers of the juvenile court are the same whatever the maximum term of imprisonment which can be imposed on an adult may be. So they will be in care proceedings. The only additional powers that the court would have in the case of the prosecution of a child compared with the powers it


would have in care proceedings would be to impose a fine or to grant an absolute or conditional discharge.
Since the argument is that these offences may be very grave it is somewhat odd to suggest that it should be possible to prosecute them merely so that they can be dealt with by way of a fine or a conditional or absolute discharge. The hon. Gentleman has argued that it may well be that in the case of a very serious offence it will be impossible to satisfy the second test in Clause 1(2). This is a highly theoretical argument. What must be considered there is whether a child needs care and control and whether he is likely to get it if an order is made. The words "care and control" must be read against the background of the facts of every particular case.
It is a question not of whether the child needs general care or control but of whether his particular condition as evidenced by the offence he has committed will be met in those circumstances. Although it is theoretically possible for a child to commit a very serious offence and for the test not to be satisfied, in practice it is extremely unlikely, and impossible in my estimation, for such a thing to happen without the test being satisfied.

Mr. Peter Mahon: Would my hon. Friend not agree that at this stage of a child's life it can commit a crime for which it alone is positively and absolutely culpable, and which is in no way the fault of the parents? Would it not be an injustice to try to shift the responsibility? Would it not be better to devise some method whereby the full responsibility can be laid upon the child for the heinous crime it could possibly commit? This is not just a theoretical case.

Mr. Morgan: I would admit that it is possible for quite young children to commit very serious offences, and not in a moment of thoughtlessness but as the result and in consequence of deliberate planning and forethought, and that in those circumstances the serious act will be the clearest indication that something is fundamentally wrong with the life of the child. It will manifest a very particular need. The question that the court will have to direct its mind to is whether

or not, in view of the particular need of the child, it is likely to get the care and control it is crying out for without an order being made. I cannot conceive of the possibility of that type of serious offence being committed without in practice the court finding that the second condition contained in subsection (2) was satisfied.

Mrs. Jill Knight: I am puzzled by one statement made by the Under-Secretary of State and I want to be clear about it. I understood him to say that it was possible for an adult to be punished by imprisonment for 14 years for a trivial crime. Is that so?

Mr. Morgan: I said that it is possible for an offence that can carry a maximum penalty of 14 years' imprisonment to be, in practice, a trivial incident. I cited the case of a boy snatching a bottle of lemonade from another boy. That, technically, is an act of robbery, and robbery is punishable by 14 years' imprisonment. In theory, that is a serious offence, but in practice, of course, it would be a very trivial incident.

Mr. Frederick Silvester: I approached this Clause in Committee willing to accept the Amendment then moved, which was accepted by the Government in that the change was made to the age of 12. I have approached this Amendment in the same spirit, but I find that I have perhaps moved to a more reactionary rather than a less reactionary position on this issue. I think that the Amendment begins to show me the fallacy of the argument which has surrounded the Clause. It would take further the distinction already made-in the Clause between homicide and other crimes. It is saying that we should decide whether a child should be brought before the court for an offence by the nature and magnitude of that offence rather than by the fact that the child has committed an offence.
Throughout discussion on this Clause, we have been asked to believe that there are good reasons for raising the age of 10 to 12 to 14. Looking back on the debates, I have not yet heard a very convincing argument and I have obviously felt the same sort of brain washing that all of us have felt over the years during which we have been reminded of times


when people were hanged for stealing a loaf of bread and young children were incarcerated in prison. That is the background in our minds, so that we have been predisposed to believe that it must be right to raise this age. Now we are asked to do it yet again. Furthermore, we are asked to write into the Bill the presumption that when Parliament has accepted that it needs to raise the minimum age from 10 to 12 it would be a good idea to raise it from 12 to 14. We are told that experience will show us that we should add another couple of years.
I think that the Amendment is a good one because it at least would improve the present situation. At least it puts a limitation on the Clause as drafted. However, people who have been ignoring the Bill are now beginning to take note of one or two matters.
There is a growing conviction that the presumption of our times should be that the law should be clearer and that when an offence is committed, action should clearly be taken by the law enforcement agencies and that the flexibility which we like in our law should be dispensed by the courts. In other words, people would be happier if when a crime was committed, someone was brought before the courts and if the courts had that flexibility, rather than that that person should not be brought before the courts at all.
There is no need for us to take an extreme position and be worried about our past in the matter of crime and about children in the last century being put into prison at an early age, because the courts already have enormous flexibility and the Bill extends that flexibility. There is no question of some poor child being bashed about the head by a cruel court, or treated in any other way which we would now regard as inhumane. The simple question is whether at this time it is wise for Parliament to extend the area in which people will not be held responsible before the courts.

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Gentleman is seeking to debate the Clause, but we are discussing an Amendment to the Clause, to add after "homicide" other kinds of offences. The hon. Gentleman will not be out of order if he comes to the Amendment.

Mr. Silvester: I will immediately do so. I support the Amendment in the sense that it is a small step towards the ideal which I was seeking to describe.

Mr. Walter Clegg: I support my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow, West (Mr. Silvester) and my hon. Friend the Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle). What I dislike about the Clause as it stands is that it limits the exception to homicide. We are in danger of falling into the trap into which Parliament has already fallen, that of considering that the death of someone makes the offence which leads to that death different in quality and kind from an offence which falls short of inducing death.
I refer to a valid previous Parliamentary experience. Parliament created the offence of causing death by dangerous driving. The experience of the courts all over the country in administering the law governing the offence of causing death by dangerous driving is that a minor accident may result in someone being killed and the person driving the car being brought before a Judge of Assize, with all that that entails. By a much worse piece of driving, a much more culpable piece of driving, another driver may not actually kill someone, but may make him a raving lunatic for the rest of his life, but all that driver has to face is a bench of magistrates. I am afraid that a similar situation may arise if the Clause remains as drafted.
There was a tragic case recently of children being tortured by other children. A child who tortured another, resulting in its death, could be prosecuted under the Clause as it stands. But if that torture resulted not in death but in maiming the other child or disabling it for the rest of its life it could not be prosecuted. Therefore, I believe that we are tackling the whole question of not prosecuting a child from the wrong point of view. I do not believe that making an exception of homicide is right. Serious offences should still be prosecuted, and the Amendment would have that effect. The Minister asked about the bottle of lemonade which is stolen. But would not that be dealt with under the new Clause 1? Would not there be, under the new Clause, a warning and not a prosecution? I do not accept the hon. Gentleman's argument on this.
I return to the main concept behind the whole Clause, the deep underlying principle that to cause somebody's death is somehow worse than causing injury to another, though in many cases that can be far worse than death. Is it more culpable to kill by a trivial act a man who perhaps has a month to live than to maim a child with 30 or 40 years more to live? I do not believe that it is, and that is why I oppose the Clause.

9.30 p.m.

Mr. Brooks: I too find a basic inconsistency in the argument. All of us agree that homicide is a serious offence, and if we were to think of any one particular offence that we wished to put in as a qualification it might well he the one we would think of.
But this creates in logic a most unsatisfactory position, because presumably what we are saying is that children below a certain age are, by virtue of that age, incapable of being judged guilty of an offence at all. We are saying, in other words, that they are below the age of responsibility for taking criminal action. This is no doubt a point of view that can be sustained. All of us would at least accept that there is a threshold below which it would be monstrous and perverse to prosecute a child for an action it had taken. But once one has accepted that proposition it becomes totally self-defeating to say that there is one category of offence where the child can be seen in principle to be responsible for its actions. That is the point the hon. Member for North Fylde (Mr. Clegg) made admirably and succinctly; we are, in effect, judging the offence not really by the wilful intent of the child but by the results.
For example, one could think of a child setting fire to the Albert Hall at midnight, when there is no one there. Some of us might necessarily regard that not as an offence at all but as a basis for architectural innovation and acoustic improvement. But if that act of arson were committed on the last night of the Proms and we saw whole legions of the young decimated inadvertently—

An Hon. Member: Not singing "Rule Britannia".

Mr. Brooks: —no doubt the child could be brought before the courts as

having committed an act of homicide. But the action taken against the child is dependent not on the nature of the act itself, setting fire to the Albert Hall, but on the time it set fire to the Albert Hall.
In a sense, I am caricaturing the argument, but there is a serious point, that if we are to say that below a certain age a child is incapable by definition of committing a criminal act owing to its age, immaturity, lack of experience and sheer childishness, it is not really possible to have any exclusion whatsoever from that principle. An act committed by such a child by definition cannot be held to be its responsibility.

Mr. Lane: I found the argument of the Under-Setcretary of State very unconvincing, and I should like to counter it on two scores from experience and opinions in the region in which my constituency lies.
The hon. Gentleman said that he could not conceive of any of the offences committed by a child covered by the Amendment which would not be caught by the double test under Clause 1. I have some figures for 1968 relating to the Mid-Anglia police area. I should have liked time to quote more, but I wish to make two points based on these figures.
Out of the total number of crimes in 1968 in this not very populous, fairly law-abiding area committed by juveniles under the age of 17, over 45 per cent. were committed by children under 14 years of age. However, the main point that I quote these figures to illustrate is that among the crimes by children under 14 years of age there were 46 cases of housebreaking and 64 cases of breaking into shops. I do not envisage these cases invariably being caught by the sort of double test which the Under-Secretary of State mentioned.
Second, in all his reasoning in answer to our Amendment, I did not detect any understanding, certainly any adequate understanding, by the Under-Secretary of State of the concern felt about this and many other features of the Bill by people outside the House who believe that in some respects we are going too far. Only last week leading members of the police authority in the Mid-Anglia area decided to set aside a morning to discuss the Bill and the Amendments which had been made in Committee with a number of


hon. Members from the area because they remain so concerned about its provisions. These were not hard, vindictive people. They were humane, experienced men and women from many walks of life. They were not all magistrates or all policemen. They were exceedingly concerned about this provision.
I ask the Under-Secretary of State to think again before the Bill leaves the Houses of Parliament. We are trying by the Amendment to put in a reserve safeguard for exceptional situations. For the sake of reassuring public opinion, this is a step which we should take.

Mr. A. P. Costain: I wish to make a short point in support of the Amendment.
A number of crimes are committed by children in gangs. What worries me most about this provision is this. In a gang of children there may be one child under 14 years of age. Suppose they are caught. Will not great pressure be brought to bear on the child under the age of responsibility to admit the crime? Is it not possible that he will be bullied into saying that he committed the crime? As a result of the Bill, a new type of criminal may be created. Will the Home Secretary take note of this point?

Mr. Miscampbell: We seem to have reached the ultimate absurdity. The Government, having refused to recognise an offence in itself as being sufficient reason for taking a person before the court, are not prepared to go all the way and say that this is a universal criterion. They seek to say in the Clause that homicide should not be treated as other crimes but should be exceptional. Why that should be so I cannot understand. This point has been made on both sides of the House, particularly by the hon. Member for Bebington (Mr. Brooks).
The crime of homicide can arise in a variety of circumstances. If it arises in the case of very young children, the circumstances surrounding it are likely to be extraordinary and very rare. Unfortunately, this may not be so if we progressively increase the age from 12 to 14 and perhaps later to an even greater age. But it is not murder about which one thinks so much, because homicide includes all varieties of manslaughter. In many cases they may not be much less

heinous, and certainly not much less heinous than the more serious crime of attempting to murder somebody in circumstances which may be much worse than in the successful crime. There are also the crimes of wounding and arson.
Here the Government—I suppose, with a feeling of outside pressure—feel that they cannot possibly allow homicide to be unreprimanded by the courts; a child or young person must go straight to the courts if he has committed the offence of homicide. This seems to me to be totally illogical.

Mr. Elystan Morgan: Would the hon. Member accept that homicide is placed in that position not only because it occupies a certain position in the public mind but because the very few cases of homicide committed by children are such that the needs of those children make it necessary for them to be tried by a judge and jury, and it is also necessary for the court to have the right to be able to detain them indefinitely? The second reason is the really compelling one rather than the former.

Mr. Miscampbell: The Under-Secretary gives the whole case away. If that is what he is saying, the reply is quite simple. This House recognises by the speeches which have been made here this evening that there are many circumstances that are worse than homicide. I can think of virtually no cases of homicide arising in 14 or 15 years at the Bar.
The hon. Gentleman is quite right to say that it arises in very few cases, but that surely cannot be a reason for arguing that it should be excluded in the Bill. If the needs of the child have to be considered, why not in the case of the much more serious offences for which an adult who committed them might be liable to imprisonment for 14 years? I am not wedded to that entirely as the criterion or yardstick by which to decide whether a crime is serious, but it is a yardstick which can be used.
If the Under-Secretary says that there may well be cases when the child has to be detained for his own good, how much more forceful that argument would be for offences which, in the circumstances in which they were committed, were much more serious than homicide. I emphasise to the Under-Secretary that homicide is


not simply murder but is all the varieties of manslaughter also.
For these reasons I feel that the Government, taking one view, have departed from their principles or, on another view, have been completely wrong-headed from the beginning.

Sir E. Errington: As my hon. Friend the Member for Blackpool, North (Mr. Miscampbell) has said, homicide varies very much from the very serious to the comparatively trivial in regard to manslaughter. A typical example of what might well occur could be a case of manslaughter arising from a fight between two children. Does the Under-Secretary visualise that in those circumstances the Clause should apply?

Mr. Worsley: I sense that the House wishes to come to a decision on the Amendment and I intend to wind up extremely briefly. I understood the Under-Secretary to remark that any child who committed the sort of offence which we seek to include under the Amendment would be certain also to be in need of care and control. I wonder how he argues, as he must if he says this, that there can be circumstances where a child commits homicide and is not in need of care and control. Surely, if he is using that argument for this slightly wider set of cases, he must in logic use it in the case of homicide.
9.45 p.m.
In other words, to draw the line where the Government are seeking to draw it is an illogical place to draw it, and this is what has been said in speech after speech from both sides of the House: it is the illogical place. Surely, the only logical place to draw this line is at what might be called the seriousness of the matter, and this is what we are attempting, by this Amendment, to do. There has been some argument whether this is the best way of defining the seriousness, but certainly none other has been put forward which is more

appealing, and for the moment this is, as it were, the front runner.

I would like to draw the attention of the House to the extremely important effect of new Clause 1 on this Amendment. I quote new Clause 1 but leaving out the irrelevant words:
A qualified informant shall not lay an information unless the informant is of opinion that it would not be adequate for the case to be dealt with by means of proceedings under section 1 of this Act.
The effect of that is to destroy completely the argument used by the hon. Gentleman about the stealing of a lemonade bottle; because, clearly, although of a potentially serious character, larceny, it is, nevertheless, a case of a trivial character. It would be dealt with under new Clause 1 and would not be caught by this Amendment. The Clause which the Government have themselves introduced automatically puts in a procedure which would keep any frivolous or any slight case out of the criminal charge procedure altogether. Thus we have already built in—as it were, accidentally, because the Government have put it in—just the sort of distinction which we are seeking to make between the serious and the frivolous.

I must say to the hon. Gentleman that we intend to divide on this issue because we feel it to be a matter of very real importance. He has listened to the debate, and he must realise that this feeling of its importance is shared widely among hon. Members on both sides of the House, and also the feeling that it is an illogical situation in which we are putting the law if we put homicide in a category different from that of some other offences in this respect. I hope that the Government, whatever position they take about it this evening, will look extremely carefully at this point, because it really is essential that in these matters the law should stand on a firm basis of sense, and, as drafted, the Bill in this respect does not so stand.

Question put, That the Amendment be made:—

The House divided: Ayes 121, Noes 186.

Division No. 235.]
AYES
[9.49 p.m.


Astor, John
Biffen, John
Boyle, Rt. Hn. Sir Edward


Atkins, Humphrey (M't'n &amp; M'd'n)
Biggs-Davison, John
Brinton, Sir Tatton


Balniel, Lord
Birch, Rt. Hn. Nigel
Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. Sir Walter


Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay)
Black, Sir Cyril
Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)


Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gos. &amp; Fhm)
Boardman, Tom (Leicester, S. W.)
Bullus, Sir Eric


Buck, Antony (Colchester)
Berry, Hn. Anthony
Boyd-CarPenter, Rt. Hn. John




Burden, F. A.
Jenkin, Patrick (Woodford)
Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon


Campbell, B. (Oldham, W.)
Jennings, J. C. (Burton)
Ridley, Hn. Nicholas


Campbell, Gordon (Moray &amp; Nairn)
Jopling, Michael
Rodgers, Sir John (Sevenoaks)


Carlisle, Mark
Joseph, Rt. Hn. Sir Keith
Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey)


Clark, Henry
King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)
Russell, Sir Ronald


Clegg, Walter
Kitson, Timothy
Scott, Nicholas


Costain, A. P.
Knight, Mrs. Jill
Sharples, Richard


Cunningham, Sir Knox
Lane, David
Shaw, Michael (Sc'b'gh &amp; Whitby)


Dance, James
Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry
Silvester, Frederick


Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F. (Ashford)
Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)
Sinclair, Sir George


Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)
Longden, Gilbert
Speed, Keith


Elliott, R. W. (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, N.)
MacArthur, Ian
Stainton, Keith


Errington, Sir Eric
McNair-Wilson, Michael
Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir M.


Eyre, Reginald
McNair-Wilson, Patrick (New Forest)
Tapsell, Peter


Fortescue, Tim
Marten, Neil
Taylor, Edward M. (G'gow, Cathcart)


Glover, Sir Douglas
Maude, Angus
Taylor, Frank (Moss Side)


Godber, Rt. Hn. J. B.
Mewby, Ray
Temple, John M.


Gower, Raymond
Miscampbell, Norman
Thatcher, Mrs. Margaret


Grant-Ferris, R.
Monro, Hector
Turton, Rt. Hn. R. H.


Grieve, Percy
Montgomery, Fergus
Vaughan-Morgan, Rt. Hn. Sir John


Griffiths, Eldon (Bury St. Edmunds)
More, Jasper
Vickers, Dame Joan


Hall, John (Wycombe)
Morgan, Geraint (Denbigh)
Waddington, David


Hamilton, Lord (Fermanagh)
Morrison, Charles (Devizes)
Walker, Peter (Worcester)


Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)
Munro-Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh
Walker-Smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek


Harrison, Brian (Malden)
Murton, Oscar
Walters, Dennis


Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)
Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael
Ward, Dams Irene


Hastings, Stephen
Onslow, Cranley
Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William


Heald, Rt. Hn. Sir Lionel
Page, Graham (Crosby)
Wiggin, A. W.


Hiley, Joseph
Page, John (Harrow, W.)
Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)


Hill, J. E. B.
Percival, Ian
Wood, Rt. Hn. Richard


Holland, Philip
Pink, R. Bonner
Worsley, Marcus


Hordern, Peter
Pounder, Rafton



Hornby, Richard
Prior, J. M. L.
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Howell, David (Guildford)
Pym, Francis
Mr. Anthony Grant and


Iremonger, T. L.
Rees-Davies, W. R.
Mr. Bernard Weatherill.


Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)
Renton, Rt. Hn. Sir David





NOES


Abse, Leo
Dunnett, Jack
Lipton, Marcus


Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)
Dunwoody, Dr. John (F'th &amp; C'b'e)
Loughlin, Charles


Alldritt, Walter
Eadle, Alex
Luard, Evan


Anderson, Donald
Edwards, William (Merioneth)
Lubbock, Eric


Archer, Peter
Ellis, John
Lyon, Alexander W. (York)


Armstrong, Ernest
English, Michael
Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)


Ashton, Joe (Bassetlaw)
Ensor, David
Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson


Atkins, Ronald (Preston, N.)
Evans, Fred (Caerphilly)
McCann, John


Atkinson, Norman (Tottenham)
Evans, Ioan L. (Birm'h'm, Yardley)
MacDermot, Niall


Bacon, Rt. Hn. Alice
Fernyhough, E.
McGuire, Michael


Bagier, Gordon A. T.
Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)
Mackenzie, Alasdair (Ross &amp; Crom'ty)


Barnett, Joel
Fowler, Gerry
Mackenzie, Gregor (Rutherglen)


Bidwell, Sydney
Fraser, John (Norwood)
Maclennan, Robert


Binns, John
Freeson, Reginald
MacMillan, Malcolm (Western Isles)


Blackburn, F.
Ginsburg, David
McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, c.)


Booth, Albert
Gregory, Arnold
McNamara, J. Kevin


Bradley, Tom
Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)
Mahon, Peter (Preston, S.)


Bray, Dr. Jeremy
Griffiths, Eddie (Brightside)
Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)


Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.
Grimond, Rt. Hn. J.
Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.)


Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan)
Hamilton, James (Bothwell)
Manuel, Archie


Brown, Bob (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, W.)
Hamilton, William (Fife, W.)
Marks, Kenneth


Brown, R. W. (Shoreditch &amp; F'bury)
Hamling, William
Mellish, Rt. Hn. Robert


Buchan, Norman
Harper, Joseph
Mendelson, John


Buchanan, Richard (G'gow, Sp'burn)
Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)
Millan, Bruce


Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)
Hazell, Bert
Milne, Edward (Blyth)


Callaghan, Rt. Hn. James
Heffer, Eric S.
Mitchell, R. c. (S'th'pton, Test)


Carmichael, Neil
Herbison, Rt. Hn. Margaret
Molloy, William


Carter-Jonss, Lewis
Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas
Moonman, Eric


Coe, Denis
Howell, Denis (Small Heath)
Morgan, Elystan (Cardiganshire)


Coleman, Donald
Howie, W.
Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)


Concannon, J. D.
Hoy, James
Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)


Conlan, Bernard
Huckfield, Leslie
Moyie, Roland


Crawshaw, Richard
Hughes, Roy (Newport)
Neal, Harold


Dalyell, Tam
Hunter, Adam
Newens, Stan


Davidson, Arthur (Accrington)
Hynd, John
Ogden, Eric


Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)
Irvine, Sir Arthur (Edge Hill)
Oram, Albert E.


Davies, Dr. Ernest (Stretford)
Jackson, Peter M. (High Peak)
Orbach, Maurice


Davies, Ifor (Gower)
Johnson, James (K'ston-on-Hull, W.)
Orme, Stanley


Delargy, Hugh
Jones, Rt. Hn. Sir Elwyn (W. Ham, S.)
Oswald, Thomas


Dell, Edmund
Jones, T. Alec (Rhondda, West)
Owen, Will (Morpeth)


Dempsey, James
Kelley, Richard
Paget, R. T.


Diamond, Rt. Hn. John
Kenyon, Clifford
Palmer, Arthur


Dickens, James
Lawson, George
Pannell, Rt. Hn. Charles


Dobson, Ray
Leadbitter, Ted
Parker, John (Dagenham)


Doig, Peter
Lee, Rt. Hn. Frederick (Newton)
Parkyn, Brian (Bedford)







Pavitt, Laurence
Shore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney)
Walker, Harold (Doncaster)


Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred
Short, Rt. Hn. Edward (N'c'tle-u-Tyne)
Wallace, George


Pentland, Norman
Short, Mrs. Renée (W'hampton, N. E.)
Watkins, David (Consett)


Perry, Ernest G. (Battersea, S.)
Silkin, Rt. Hn. John (Deptford)
Watkins, Tudor (Brecon &amp; Radnor)


Perry, George H. (Nottingham, S.)
Silverman, Julius
Wellbeloved, James


Prentice, Rt. Hn. R. E.
Slater, Joseph
Whitaker, Ben


Price, Christopher (Perry Barr)
Small, William
Whitlock, William


Price, Thomas (Westhoughton)
Spriggs, Leslie
Wilkins, W. A.


Price, William (Rugby)
Steele, Thomas (Dunbartonshire, w.)
Williams, Alan Lee (Hornchurch)


Probert, Arthur
Taverne, Dick
Williams, W. T. (Warrington)


Rees, Merlyn
Thomas, Rt. Hn. George
Wilson, Rt. Hn. Harold (Huyton)


Roberts, Gwilym (Bedfordshire, S.)
Thomson, Rt. Hn. George
Wilson, William (Coventry, S.)


Rodgers, William (Stockton)
Thorpe, Rt. Hn. Jeremy
Winstanley, Dr. M. p.


Roebuck, Roy
Tinn, James
Woof, Robert


Ross, Rt. Hn. William
Tuck, Raphael



Rowlands, E.
Varley, Eric G.
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Ryan, John
Wainwright, Edwin (Dearne Valley)
Mr. Alan Fitch and


Shaw, Arnold (Ilford, S.)
Wainwright, Richard (Colne Valley)
Mr. Neil McBride.


Sheldon, Robert

Clause 5

CONSENT REQUIRED FOR CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST YOUNG PERSONS

Amendment made: No. 24, in page 6, line 38, leave ourt Clause 5.—[Mr. Callaghan.]

Clause 6

SUMMARY TRIAL OF YOUNG PERSONS

Amendment made: No. 25, in page 8, line 36, leave out commit the accused' and insert:
'if it is of opinion that there is sufficient evidence to put the accused on trial, commit him'.—[Mr. Callaghan.]

Clause 7

ALTERATIONS IN TREATMENT OF YOUNG OFFENDERS ETC.

Mr. Carlisle: I beg to move, Amendment No. 26, in page 9, line 15, leave out 'seventeen' and insert 'twelve'.
This Amendment concerns the age at which people can be put on probation. The House will know that at present probation is a means—

It being Ten o'clock, further consideration of the Bill, as amended, stood adjourned.

Ordered,
That the Proceedings on the Children and Young Persons Bill may be entered upon and proceeded with at this day's Sitting at any hour, though opposed.—[Mr. Mellish.]

Bill as amended (in Standing Committee), further considered.

Mr. Carlisle: I was saying that, at the moment, probation is a means of sentence available to the court for anyone of any age. Under the Bill, it is proposed that in future no court may put anyone on probation for any offence if he is under 17. The Amendment proposes that instead of 17 the lower age limit should be 12.
At the outset, I ought to make it clear that we are not talking about care proceedings, under Clause 1. We are now considering prosecutions for criminal offences under the new Clause 1 which was the old Clause 5. In other words, we are dealing with people under the age of 17 who are prosecuted and convicted in respect of criminal offences and deciding what should hapen to them. At the moment, the Bill says that they cannot be put on probation and that they can only be made subject to a supervision order. We believe that the power to impose probation orders on people of that age which has existed up till now should continue.
It may be asked why we say that the age should be 12 rather than 17. The age of 12 has been chosen deliberately because, although the Bill intends to provide care proceedings rather than criminal proceedings for young people under the age of 14, the Home Secretary has given an undertaking that at first it will be limited to those up to the age of 12 and that for those over 12 normal criminal proceedings will take place. Since it is with normal criminal proceedings that we are concerned, we think that the lower age limit for putting people on probation should be 12.
I find it difficult to understand the Government's reasoning in proposing that


in future no young person of 14, 15 or 16 and no child of 12 or 13 should be put on probation. I cannot see the advantage that they see in saying that in future, rather than putting a child on probation, he must be put under supervision, which is likely to become the supervision of the local authority.
I believe that that has one very severe disadvantage. I fear that if this occurs, the knowledge acquired by the Probation Service in dealing with young delinquents will be lost. I know that we shall be told that, under the Bill it will be possible for the court to put young people over 14 years of age under the supervision of probation officers. The fact remains that the whole aim of this Measure is to bring children and young persons under the care of the local authority, and there is no doubt that in the case of young persons up to the age of 17 more and more supervision orders will be made putting them under the supervision of children's officers or care officers of the local authorities rather than that of probation officers. We are committing a grave error in removing the knowledge and the expertise gained by probation officers from this whole sphere.
I do not believe that the Home Office has adequately considered the contribution that the probation service has made and is able to make in the treatment and control of young offenders. I am not sure whether this has been fully recognised.
Is there any evidence to suggest that probation, as a means of sentence, has failed with young people any more than it has succeeded or failed with adults? I do not believe that there is any such evidence. I do not believe that there is any evidence to show that probation has been an unsuitable method of sentencing people of this age. The great advantage of using the probation service and, therefore, making probation orders is that it is recognised as an independent service which is responsible to the judiciary.
It is necessary to say something about the size of the problem with which we are concerned. In future, under the Bill, with the absence of the power to put people on probation, everyone who might otherwise be put on probation will have to go into the care or under the supervision of the local authority. The likely-

hood is that, under the Bill, people previously suitable to be put on probation will come under the supervision of the local authority.
I hope that the Minister will be able to give to the House the numbers of young people under the age of 17 who are on probation. I have not got the figures, but I can tell the House that 12,000 young people under the age of 14 are on probation at this moment. Therefore, the figure for those under 17 is substantially increased. Yet in future all those young people on probation to probation officers will come under the supervision of child care officers.
We must surely accept that the child care officer will be wholly overworked by the Bill. I think that we have at the moment 3,038 fully trained child care officers. It is estimated by the Government that the Bill will require another 1,000 child care officers to work it, and I have heard estimates put as high as double the present number.
But are child care officers necessarily more suitable or, indeed, as suitable to deal with young people of 13, 14, 15 and 16 convicted of offences than are our present probation officers? My view is that they are not as suitable. I do not want to be accused of making attacks on child care officers. I do not say that there are not in the child care departments a great many dedicated people. I am sure that they all are. But the fact remains that, of necessity, it is a young service, it is comparatively inexperienced and it has a rapid turnover. There is a wastage rate of about 18 per cent. This is understandable, because they may be young people. A lot of them are females, and the marriage market and everything else comes into it.
One must ask: are they really, for that very reason, more capable of dealing with young people of the ages we are talking about than experienced probation officers? We must remember that up to the age of 14 a child will only be able to be put under the care of the child care officer. For that reason the Amendment is right.
In Committee the Under-Secretary said that we were concerned only with words and that, whereas our case rested on the fact that there was a substantial difference, the reason the Government had


moved from probation orders to supervision orders was that the difference between the two was minimal. This is true to a degree; the requirements under a supervision order may be the same as those under a probation order.
Where the difference is considerable is as to what happens if the person under supervision or on probation breaks the terms of the order or commit a further offence. If during the period of a probation order the probationer commits another offence, he can be and is brought back to the court and punished—sentenced, to use a neutral word—for the original offence. If that is done, the probation order is ended. Or he can be brought back to the court for being in breach of the conditions of the probation order for not reporting to the probation officer, for example. In that case a fine of up to £20 can be imposed, or he can be ordered to attend an attendance centre and the probation order continued. A probationer knows that, if during the period of the probation order he offends again, he can be brought back before the court and punished for the original offence. If he does not abide by the probation officer's instructions, he can be brought back before the court and have it made clear to him that the court has required him to obey the conditions.
In the case of a person under supervision, the only course is to bring him back to the court. The only power of the court is the highly elaborate one of placing him in the care of the local authority. If he commits another offence whilst he is under supervision, there is no means of sentencing him for the original offence. If he ignores the conditions of the supervision order, there is no means of having him dealt with for that in itself. The only power is to bring him back before the court and to ask that he be put into the care of the local authority. It is a power that, of necessity, supervising officers will not be keen to use. As a result, people put under supervision will be under nowhere near the same sense of discipline or requirement to behave as those put on probation.
We are concerned with a matter of major juvenile crime. No one wishes the courts to adopt any attitude other than that of doing what they believe to be

in the best interests of the child. Probation has worked. Probation officers have a knowledge of young people. The added advantage of probation as against a supervision order system is that probation has a heightened discipline and is a heightened deterrent to the person against committing further crimes. I see no argument in favour of removing probation as a means of sentence for those under 17. I greatly hope that the House will agree that probation should be retained as a means of sentence for those over 12 who are convicted of offences.

10.15 p.m.

Mr. Turton: I hope the Government will think again on this point. This Bill has many merits, one of which is to give greater flexibility of treatment. But here flexibility is denied.
The Under-Secretary challenged us to find a difference between a supervision order and a probation order. I do not want to repeat the argument used by my hon. Friend the Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle), but I would mention that I have a certain amount of experience in this matter. In my early days I was an assistant probation officer in the East End of London and since then I have sat on probation case committees and in the juvenile court for some years.
The mistake that is being made, quite apart from that which was mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Runcorn, concerns the attitude of the boy or girl to the probation officer under a probation order and his attitude under supervision order, whether it be a supervision order under a local authority or under a probation officer. The probation order is a personal challenge. It cannot be made unless the young person agrees to it. Once that challenge exists, the young person has got the probation officer—the father-figure, if you like—to help him to run straight. That is the value of a probation order. If we destroy that, we shall be destroying one of the greatest and most worthwhile weapons we have for dealing with juvenile delinquency, and I hope very much that the Government will think again on this point.
That point is not mine alone. The Central Council of Probation and After Care Committees has begged the Government to retain this option, as have many magistrates throughout the country. At


this time, when the whole country is anxious about the spread of juvenile crime, especially among the age group covered by this Amendment, it would be wrong of the Government to take away this option from magistrates. I hope this Amendment will succeed.

Mr. Peter Mahon: I have found myself, out of loyalty, going through the Lobby voting consistently for the different facets of this Bill—

Mr. Callaghan: Out of conviction.

Mr. Mahon: Not only out of conviction but also out of loyalty. I hope that I shall be able to do that for the rest of the evening.
However, it is getting more difficult and I certainly have some misgivings about this facet of the Bill, particularly when one recognises that we are deciding in the not too distant future to let young people have the vote at 18, and now we are deciding that young people who are guilty of misdemeanours should not be subject to probation at the age of 17 and below.
This is extending generosity too far. This is a sort of concession that we could readily make in Utopian circumstances. Bearing in mind the amount of crime that is being committed in our country, we have by no means reached that stage yet. I feel that there is no justification at the moment to revert to kidglove methods. I am not a sadist. When one talks about corporal punishment these days, even in the mildest possible form, one is looked upon as being some sort of a sadist.
What is necessary if corporal punishment is not necessary? I know that it is among our fondest hopes that in the not too distant future, by various methods which we are anxious to try, we shall be able to get into the hearts of people and convince them that this is a good world, that there is no reason for people to resort to dishonesty or violence, and no reason for people not to love and respect their fellow men, but that they should live decently in this splendid country of ours. There should be deterrents of a kind. We are going too far in our desire to say to people, "Whatever misdemeanour you are capable of and what-

ever wrong you do against the social order to the detriment of your fellowmen, the least possible punishment will be administered", rather than the punishment that the crime deserves. The people of this country have always rightly, fervently and faithfully believed that the punishment meted out to any miscreant should be equal to the crime.

Mr. Speaker: Order. I have hesitated to interrupt the hon. Member, but we are discussing in this Amendment whether we should change the age from 17 to 12 for those who come under probation officers.

Mr. Mahon: I agree, Mr. Speaker. The position was outlined by the hon. Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) very well and explicitly. I followed his argument carefully and found that it had great merit. Local authorities have as much responsibility as they can contain at the moment. I say that with a great deal of authority and knowledge for this is my 36th year in local government. That service will probably come to an end, because of political misfortunes, next year. Some hon. Members may think that that is deservedly so, but no one can take from me the knowledge of local government which I am proud to possess.
Children officers have enough on their plates. The other evening in my constituency I went to the 80th anniversary celebrations of the N.S.P.C.C. Cruelties inflicted on young children are still diabolical in the extreme. We need all the children officers we have in local government today to do the type of work they are at present doing. They should continue that work and there should be more officers to do it. To take them from their sphere and project them into a sphere in which they have little or no experience of dealing with reprehensible people would be wrong. Of necessity children's officers are very nice people. They are not cut out for this work. I agree profoundly with the hon. Member for Runcorn, who was right on all counts. The Under-Secretary has batted on a very sticky wicket and has rebutted some redoubtable arguments, but I shall need much convincing about this proposal.

Mr. Callaghan: We had a long discussion on this matter in Committee. I hope that the House will allow me now to intervene to put the case shortly.

Mr. Grieve: There is no case.

Mr. Callaghan: If the hon. and learned Member says that there is no case, it means that he is not prepared to listen to me.

Mr. Grieve: Nor if the Home Secretary will allow me to say so—

Mr. Speaker: Order. We cannot have two hon. Members standing at the same time.

Mr. Callaghan: I think that most hon. Members will agree that a case should be made on this, and I would like to put it.
We have a number of Amendments still to deal with tonight, and therefore I shall put the argument shortly. I think that I can convince my hon. Friend the Member for Preston, South (Mr. Peter Mahon). Although magistrates and those concerned with them have a deep affection and regard for their own system, which I share, because it has stood the country in good stead, I am sure that they recognise that things change. It was a fascinating sidelight on the history of the Father of the House to know that he was once a probation officer in the East End. I did not know this, but I can well imagine it, knowing his humanity. But I would like to say to him that perhaps since those days the situation has changed a little too.
Basically the case—and I think that this is admitted, certainly by the National Association of Probation Officers—is that it is not very sensible to have two almost identical systems running side by side, and the probation system and the supervision system are almost identical. I claim for the supervision system that it is more flexible and more all-embracing than the system of probation, and will be of more value to the children concerned than even the system of probation has been in recent years.
One has only to look at the conditions set out in Clause 12, under which supervision orders are made, to see the wide range of treatments that a child may be asked to undergo. It is far wider than a probation order provides now. Clause

12(2) is the answer to my hon. Friend. This is no weakening of the provisions. Sometimes probation can be very valuable, but at other times it is not so valuable. With his experience my hon. Friend will know that I am right. There are many cases—certainly I know some—where probation does nothing to restore a child to the full sense of community we want to see. In Clause 12(2) my hon. Friend will see something that has been accepted and welcomed by both sides of the House. Here is a wide range of so-called intermediate treatment which is tough. Do not let him be swept away on a misplaced sea of sentiment; there is no sentiment about the Bill. What it tries to do is to substitute not a weaker or more namby-pamby system but a more effective system for that which has existed so far. I do not think that even the most fervent defenders of the probation system would claim that it is Perfection and could never be improved in any way.
The system of supervision orders which replaces the probation system largely overlaps it and provides for a more comprehensive range of treatment. It will therefore be superior to the existing system in trying to provide a service to the child to promote his integration within the community. That is why I think that it is generally agreed that it would be unnecessary to have two systems running side by side. The Opposition certainly do not want to get rid of the supervision orders. They supported them fully on Second Reading and in Committee.
It is true that the child care officers form a young service, but it is not as young as all that. They have been going for over 20 years, and have wide experience. They are no more capable, but no less capable than probation officers in dealing with these situations. Throughout the Bill I have tried to avoid setting up the probation officer against the child care officer. There is, quite rightly, a certain amount of peddling of individual interests. That is what the House is here for—to put forward the interests of this group or that. I am not attacking anybody for doing it, but we must consider whether we are looking at the interests of particular groups or the best way to deal with the children. The approach of the Bill on both sides of the House has been to see what is in the best interests of the children, and that is what


I take my stand on here, not on the best interests of the child care officers, whether or not theirs is a young service, or the best interests of the probation officers, whether or not they have a great deal of experience. What is in the best interests of the children? That is the question the House must answer.
In my view, the system of supervision orders, widely extended as it is, by Clauses 12 and 19, matches the need in a much more comprehensive way than does the probation system, with all the virtues that it has had. I have made clear in Committee, as has my hon. Friend, that probation officers can and will no doubt he used by the courts and in other ways to the fullest extent of their knowledge and capacity.
10.30 p.m.
I want to see—and here I venture on an obiter dictum—these services working much more closely together than at present, not just in probation work but in other work in connection with offences and offenders, in which too many organisations and individual groups are trying to handle one aspect. This is not the time to develop the theme, but there are other fields in which we should bring much more closely together than we have done up to now these groups of people, all of whom have the same basic objectives.
The point put by the hon. Member for Runcorn is that if a child commits a further offence he can be brought back in respect of the original one. If a supervised person commits a further offence he can be dealt with for that. He can be brought back to court, which may make a different order and is entitled to do so if it thinks it right. There is nothing in this provision which weakens the system which exists. Indeed, my view is that it is more wide and more flexible and meets the situation much more fully.
I hope I have convinced hon. Members and that the House will see that there is a formidable and substantial case here and also that, if there is a difference of view, it is not because the Government are being obtuse, for I have given enough examples of my willingness to meet hon. Members and have moved a number of Amendments today to meet views expressed in Committee. But otherwise we would be seeking to preserve a dual

system which will be unnecessary once we have adopted the principle of supervision orders. Therefore, I hope my hon. Friend and others will be able to go into the Lobby with clean hands and pure hearts.

Mr. Grieve: If the Home Secretary had day-to-day experience of the administration of the criminal law and of the service which the probation service gives in that administration and in assistance to the offender he could not have made that speech. He said that he had made a case for the substitution of this new system of assistance by child care officers for those under 17. I listened to see what arguments he had in support of his case but I heard nothing but a series of statements and no arguments which could carry weight with any deliberative assembly.
Over a long period, the probation service has given inestimable service both to the courts and to delinquents in assisting them to rehabilitate themselves and to lead honest lives. The reason probation officers have been able to do this is not only because they are a group of utterly dedicated men and women following a vocation for the sake, very largely, of the good they can do, but because they have unrivalled experience not only of the young delinquents but of all delinquents, and we should be blinding our eyes to the reality of the situation if we did not recognise that a very large number of young delinquents come from delinquent families. The great strength of the probation service and the value of the advice which it gives to the courts and to those it is called upon to look after and assist lies in the fact that it knows the family backgrounds usually from A to Z.
When the probation officer comes before the court, and I have seen the service develop over a number of years since before the war, the court knows that it can place every reliance on the fact that the probation officer is dedicated to assist the wrong-doer if he can and will give cogent, clear and valuable assistance to the court in determining what is the right sentence to pass in any case.
What will happen as a result of the Bill? The under-17s are to be taken


out of the responsibility of the probation officer. He will no longer be the person called upon to assist the court about them. The result will be that responsibility for families will be divided. The probation officer will deal, as he has always dealt, with the over-17s, giving a hand when Johnny and Tommy and Jane and the rest of them in the family have reached that age, able to assist by describing the family background and explaining the difficulties of the mother and father and one must not forget in this context that the probation service has a duty in the civil courts as well as in the criminal courts.
The probation officer will look after the elder brothers and sisters and sometimes the parents, while the child care officer will look after the youngsters when they first offend. This will be bad for the accused, bad for the delinquent young and bad for the administration of the criminal law. That is a view which I have heard expressed by numerous probation officers whose opinions in this matter I respect and value and whom I believe, having carefully considered the matter, to be right.
The Home Secretary said that there was a case for doing this, but he did not explain in detail why. I believe that he and the Home Office have persuaded themselves, for what reasons I know not, that this is a good thing to do, but they have certainly not explained their reasons to the House. As the hon. Member for Preston, South (Mr. Peter Mahon) said, child care officers already have considerable scope in which they render important social and public service and there is room for the activities of both services in connection with the young. But the probation service should be given the opportunity to continue the great service in connection with the young delinquent which it has given to the community for many years.
I support what my hon. Friend the Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) said about the value of the probation order. It carries sanctions with it, for it provides that if a person on probation does not comply with its terms, does not report regularly to the probation officer, does not go to see him when he is asked to go, does not work if there is work available, or commits another offence, he may

be brought before the court. At a time when delinquency is on the increase, this is a valuable sanction which it would be unwise for society to jettison in respect of the under-17s.
For those reasons, I support the Amendments and I hope that the House will divide and carry them.

Mr. Goodhart: There is one aspect of this argument that the Home Secretary did not touch on in his speech and which was not touched upon in Committee. About one-third of the present probation service work is done with young people under the age of 17—in some areas it is higher. Many people join the probation service because they like working with young people and because they feel that they have a special talent for dealing with them. If the Government continue to resist this Amendment these people will be faced with a situation in which they either have to leave the profession which they have made their life, or they will have to give up a valuable area in which they have shown that they have great talent. The Home Secretary said that he hoped that in years to come the supervisory services would come together. I hope that before this debate is ended the Government will realise that by resisting this Amendment, far from bringing the services together, they are driving them apart.

Mr. Miscampbell: We face, by general consent, a worsening situation, with the figures of offences by children with whom we are dealing in this debate rising. I find it surprising that the Government are prepared to give up one of the most valuable services which is available in combating that crime and protecting and guiding those who fall into criminal ways between the ages of 12 and 17. They can only have done so for good reasons, because they are well aware, I know from the Memorandum that they have had, of the great concern in the probation service, which has been spoken of by my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Mr. Goodhart).
The service feels rightly that it wilt be out off from a very special area of endeavour if it does not start its casework until it meets its cases at the age of 17. We have heard some of the reasons why the Government have come to this conclusion. I acknowledge that this is a matter on which there can be


two views. I have come down firmly on one side, and the Home Secretary and his advisers have come down on the other.
The Home Secretary has given us some of his reasons for wanting to get rid of the probation service up to the age of 17. They include the following. First we are told that there should not be two systems. Why on earth not? It would be extraordinary in our society if we went in for logical organisation in every area of social endeavour. We are practically running two systems at the moment, and I cannot believe that administrative tidiness is worth the loss which there will inevitably be if we lose the probation service for those under 17.
It is said that the probation service cannot provide the new systems provided in Clause 12. Why on earth not? No doubt we can make them available to the service. There is nothing exclusive about them. The service should be able to make use of all the provisions in the Bill and it should continue to serve the courts in the way it has done. In the difficult cases it will be able to bring a wealth of experience to the courts which may not be available to the local authority.
It is not for those reasons that I want to urge the House that a different decision should be taken. I concentrate on one out of the many points that could be raised. My hon. Friend the Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) mentioned the question of the independence of the probation service in its relationship with the courts and with the offender. It is that independence I want to emphasise. It is first noticeable before trial, before any process of law takes place, when a probation officer goes to the offender's home and can have a free discussion with him about his home background, why he did it and what he did. The probation officer can ask the boy what he will plead and what he will say. The boy or girl may well tell him facts which he does not want disclosed to the court. He may be completely open and honest with the probation officer. He can do that because the probation officer is in no way involved in the prosecution.
10.45 p.m.
That is not the case where supervision is conducted by the local authority. The local authority services will, in part,

decide whether there should be proceedings for care because there is an unsatisfactory home background. The local authority is thus itself involved in decision-making as to whether there should be proceedings. It is equally involved in all the inquiries which have to be made if there are proceedings because the child is in need of care and supervision.
Over and above that, there are the other relationships which exist between a problem family and the local authority. The family may well be in a council house. It may be in arrear with rent. It may view those who come from the local authority as not helping, but hindering. There might be a demand for payment of arrears of rent. Although they may not be connected with the local authority, the gas and electricity board men may be regarded by the family as being associated with the local authority and as making life difficult for them. These are the very families who, as it were, produce the clients for the local authority for supervision orders.
For that reason alone, because there cannot be the same trust in total independence, it is useful to keep the probation service available for children and young persons of all ages from 12 upwards. Of course, we would not use them in every case, but there would be many cases in which it would be immensely useful to have their services available. I cannot think that we have heard any reasons urged upon us, either in Committee or tonight, which should make us give up one of the universally-respected British institutions which has been followed throughout the world and which has proved so successful for us in the courts over the years.

Dame Irene Ward: I support the Amendment. I hope that the Home Secretary will realise that I waited until I had heard what he had to say before I sought an opportunity to speak. I listened carefully to the right hon. Gentleman.
The Home Secretary put his case with great charm and deliberation, but his experience, at least in recent years, has been at the top and not in local administration. I noticed with some surprise that he never really mentioned the view of the courts as to which was the best system and whether the Amendment


would be likely to be more acceptable to the courts than the explanation which he has put forward.
I am as certain as it is possible to be in a difficult world that the courts would much prefer to maintain the probation service with its present powers. I am sorry that the right hon. Gentleman did not deal a little more with the attitude of the courts in the administration of justice. The courts rely, and have learnt to rely over many years, on the probation service. I sit as a magistrate, although with my membership of the House of Commons I am not now able to attend the courts very often. However, I know that the probation service has grown up within the courts and that we rely on the probation service; we know that the probation officers know exactly how the magistrates' minds work on these matters; and it is very important, in assessing a problem of this kind, that all angles should be taken into consideration, and not just the rather emotional desire—as I often rather suspect it is—of the Home Office, with the difficulties which the Home Office faces to try something different. I do not believe that to make alterations is always for the good of society.
The general public make a very great distinction between the probation service and the child care and other local authority services, about which many families can get very confused. If we have two distinct services, the probation service with its traditional work and with all the work which it has been able to render—

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. I hesitate to interrupt the hon. Lady, but she must relate her remarks more to the Amendment. We are not discussing the child care service and local authority services but an Amendment to delete the age of 17 and to substitute the age of 12.

Dame Irene Ward: I hate to make any comments on that observation, but I really do not think that the Home Secretary talked very much about that. I did not notice that he referred to that subject at all. He spent all his time talking about the child care service and its advantage compared with the probation service, and why this new restriction should be imposed on the probation service. I find it really a little hard if a

Minister can sail away with all sorts of ideas, and then, when back benchers try to answer what the Minister has said, we are told we have to stick to the Amendment. I really do not think that is quite fair—

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. The hon. Lady must not challenge the Ruling of the Chair. The Minister, in my view, was completely in order.

Dame Irene Ward: I am not challenging you, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I am challenging the Home Secretary. If I have to get off my subject I will have much bigger and harder blows at the Home Secretary, and presumably, if he is going to make a speech, I am entitled to say what I think about him, and what I think about the Home Office administration, which I sometimes think is quite stupid, and, at the top, does not always know what it is talking about. I am sorry to have to say that, but I am jolly well going to say it, if I am not allowed, even as a magistrate, to talk about making this proposed restriction. If I am permitted to say it in a sentence, I will say in a sentence that I am sorry we have to reduce the probation service to the courts by altering the age to 17. I am sorry we have to do that, and I think it is wrong we should have to do it. I will repeat again, I think it is wrong we should have to do it, and I will say it again: I think it is wrong we should have to do it.
The Home Secretary talked a lot about families, so I may be allowed to talk about families. The probation service is allowed, in its operation for the courts, to deal with boys and girls under 17—perhaps that will put me in order. Families are much more likely to be confused and to take not such a serious view of their young people's misdeeds if the young people have to be absorbed into the child care service and the local authority services, as distinct from the probation service. As a magistrate, I would regret this very much indeed. I listened carefully to the speech of the Home Secretary in which he did not mention age. He was searching for a change in function for this service. He did not put up a case but merely said that he thought it would be a good idea. We all have lots of good ideas which may not always be practical, and he gave no practical reasons why this


Amendment dealing with age should not be accepted.
I would like to see a great deal more, which has nothing to do with the probation service, done by the child care service, and it would be a great pity for the child care service, which is so necessary in human relations, to spend time in interfering with the great work which is done by the probation service.
I repeat that I regret that the Home Secretary did not give a little more advice on how the courts would regard his new proposals as against the Amendment. I am not a statistician, and I probably would not be in order if I were to talk about statistics, but the question of the age is not a statistical matter, and I am sorry that the Home Secretary did not say more about how the courts would react to his proposal.
I hope the Amendment will be pressed to a Division and that, for once, the Home Office will pay a little more attention to the feelings of responsible people who have served for so many years in all sorts of capacities. Although the Home Secretary made his speech with great charm, there was nothing in it. It is possible to be extremely charming without ever doing or saying anything, and I hope we shall wholeheartedly defeat him in the Division.

Sir Douglas Glover: Were it not for what the Home Secretary said, I would not have risen. We are all, as he said, trying to look after the interests of children rather than the interests of probation officers or child care officers, and it is right that we should do so.
The Home Secretary has it the wrong way round. When thinking of the children, particularly the younger element rather than the 17-year olds, in making up one's mind where the balance lies, there is an enormous amount in what my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Solihull (Mr. Grieve) said about the probation officer having a long history behind him. However successful the new law may be, many of those between the ages of 12 and 17 who reach the courts will come back to the courts again; this is the way in which human nature works; and therefore the probation officer, with his much longer family background, is far better able to deal with these problems

over a long period than any child care officer in any local authority.
11.0 p.m.
I thought that the Home Secretary got it the wrong way round. He said that he thought that there were far too many divisions in this Clause, but he is only making another, in that probation will now start at 17 years of age, and anyone below 17 will be the responsibility of the child care officer of the local authority.
I do not want the right hon. Gentleman to make any off-the-cuff decision, but I would like to put this point to him. He proposes that child care officers should deal with anyone under 17. It must not be forgotten, however, that child care officers deal with quite a lot of cases which have nothing to do with crime. Cases are referred to them by such bodies as the R.S.P.C.C. Children are put into their care because of their family environments, but those children have committed no crime.
Amongst the general public, a person on probation is looked upon as someone who has committed a misdemeanour. It is now proposed that a young person under 17 who has committed a misdemeanour shall be put under the care of the same person who cares for those who have committed no misdemeanour but whose parents have. That will result in perfectly innocent boys and girls feeling that in some way they are linked with the criminal element.
If the Government's proposal is accepted, we shall find the more solid type of young criminal between the ages of 12 and 17 being looked after by the child care officer—

Mr. Callaghan: Child care officers already look after children up to the age of 17 who may have committed a misdemeanour.

Sir D. Glover: But that would be a minor misdemeanour, otherwise those children would certainly be on probation. That is where the Home Secretary has it wrong.
All the speeches that I have heard convince me that the House would be wise to accept the Amendment, because the weight of the argument is on our side. If the matter is pressed to a Division, I shall be only too happy to vote for the Amendment.

Mr. Wersley: It has been common ground in the debate that the services of the probation officers command the highest respect. The House feels that the probation service has been and should continue to be a very important element in our system.
The difference comes in our attitude to the Home Secretary's words to the effect that the probation service would be used to the fullest extent in the new system. The right hon. Gentleman must realise that he has not convinced my hon. Friends of this.
He must appreciate, to begin with, that as a result of the Bill it will not be possible to use probation officers initially for children under 12 and eventually for children under 14 unless there is already a member of the family under a probation officer. So far from using them to the fullest extent, instantly they are taken out of an important section of their present work.

I cannot escape the feeling that the long term intention at least is that they should do less and less for the next section; namely, young people between the ages of 14 and 17. Therefore, we feel—and I think that the Home Secretary has only himself to blame if he has given this impression wrongly—that there is an intention gradually to squeeze the probation service out of the supervision of young people and to hand it over entirely to the children's service.

We regard this as a great error. We believe that there is a wealth of practical experience among probation officers that should be used not only for adults, but also for young people.

For these reasons, if the Home Secretary cannot meet us on this point, we will go into the Lobby in support of the Amendment.

Question put, That the Amendment be made:—

The House divided: Ayes 117, Noes 160.

Division No. 236.]
AYES
[11.6 p.m.


Astor, John
Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)
Percival, Ian


Atkins, Humphrey (M't'n &amp; M'd'n)
Hastings, Stephen
Pink, R. Benner


Balniel, Lord
Hiley, Joseph
Pounder, Rafton


Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gos. &amp; Fhm)
Hill, J. E. B.
Prior, J. M. L.


Berry, Hn. Anthony
Holland, Philip
Pym, Francis


Biffen, John
Hordorn, Peter
Ramsden, Rt. Hn. James


Biggs-Davison, John
Hornby, Richard
Rees-Davies, W. R.


Birch, Rt. Hn. Nigel
Howell, David (Guildford)
Renton, Rt. Hn. Sir David


Black, Sir Cyril
Hunt, John
Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon


Boardman, Tom (Leicester, S. W.)
Iremonger, T. L.
Ridley, Hn. Nicholas


Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hn. John
Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)
Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey)


Boyle, Rt. Hn. Sir Edward
Jenkin, Patrick (Woodford)
Russell, Sir Ronald


Brinton, Sir Tatton
Jopling, Michael
Scott, Nicholas


Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. Sir Walter
Joseph, Rt. Hn. Sir Keith
Sharples, Richard


Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)
King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)
Shaw, Michael (Sc'b'gh &amp; Whitby)


Buck, Antony (Colchester)
Kitson, Timothy
Silvester, Frederick


Burden, F. A.
Knight, Mrs. Jill
Sinclair, Sir George


Campbell, B. (Oldham, W.)
Lane, David
Speed, Keith


Campbell, Gordon (Moray &amp; Nairn)
Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry
Stainton, Keith


Carlisle, Mark
Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)
Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir M.


Clark, Henry
Longden, Gilbert
Taylor, Frank (Moss Side)


Clegg, Walter
McAdden, Sir Stephen
Temple, John M.


Costain, A. P.
MacArthur, Ian
Thorpe, Rt. Hn. Jeremy


Cunningham, Sir Knox
Mackenzie, Alasdair (Ross &amp; Crom'ty)
Turton, Rt. Hn. R. H.


Dance James
McNair-Wilson, Michael
Vaughan-Morgan, Rt. Hn. Sir John


Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F. (Ashford)
McNair-Wilson, Patrick (New Forest)
Waddington, David


Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)
Marten, Neil
Wainwright, Richard (Colne Valley)


Elliott, R. W. (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, N.)
Maude, Angus
Walker, Peter (Worcester)


Errington, Sir Eric
Mawby, Ray
Walters, Dennis


Fortescue, Tim
Miscampbell, Norman
Ward, Dame Irene


Glover, Sir Douglas
Monro, Hector
Weatherill, Bernard


Godber, Rt. Hn. J. B.
Montgomery, Fergus
Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William


Gower, Raymond
More, Jasper
Wiggin, A. W.


Grant-Ferris, R.
Morgan, Geraint (Denbigh)
Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)


Grieve, Percy
Morrison, Charles (Devizes)
Winstanley, Dr. M. P.


Griffiths, Eldon (Bury St. Edmunds)
Munro-Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh
Woodnutt, Mark


Hall, John (Wycombe)
Murton, Oscar
Worsley, Marcus


Hamilton, Lord (Fermanagh)
Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)
Onslow, Cranley
Mr. Reginald Eyre and


Harrison, Brian (Maldon)
Page, Graham (Crosby)
Mr. Anthony Grant.




NOES


Abse, Leo
Hamilton, James (Bothwell)
Newens, Stan


Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)
Hamilton, William (Fife, W.)
Ogden, Eric


Alldritt, Walter
Hamling, William
Oram, Albert E.


Archer, Peter
Harper, Joseph
Orbach, Maurice


Ashton, Joe (Bassetlaw)
Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)
Orme, Stanley


Atkins, Ronald (Preston, N.)
Haseldine, Norman
Oswald, Thomas


Atkinson, Norman (Tottenham)
Hazell, Bert
Owen, Will (Morpeth)


Bagier, Gordon A. T.
Herbison, Rt. Hn. Margaret
Palmer, Arthur


Barnett, Joel
Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas
Parker, John (Dagenham)


Bidwell, Sydney
Howell, Denis (Small Heath)
Parkyn, Brian (Bedford)


Binns, John
Howie, W.
Pavitt, Laurence


Blackburn, F.
Hoy, James
Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred


Booth, Albert
Huckfield, Leslie
Pentland, Norman


Bray, Dr. Jeremy
Hughes, Roy (Newport)
Perry, Ernest G. (Battersea, S.)


Brooks, Edwin
Hynd, John
Perry, George H. (Nottingham, S.)


Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.
Jackson, Colin (B'h'se &amp; Spenb'gh)
Prentice, Rt. Hn. R. E.


Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan)
Jackson, Peter M. (High Peak)
Price, Christopher (Perry Barr)


Brown, Bob (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, W.)
Johnson, James (K'ston-on-Hull, W.)
Price, William (Rugby)


Brown, R. W. (Shoreditch &amp; F'bury)
Jones, Rt. Hn. Sir Elwyn (W. Ham, S.)
Probert, Arthur


Buchan, Norman
Jones, T. Alec (Rhondda, West)
Rees, Merlyn


Buchanan, Richard (G'gow, Sp'burn)
Kenyon, Clifford
Roberts, Albert (Normanton)



Lawson, George
Roberts, Gwilym (Bedfordshire, S.)


Callaghan, Rt, Hn. James
Leadbitter, Ted
Rodgers, William (Stockton)


Carmichael, Neil
Lee, Rt. Hn. Frederick (Newton)
Roebuck, Roy


Coe, Denis
Lipton, Marcus
Ross, Rt. Hn. William


Coleman, Donald
Loughlin, Charles
Rowlands, E.


Conlan, Bernard
Luard, Evan
Ryan, John


Crawshaw, Richard
Lyon, Alexander W. (York)
Shaw, Arnold (Ilford, S.)


Dalyell, Tam
Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)
Sheldon, Robert


Davidson, Arthur (Accrington)
Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson
Shore, Rt. Hn, Peter (Stepney)


Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)
McBride, Neil
Short, Mrs. Renée (W'hampton, N. E.)


Davies, Dr. Ernest (Stretford)
McCann, John
Silkin, Rt. Hn. John (Deptford)


Davies, Ifor (Gower)
MacDermot, Niall
Silverman, Julius


Delargy, Hugh
McGuire, Michael
Slater, Joseph


Dell, Edmund
Mackenzie, Gregor (Rutherglen)
Spriggs, Leslie


Dempsey, James
Maclennan, Robert
Taverne, Dick


Diamond, Rt. Hn. John
MacMillan, Malcolm (Western Isles)
Thomas, Rt. Hn. George


Dobson, Ray
McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)
Thomson, Rt. Hn. George


Dunnett, Jack
McNamara, J. Kevin
Tinn, James


Dunwoody, Dr. John (F'th &amp; C'b'e)
Mahon, Peter (Preston, S.)
Tuck, Raphael


Eadie, A'ex
Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)
Varley, Eric C.


Ellis, John
Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.)
Wainwright, Edwin (Dearne Valley)


English, Michael
Manuel, Archie
Walker, Harold (Doncaster)


Ensor, David
Marks, Kenneth
Wallace, George


Evans, Fred (Caerphilly)
Mellish, Rt. Hn. Robert
Watkins, David (Consett)


Evans, Ioan L. (Birm'h'm, Yardley)
Mendelson, John
Watkins, Tudor (Brecon &amp; Radnor)


Fernyhough, E.
Millan, Bruce
Wellbeloved, James


Fitch, Alan (Wigan)
Milne, Edward (Blyth)
Whitlock, William


Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)
Mitchell, R. C. (S'th'pton, Test)
Williams, Alan Lee (Hornchurch)


Fowler, Gerry
Molloy, William
Wilson, William (Coventry, S.)


Fraser, John (Norwood)
Morgan, Elystan (Cardiganshire)
Woof, Robert


Freeson, Reginald
Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)



Gregory, Arnold
Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)
Moyle, Roland
Mr. Ernest Armstrong and


Griffiths, Eddie (Brightside)
Neal, Harold
Mr. J. D. Concannon

11.15 p.m.

Mr. Elystan Morgan: I beg to move Amendment No. 27, in page 9, line 30, leave out from beginning to end of line 31 and insert:
detention for defaults) shall cease to apply to young persons".
This is a technical Amendment. Clause 7(4) provides that Section 5 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1961, which provides for detention for defaults in the case of young persons, shall cease to have effect except as applied, in the case of persons over the age of 17, by Section 6.
As a result of amendments made in Committee to improve the drafting of the Bill, paragraph 37 of Schedule 4 now amends Section 5 so as to apply directly

to the case of persons over the age of 17, and Schedule 5 instead of repealing Section 5 except as applied by the provisions of Section 6 to the over-17's, repeals those provisions of Section 6.
The present Amendment is consequential on these Committee amendments.

Amendment agreed to.

Mr. Elystan Morgan: I beg to move Amendment No. 28, in page 10, line 15, leave out "young person guilty of any offence" and insert:
person guilty of an offence and either he is a young person or was a young person when the proceedings in question were begun
Clause 7(8) imposes a duty on an adult magistrates' court, where it finds a


young person guilty of an offence, to exercise their power under Section 56 of the Children and Young Persons Act, 1933, to remit the case to a juvenile court, unless it decides to make any of the orders mentioned in the subsection, for example a discharge or a fine.
Section 29(1) of the Children and Young Persons Act, 1963, provides that where care, protection or control proceedings in respect of a young person are begun before a juvenile court, and the young person attains the age of 17 before the conclusion of the proceedings, the court may continue to deal with the case and make any order which it could have made if he had not attained that age. In criminal proceedings the court has a similar power to continue to deal with the case under Section 48 of the 1933 Act, but in the case of Hamlyn v. Pearce—

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. Perhaps we could have a little silence. There are too many committee meetings taking place.

Mr. Morgan: In the case of Hamlyn v. Pearce in 1962 the Divisional Court held, with some reluctance, that there was no power to make an approved school order or a fit person order after the person had attained the age of 17. The court clearly regarded it as unfortunate that this should be the law.
The Amendment requires the adult court to remit the case to the juvenile court where the offender is a young person or was a young person before the proceedings began and attained the age of 17 at any time during the proceedings.

Amendment agreed to.

Further Amendment made: No. 29, in page 10, line 19, leave out 'the young person' and insert 'him'—[Mr. Elystan Morgan.]

Mr. Elystan Morgan: I beg to move Amendment No. 30, in page 10, line 20, leave out second 'or'.
The purpose of this Amendment and the next Amendment, No. 31, is to deal with a point raised by the hon. Gentleman the Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) in Committee.

Mr. Carlisle: I merely want to say thank you to the hon. Gentleman for

bringing forward this Amendment. It seems to have made the Clause very much better than it was before.

Amendment agreed to.

Further Amendment made: No. 31, in page 10, line 23, at end insert:
'or an order under section 5 or 7 of the Road Traffic Act 1962 (which relate respectively to the disqualification of drivers and the endorsement of licences'.—[Mr. Elystan Morgan.]

Clause 8

FINGER-PRINTING OF SUSPECTED YOUNG PERSONS

Amendments made:

No. 32, in page 10, line 24, leave out subsection (1) and insert—
(1) If a police officer not below the rank of inspector makes an application on oath to a justice stating—

(a) that there is evidence sufficient to justify the laying of an information that a young person has or is suspected of having committed an offence punishable with imprisonment in the case of an adult; and
(b) that with a view to deciding, in accordance with section (Restrictions on criminal proceedings for offences by young persons) of this Act, whether the information should be laid it is appropriate in the opinion of the officer for an order under subsection (2) of this section to be made in respect of the young person,

the justice may if he thinks fit issue a summons or warrant for the purpose of securing the attendance of the young person before a magistrates' court with a view to the making of such an order in respect of him.

No. 33, in page 11, line 6, leave out 'information' and insert 'application'.

No. 34, in line 8, leave out subsection (4).—[Mr. Elystan Morgan.]

Mrs. Knight: I beg to move Amendment No. 35, in page 11, line 12, at end insert—
(5) Where the finger or palm-prints of a young person have been taken by a constable, then the finger-prints or palm-prints and all copies and records of them shall be destroyed not more than ten years from the date of the taking of such prints if since such date the person to whom they relate has not been convicted of any further offence; and the provisions of this section shall be in addition to those of any other enactment under which finger-prints or palm-prints shall be destroyed.
My hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Sir E. Errington) and I are rather concerned about this matter. While it is not nearly of such importance as that on which we had our last debate a few moments ago, it is nevertheless


a matter of some importance and some principle. My hon. Friend and I are concerned that finger prints and palm prints taken by a police constable from a young person will henceforward remain on record.
I do not like to think that young people who have been involved in some brush with the law will for ever have their finger prints on record. After all, they may not have done anything very bad. They may merely have committed some youthful misdemeanour for which in days gone by the "bobby" on the beat would have given them a brisk box on the ears and that would have been the end of that. In fact, it is debatable that a box on the ears was not probably more effective in putting an end to trouble than some of the measures which we are discussing now. Nevertheless, a mere youthful misdemeanour could easily result in the finger prints and palm prints being taken.
Even if, on the other hand, it was not a misdemeanour but something quite bad, I would have thought that after a certain period of time and after whatever crime had been committed had been paid for—even if by only seeing the children officer or the probation officer regularly—there would be a strong case for those fingerprints to be removed from the record. Some people who have their finger prints taken—and this would include young persons—are completely innocent of any crime.
A month or so ago I had the misfortune to have my house burgled. Two young persons entered it. I am bound to say that I am not gravely concerned whether they were under 17 or not. The fact is that they broke into my house and ransacked it and left a considerable number of finger prints behind them. In the course of justice I had to go to the local police station and have my own finger prints taken; no doubt they are enshrined in the archives in Scotland Yard and, for all I know, they may be there for evermore.
I have no objection to my finger prints being on record. But one of the rules of debate is that one should not argue from the general to the particular, and in this case I find myself unable to argue from the particular to the general. In other words, I find it quite impossible to say that just because I have no objection to my finger prints being on record

nobody else ought to have any possible objection. I have an objection to law-abiding people having to have their finger prints on record for evermore. There is something Third Reichish about it.
Some people may say, as an hon. Friend of mine said to me this evening, that if a person is innocent there is no reason why he should mind his prints being on record at Scotland Yard. It that is the case, why should we stop merely at finger prints of people who have been engaged in some crime or misdemeanour or who inadvertently happened to be at the place of some trouble and who have had their finger prints taken in order to separate them from the finger prints of whoever committed the crime? Either everyone should have his finger prints taken or only the finger prints of enemies or potential enemies of society and those who have not discharged their debt to society should be on record. If we say that finger prints should be on record, why not have photographs taken and listed in the archives?
If a large number of finger prints are kept permanently on record that occasions much difficulty. When I had the experience I have told the House about, I asked the local police inspector whether I would soon know if my finger prints coincided with any on record at Scotland Yard. He replied that I could not expect to have an answer quickly because so many finger prints were on record at Scotland Yard. He replied that I could not expect to have an answer quickly because so many finger prints were on record at the Yard that it would take two or three months to make sure that none coincided with those found in my house. Far too many people think that one slips a photograph into a kind of computer and the answer comes out in five minutes. It may not be generally recognised that to have a large number of finger prints taken does not make things easier, but more difficult.
If one commits a motoring offence of the kind for which one's licence is endorsed, the endorsement is finally wiped out when the licence is cleared. The same should take place with finger prints. I draw attention to the words of the Amendment, they
shall be destroyed not more than ten years from the date of the taking of such prints if since such date the person to whom they


relate has not been convicted of any further offence.
It is not suggested that they should be taken off the record while society might think that there is any further danger from that person, but that after 10 years they should be removed from the record.
Some people would consider that one was perennially punished for having been involved in a crime if the finger prints remained on the record. Logically, or illogically, they think it a punishment to have their finger prints on record at Scotland Yard. This is a principle that the Amendment seeks to probe and to alter. The slate and the record should be cleared after 10 years if the person has committed no further crime and there is no reason why the record should remain.

Sir E. Errington: I support the Amendment moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Mrs. Knight). The whole question of finger prints is of some difficulty, particularly when dealing with young persons. So far as one knows there is not the element of deceit which might distinguish older persons in regard to their identity. There is probably more ability to identify a young person than an older person. In those circumstances we want to be very careful about how long and in what way the finger prints should be taken. In some cases finger printing may even be a worse thing for the rehabilitation—if that be the right word—of young people, because there is sometimes a feeling that they are big boys having had their finger prints taken.
As a magistrate, I feel very strongly that in considering the record of an adult coming before me I would not consider convictions dating back more than 10 years. It would be a retrograde step to try to label a young person by retaining his finger prints for a prolonged period. I shall not pontificate on whether or not it is necessary to have the finger printing procedure for young persons. But if it is necessary there is an unanswerable case for not retaining the finger prints for the rest of their lives. There should be a period—and perhaps five years is better—after which a clean sheet is started. I hope that the Government will agree, and that this or a similar Amendment can be made.

11.30 p.m.

Mr. Elystan Morgan: Under the present law, when a person aged not less than 14 is charged or summoned for an offence punishable in an adult with imprisonment the police may apply to a court for an order to take his fingerprints and palm prints. If he is not convicted the prints must be destroyed, and where the prints have been obtained by consent they are, as a result of administrative procedures, destroyed in similar circumstances.
So far as is possible, the Clause is intended to preserve the existing practice. The Amendment would introduce an entirely new principle, that even if a young person has been found guilty his finger prints or palm prints should nevertheless be destroyed if thereafter he remains free from convictions for 10 years.
I well appreciate the reason underlying the Amendment—a feeling that a stigma attaches to the existence in police records of a person's finger prints. This view was expressed in Committee, although not strongly supported. I then undertook to consider the matter, and I have done so. I appreciate that it will not satisfy those who hold this view to be assured that police records are confidential and not disclosed to other persons, or that the records are required not only to establish positive identification but also to eliminate persons possibly involved in a matter, which could protect some individuals from what they would regard as harassment by the police.
It is, however, generally accepted that finger prints are of considerable importance in police work. Finger prints and palm prints will be obtained under this Clause for a variety of reasons. They could be obtained as a preliminary to a decision by the police whether to use informal methods of dealing with the offender, but it is possible that they will be obtained in the early stages of an extremely serious case where there would certainly be a prosecution.
A whole spectrum of cases may, therefore, be involved, ranging from the least to the most serious offences. In my submission, it would be inimical to the interests of the public that, irrespective of the nature of the offence, finger prints and palm prints should automatically be


destroyed in the circumstances envisaged after the lapse of 10 years. For example, it is wrong that the police should be deprived of this aid to detection when the individual concerned, although between the ages of 14 and 17, has been guilty of grave offences involving felonies, major larcenies or sexual offences, for example.
Further, it is not sufficient to argue that retention is unnecessary if the individual concerned has not committed another offence during the span of 10 years. This may be so, but it may be that the individual has as a result of conviction spent a good part of this period in some form of detention and has been compelled to be of good behaviour during the period. It may be that for a period of 10 years he has taken to wearing gloves. Although this would not normally be so, it would be difficult to defend a situation in which in the event of a second offence the police were unable, in spite of the existence of finger prints or palm prints at the scene of the crime, to connect them with a grave offence.
I would not go so far as to say—I have considered the matter—that there is no merit whatever in the case put forward by the hon. Members, but I am sure they will agree with me that it is necessary to balance that case against the very considerable help which finger prints and palm prints can give to the police. They are kept confidentially they are not disclosed to employers or anybody else. No man has anything to fear on account of his finger prints being kept by the police save, and only, in the event of his committing a further offence. In the circumstances, I ask the House to reject the Amendment.

Amendment negatived.

Clause 9

INVESTIGATIONS BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES

Mr. Carlisle: I beg to move Amendment No. 36, in page 11, line 13, leave out subsection (1).

Mr. Deputy Speaker: It might be for the convenience of the House to discuss at the same time Amendment No. 40, in page 11, line 24, leave out 'health'.
Amendment No. 45, in line 27, leave out 'mentioned in subsection (1) of this section', and insert:
'before whom proceedings are brought under section 1 of this Act'.
Amendment No. 47, in line 28, leave out 'aforesaid' and Amendment No. 48, in line 30, leave out 'the matters aforesaid', and insert:
'the school record, health, and character of the child or young person in question'.

Mr. Carlisle: The Clause, which has raised a considerable degree of controversy from time to time, deals with the question of reports to the courts when children or young persons are brought before them. The Clause as it stands lays a duty on the local authority when any young person or child is being brought before the court on the basis either of care proceedings or of prosecution to make reports to the court about the person's home surroundings, school record, health and general character.
The short issued raised, and the issue between us, is who are the right people who should make the reports to the courts in proceedings of this kind. The argument against the Clause as it stands is clear and is summed up by the fact that there is a grave danger that people will feel that the local authority, through its children's officer, is to be the prosecuting authority, the reporting authority to the court and, at the same time, the treatment agency to which the court eventually sentences the person.
It is felt very strongly, particularly by the probation service, that to give this power of making reports to the court will effect, or give the impression of effecting, the impartiality of the court.
Many people will be brought before the court as being in need of care or control where the local authority has already failed; or they will be brought before the court because the local authority has decided that there are grounds for suggesting that they are in need of care or control or because the local authority, having already been consulted, a prosecution is to be brought. In every one of these cases the local authority is to a large extent the body behind the prosecution or is bringing the person before the court. If the same agencies which prosecute are to be the agencies which make the reports to the court, it may be clear from the child's point of view that


those reports are bound to be bad, because if they were not bad then the local authority would not have brought the proceedings. The reports are bound, from the child's point of view, to appear to be other than impartial. During 1967, for example, the probation service, which normally makes these reports, made some 67,000 written reports to the courts. By putting that duty in future on the local authority one is yet again increasing the work of the children's officers.
I ask the Home Secretary to consider whether this Clause as it stands is necessary. The local authority, under Clause 1, is already required before bringing proceedings to be satisfied that there are grounds for bringing them. Under Clause 2, it is required to make inquiries itself when proceedings are to be brought. It seems unnecessary that it should also be given the power to make reports to the court when the court is deciding what to do with the person concerned. Surely it is far better that these reports should come, as at present, from the probation service, which is recognised as being impartial and there to serve the judiciary. Obviously, under Schedule 5 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1948, the court can already require the probation service to make the reports
I shall not go into detail on the Amendments we are discussing with Amendment No. 35 but the purpose is, first to do away with the duty of local authorities to provide reports in advance to the court; secondly, to leave the situation as it is whereby, normally, under local arrangement the reports are made by the probation service on the home surroundings of the child; and thirdly, merely to put on the local authority the same duty as at the moment rests on the probation service, whereby, if, when the matter comes before the court, the court in its wisdom asks the local authority for a report on the school record, the health and character of the child, just as it may have received a report from the probation officer on the home surroundings, the local authority should be under a duty to provide that report. I believe that, if we do this, we will ensure that the reports given by the probation officer directly to the court continue to be independent and that we will avoid the grave danger, which many people see in the Clause as it stands, that the local

authority will be cast in the rôle of prosecutor, adviser to the court and the body which eventually deals with the person concerned as well.

11.45 p.m.

Mr. Gilbert Longden: A particularly objectionable feature of the Clause is that it imposes a duty on the local authorities to make a report upon the health of a child or young person. As the Home Secretary will know, the British Medical Association fears that the Clause will impose on medical officers of health a duty to reveal confidential medical details in court. As the right hon. Gentleman will also know, the principle at the moment is that the court can insist upon medical evidence about the health of an individual only by serving a subpoena on a medical witness and requiring him to answer questions. The Clause will undermine that principle if the word "health" is left in it. That is the object of Amendment No. 40 which, together with this Amendment, I commend to the House.

Mr. Callaghan: I am not sure about a subpoena. My understanding is that this subsection replaces Section 35 of the Children and Young Persons Act, 1933, and that Section places on local authorities the duty to provide the juvenile court with information about the home surroundings, school record, health and character of a child or young person appearing before the court. If that is so, and I understand that it is, this responsibility and duty must have existed for the last 36 years without attracting at any rate a great deal of adverse criticism; so I doubt whether there is much in this point.
The health of a child may be very germane to the case. If the parents did not like what was said about the child's health, there would be absolutely nothing to prevent them from calling their own family doctor if they wished either to amplify or refute what had been said. I can think of a number of cases when what was happening to the health of the child would be of great importance to the court, and I hope that that Amendment will not be pressed.
The hon. Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) started by saying that the question was who should make the report. I agree that that is what we are discussing and there cannot be any large issue


of principle about it. I understand that the probation officers wish still to make the report. They were brought into this at a time when there was no children's service—this derives from the 1933 Act—but since then we have required the local authority to make reports about the school record, the health, and the character of the child. That is already laid down and will continue to be laid down and it would be an unnecessary bifurcation if we said that, the local authority having provided all these reports through the children's service, it was for the probation officer to tell the court about the child's home surroundings.
If the children's service did not exist, there would be a case for saying that, but the service does exist and I see no reason why we should divide the responsibility as suggested when the local authority is aware of the circumstances of the home. It therefore seems sensible to say that the local authority shall have the duty of providing all this information.
Again, I make no attack on the probation service, but we should not continue rôles for a service if there are other agencies as well or better fitted to do the job, and no hon. Member would want us to do so. Because of the way in which the service has grown up, the children's service is generally well aware of the circumstances of the home because it is often in and out of the home.
The hon. Gentleman said that he did not want to discuss the Amendments in detail. That is probably because he realised that if they were passed they would repeal a law which has stood for more than 30 years, and there would then be no duty on local authorities to obtain and provide this information, and he obviously would not want that.

Mr. Carlisle: More obviously for the reason that I drafted them and knew that they would be wrongly drafted.

Mr. Callaghan: I do not take the technical point, but this would be the case for not pressing this to a Division. It was wrong in any case in principle to say that the local authority should not provide this information unless and until the court asked for it, because that would mean an adjournment. The hon. Gentleman has pressed on me on several occasions the delay that may arise, and

this could create an additional period of delay, especially in rural areas, where juvenile courts meet at irregular intervals.
It be a remarkable proposition, which I am sure the hon. Gentleman would not wish to sustain, that with that information about a child's educational record in the hands of the local authority, the probation officer should then go to the local authority and ask for the record to pass it on to the court. As the local authority will be doing this, it seems to be commonsense that it should cut out this intermediate stage and provide the information. I hope, without dealing with the technicalities, that on the merits of the case the hon. Gentleman will not wish to press the Amendment.

Mr. Silvester: There is one aspect with which the Home Secretary has not dealt which is in the minds of local authorities, and that is the increased burden being placed on children's officers. He said, quite rightly, that if there were no children's departments it would be all right and we could carry on with the probation service. As I understand it, 38 per cent. of the home investigations are being conducted by the service. His argument, although true for the future, perhaps, is still weak at present, and at some stage I hope that he will be able to give to local authorities a further assurance on this point, which is worrying them—where will they get the people to carry out this additional task?

Mr. Callaghan: If I may just say a further word here. I have said that the various stages of the Bill will be brought into force at a time when the administrative structure will bear the burden placed upon it. A much larger number of officers is being trained. I hope and believe that the probation service will still be used in a number of cases, although less so in future. Clearly no one will introduce these various changes until we can be certain that the structure will bear the proposed changes. That applies to a number of phases in the Bill.

Mr. Carlisle: Having heard the Home Secretary, and in view of his comments on the drafting, I obviously would not want to press the Amendment to a Division. I do not think that he has answered the point I made about the same authority doing all the various matters. Since I know that it would be said earlier that


the powers of the probation officer to make reports through the courts would still continue, and having ventilated the matter again, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendments made: No. 37, in page 11, line 13, at end insert:
'or a local education authority'.

No. 38, in line 15, leave out from 'offence' to end of line 19 and insert:
'alleged to have been committed by a young person or are notified that any such proceedings are being brought,'.

No. 39, in line 22, leave out from 'provide' to third 'the'.

No. 41, in line 25, leave out 'child or young person in question' and insert:
'person in respect of whom the proceedings are brought'.

No. 42, in line 26, leave out 'the justice or'.

No. 44, in line 27, leave out 'justice or'.

No. 46, line 28, leave out 'local'.—[Mr. Callaghan.]

Clause 10

FURTHER LIMITATIONS ON PUBLICATION OF PARTICULARS OF CHILDREN AND YOUNG PERSONS

Mr. Elystan Morgan: I beg to move Amendment No. 49, in page 11, line 33, leave out from beginning to 'subsection' in line 34 and insert 'In'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: I understand that it is the desire to discuss at the same time Amendments Nos. 50, 51 and 123.

Mr. Morgan: When Clause 10 was discussed in Standing Committee on 22nd April, a number of hon. Members expressed the view that the power of the juvenile court to authorise publication of the name of a child or young person, which subsection (1) of the Clause in its present form would remove, should be retained. On the other hand, there was also acceptance of the view that juvenile courts ought not to authorise publication as a form of extra punishment or to make an example of the child. It is to ensure that this cannot happen that subsection (1) appears in the Bill.
Since doubt was expressed in Committee whether publication is ever authorised for that purpose, the House may wish to be aware that it is occasionally. This provision of the Bill, therefore, is based upon fact rather than upon conjecture. Admittedly, publication as a punishment is rare so far as is known. That is largely because the courts seldom use the power to authorise publication, for whatever purpose. Thus, the Government do not accept the suggestion, which was made in Standing Committee, that the proper course would be to leave things entirely as they are. This would frustrate the achievement of the object of Clause 10.
In the Committee discussion, the hon. Member for Chelsea (Mr. Worsley) made the constructive suggestion that the power of the court to authorise publication should be retained but put
in more specific terms than the broad sphrase 'in the interests of justice'."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee G, 22nd April, 1969; c. 308.]
That is what these Amendments do. They leave the power with the courts as well as with the Secretary of State. The form of words now proposed, "avoiding injustice", is intended to describe more precisely than the present law the kinds of case in which we all agree that publication should be possible. We believe that the new form of words is apt to cover all those cases but will avoid any possibility of a punitive use of this power in future.

Mr. Carlisle: Although the Under-Secretary to a certain extent appeared to be trying rather to "wrap it up", this is another point on which, clearly, the Government have wisely seen the force of the arguments put against their proposals and have wholly given way on the point that was made. All those who spoke in Committee proved clearly that the Government's proposal, when worked out in practical terms, was nonsense.
I am glad to see that the Government are putting back the power to the court to use its discretion in the very occasional case when it decides that lack of publication of the name of a child could cause injustice. It is right that that power should be left to the court and not to the Secretary of State, although he will have it, but not exclusively.
I should like to raise a small point on Amendment No. 51. I understand that in future the justices will be able to order publication of the name of the child whom they have committed for trial only if publication would avoid injustice to that child. If my interpretation is correct, it does not meet the point which was made in Committee. There might be possible injustice not to the child who is being committed for trial, but to another child.
The example was given by Mr. Watson, in his letter to The Times, of a child being charged with murder and everybody in the locality genuinely believed that it was another child. It was to safeguard the interests of the other child that the justices agreed to publish the name of the child who was charged. The other child had been a witness and had been seen to go to the court, and the gossip went round that he had committed the murder. It seems to me that, from a drafting point of view, the Amendment does not really meet that point, and I hope that the Under-Secretary will look at it again, to check that it is correct, before the Bill reaches Committee in another place.

12 m.

Mr. Elystan Morgan: By your leave, Mr. Deputy Speaker, and that of the House, I would draw attention to the words in Amendment No. 51,
for the purpose of avoiding injustice to him".
I take the point the hon. Gentleman has made and will bear it in mind.

Amendment agreed to.

Further Amendments made: No. 50, in page 11, line 37, leave out from beginning to end of line 42 and insert:
'but authorises the court or the Secretary of State, if satisfied that it is in the interests of jusice to do so, to dispense with the requirements of that section) for the words "in the interests of justice so to do" there shall be substituted the words "appropriate to do so for the purpose of avoiding injustice to a child or young person" and after the word "section" there shall be inserted the words "in relation to him"'.
No. 51, in page 12, line 3, leave out from 'person' to end of line 4 and insert:
'unless the justices in question have stated that in their opinion he would be mentioned in the notice apart from the foregoing provisions of this subsection and should be mentioned in it for the purpose of avoiding injustice to him'.—[Mr. Elystan Morgan.]

Clause 12

POWER TO INCLUDE REQUIREMENTS IN SUPERVISION ORDERS

Mr. Elystan Morgan: I beg to move, Amendment No. 52, in page 12, line 38, after 'decided', insert:
'whether and to what extent he exercises any power to give directions conferred on him by virtue of the preceding provisions of this subsection and to decide'.
This Amendment restores the words which were deleted in Committee by Amendment No. 87. Before dealing with the merits of the matter it may be useful to state briefly the reasons why in this particular the Government have come to the conclusion that the right course is simply to put back the words taken out by the Standing Committee.
The words in question which it is proposed to restore make it, in my submission, very clear that it is for the supervisor to decide whether, when, and in what way he exercises his power to give directions under the supervision order. That Amendment—I am sure I carry hon. Gentlemen opposite with me in this—does not achieve its object of removing this discretion from the supervisor, but has only the effect of creating a very substantial ambiguity. Under Clause 12(2), as amended, the supervisor still has this discretion, but the narrower reference at the end of the subsection, to its being for him to decide the form of any directions, is, in my submission, confusing and might lead to argument as to what else he may decide. His substantial power is already set out at the beginning of Clause 12, and that was not removed by that Amendment. Thus the subsection, clearly, could not be left in its present form.
As a result of the debate in the Standing Committee the Opposition came to see that had their Amendment succeeded in removing from the supervisor discretion to decide anything but the form of the directions it would have gone too far. They eventually accepted that the supervisor must have some discretion as to the precise nature and timing of his directions, and that there was also sense in leaving him some discretion whether to require residence or participation for all the days authorised by the court or for a lesser number of days.
It is right to explain to the House why the Government were not really in a minority, even temporarily, when the Amendment was carried. A Government Member of the Committee was sitting at the time in another Committee—in the Grand Committee Room. When the Division was called he ran with very great speed up to the Committee Floor and only just failed to make his vote in time.

Mr. Carlisle: If the hon. Gentleman is going to make that point he should also remind us that at another meeting of the Committee he himself deliberately had to filibuster his own Bill until he could get his supporters there, and that he had to do that to avoid a vote when he was clearly in a minority.

Mr. Morgan: It is really a matter of opinion whether I was speaking at my natural rate and in my own pettifogging way, or whether I was filibustering; it is a matter on which the hon. Gentleman and I might not agree, but on this occasion it was clear that the absence of my hon. Friend was purely fortuitous. He wished to vote on the Amendment, but owing to a misunderstanding—

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. I do not think the Minister should pursue this matter too far. We are not discussing the Committee proceedings but the powers given by the court.

Mr. Morgan: I certainly accept your Ruling, Mr. Deputy Speaker, but I merely put it to the House that but for this contretemps there would have been a tied vote, and no doubt the wording of the Bill as introduced would have been preserved by the Chairman's casting vote to enable the issue to be further considered by the House. The Government Amendment to restore the words in question ensures that the House is not deprived of that opportunity.
At the end of the debate in Committee it seemed that what mainly worried the Opposition was the possibility that the supervisor would be able entirely to disregard the powers given to him by the court and issue no directions at all. The hon. Member for Chelsea (Mr. Worsley) and his hon. Friend the Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) contemplated the possibility of an extreme case in which the supervisor, imme-

diately after the court proceedings, would say that he would not give any directions at all. I concede that that is a theoretical possibility, but the argument rests upon the unlikely supposition that there would ever be such a supervisor, and upon the proposition that the supervisor, whether a local authority or a probation officer, cannot be trusted to act responsibly, and I am sure that the picture the House has of supervisors and probation officers is not one that is in line with such a contention.
The boundaries within which the supervisor exercises his responsibility are set by the terms of the supervision order. Within those boundaries it is right that the supervisor should be regarded as a responsible person whose judgment as to the way in which he deals with a supervised person can and should be trusted. No responsible supervisor would simply disregard the wishes of the court and, before he had had an opportunity of gaining a closer knowledge of the child and his problems, announce his intention of giving no directions whatsoever. If there were any genuine grounds for thinking that local authorities and probation officers would behave in this irresponsible fashion, the whole basis of the supervision provisions of the Bill would be completely undermined, and this could not be cured by the amendment of one subsection of Clause 12.
For that reason, the Government, having considered this matter, came to this choice. Are we to retain the existing system, under which the courts make orders which are immediately enforceable and which cannot subsequently be varied except by the court itself, or are we, on the other hand, to have the system proposed by the Bill, under which the supervisor has discretion to decide what is best for the child within the limits of the authority given to him by the court? There is no practicable half-way house between those two, and if, as the Government believe, we are to have the second system, the supervisor must be given clear discretion, and must be trusted to exercise that discretion in a responsible way. The Government cannot, therefore, accept the Amendment, which rests on the implicit premise that such a trust would be misplaced.

Mr. Worsley: I find myself in some difficulty on this Amendment. To begin


with, whereas the Under-Secretary went into considerable detail of the exact position in this Palace of his hon. Friend. I am unfortunately ruled out of order in discussing this. The question was debated on its merits in Committee and on its merits was decided, and I regret that the Government have come back to the House attempting to put these words back into the Bill. Perhaps we had a bit of luck, but we put down the Amendment on its merits, and we still believe that the Government are giving an extraordinary width of discretion to supervisors which cannot be justified.
It may be that the result of this Amendment will mean that other Amendments to the Clause will be necessary. But that is for the Government to do. The Government had a clear choice. Either they tidied up the Bill and followed the express desire of the Standing Committee, or they tried to do what they have done and put back this very wide discretion.
Like my hon. Friends, I feel that when a new structure of this sort is set up, it sould he one which does not bear the ridiculous possibilities that this con-

struction of words does. It is absurd to allow a supervisor wholly to ignore the decision of the court, and the hon. Gentleman accepts that that would be the case. He says that it is only a theoretical possibility and that such a supervisor is an unlikely person. Nevertheless, when a structure is set up, why not make it one which gives only a reasonable degree of flexibility, and not such a wide one?

We do not seek to leave no flexibility. We appreciate that a supervisor needs a degree of flexibility. But it derogates from the authority of the court if, when it makes a decision to put a young person under supervision, at the end of the day the supervisor can either ignore or radically modify the court's decision. This goes too far, and therefore we invite the House to follow the Standing Committee in this case and continue to leave out these words on the ground that they give far too wide a discretion to the supervisor.

Question put, That the Amendment be made:—

The House divided: Ayes 145. Noes 100.

Division No. 237.]
AYES
[12.14 am


Alldritt, Walter
Evans, Fred (Caerphilly)
Mackenzie, Cregor (Rutherglen)


Anderson, Donald
Evans, Ioan L. (Birm'h'm, Yardley)
Maclennan, Robert


Ashton, Joe (Bassetlaw)
Fernyhough, E.
MacMillan, Malcolm (Western Isles)


Atkins, Ronald (Preston, N.)
Fitch, Alan (Wiggn)
McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)


Atkinson, Norman (Tottenham)
Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)
McNamara, J. Kevin


Bagier, Gordon A. T.
Fowler, Gerry
Mahon, Peter (Preston, S.)


Barnett, Joel
Fraser, John (Norwood)
Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)


Bidwell, Sydney
Freeson, Reginald
Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.)


Binns, John
Gregory, Arnold
Manuel, Archie


Booth, Albert
Griffiths, Eddie (Brightside)
Marks, Kenneth


Bray, Dr. Jeremy
Hamilton, James (Bothwell)
Mellish, Rt. Hn. Robert


Brooks, Edwin
Hamling, William
Mendelson, John


Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.
Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)
Millan, Bruce


Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan)
Haseldine, Norman
Milne, Edward (Blyth)


Brown, Bob (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, W.)
Herbison, Rt. Hn. Margaret
Mitchell, R. C. (S'tn'pton, Test)


Brown, R. W. (Shoreditch &amp; F'bury)
Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas
Molloy, William


Buchan, Norman
Howell, Denis (Small Heath)
Morgan, Elystan (Cardiganshire)


Buchanan, Richard (G'gow, Sp'burn)
Howie, W.
Morris, Alfred (Wythenehawe)


Callaghan, Rt. Hn. James
Hoy, James
Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)


Carmichael, Neil
Huckfield, Leslie
Moyle, Roland


Coe, Denis
Hughes, Roy (Newport)
Newens, Stan


Coleman, Donald
Hynd, John
Ogden, Eric


Concannon, J. D.
Jackson, Colin (B'h'se &amp; Spenb'gh)
Oram, Albert E.


Conlan, Bernard
Jackson, Peter M. (High Peak)
Orbach, Maurice


Crawshaw, Richard
Johnson, James (K'ston-on-Hull, W.)
Orme, Stanley


Dalyell, Tam
Jones, T. Alec (Rhondda, West)
Oswald, Thomas


Davidson, Arthur (Accrington)
Kenyon, Clifford
Palmer, Arthur


Davies, Dr. Ernest (Stratford)
Lawson, George
Parkyn, Brian (Bedford)


Davies, Ifor (Cower)
Leadbitter, Ted
Pavitt, Laurence


Dell, Edmund
Lipton, Marcus
Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred


Dempsey, James
Loughlin, Charles
Pentland, Norman


Diamond, Rt. Hn. John
Luard, Evan
Perry, Ernest G. (Battersea, S.)


Dobson, Ray
Lyon, Alexander W. (York)
Prentice, Rt. Hn. R. E.


Dunnett, Jack
Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)
Price, Christopher (Perry Barr)


Dunwoody, Dr. John (F'th &amp; C'b'e)
Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson
Probert, Arthur


Eadie, Alex
McBride, Neil
Rees, Merlyn


Edwards, William (Merioneth)
McCann, John
Roberts, Albert (Normanton)


Ellis, John
McGuirc, Michael
Roberts, Gwilym (Bedfordshire, S.)


English, Michael
Mackenzie, Alasdair (Ross &amp; Crom'ty)
Rodgers, William (Stockton)




Roebuck, Roy
Taverne, Dick
Watkins, Tudor (Brecon &amp; Radnor)


Ross, Rt. Hn. William
Thomas, Rt. Hn. George
Wellbeloved, James


Rowlands, E.
Thomson, Rt. Hn. George
Whitlock, William


Ryan, John
Tinn, James
Williams, Alan Lee (Hornchurch)


Shaw, Arnold (Ilford, S.)
Tuck, Raphael
Wilson, William (Coventry, S.)


Sheldon, Robert
Varley, Eric G.
Woof, Robert


Short, Mrs. Renée (W'hampton, N. E.)
Wainwright, Edwin (Dearne Valley)



Silkin, Rt. Hn. John (Deptford)
Wainwright, Richard (Colne Valley)
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Silverman, Julius
Walker, Harold (Doncaster)
Mr. Ernest Armstrong and


Slater, Joseph
Wallace, George
Mr. Joseph Harper.


Spriggs, Leslie
Watkins, David (Consett)





NOES


Astor, John
Harrison, Brian (Maldon)
Pounder, Rafton


Atkins, Humphrey (M't'n &amp; M'd'n)
Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)
Prior, J. M. L.


Balniel, Lord
Hastings, Stephen
Pym, Francis


Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gos. &amp; Fhm)
Hill, J. E. B.
Ramsden, Rt. Hn. James


Berry, Hn. Anthony
Holland, Philip
Rees-Davies, W. R.


Biffen, John
Hordem, Peter
Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon


Biggs-Davison, John
Hornby, Richard
Ridley, Hn. Nicholas


Black, Sir Cyril
Howell, David (Guildford)
Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey)


Boardman, Tom (Leicester, S. W.)
Hunt, John
Russell, Sir Ronald


Boyle, Rt. Hn. Sir Edward
Iremonger, T. L.
Sharples, Richard


Brinton, Sir Tatton
Jenkin, Patrick (Woodford)
Shaw, Michael (Sc'b'gh &amp; Whitby)


Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)
Jopling, Michael
Silvester, Frederick


Buck, Antony (Colchester)
King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)
Sinclair, Sir George


Burden, F. A.
Knight, Mrs. Jill



Campbell, B. (Oldham, W.)
Lane, David
Smith, John (London &amp; W'minster)


Campbell, Gordon (Moray &amp; Nairn)
Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry
Speed, Keith


Carlisle, Mark
Longden, Gilbert
Stainton, Keith


Clark, Henry
MacArthur, Ian
Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir M.


Clegg, Walter
McNair-Wilson, Michael
Taylor, Frank (Moss Side)


Cunningham, Sir Knox
McNair-Wilson, Patrick (New Forest)
Temple, john M.


Dance, James
Marten, Neil
Turton, Rt. Hn. R. H.


Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F. (Ashford)
Maude, Angus
Vaughan-Morgan, Rt. Hn. Sir John


Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)
Mawby, Ray
Waddington, David


Elliott, R. W. (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, N.)
Miscampbell, Norman
Walker, Peter (Worcester)


Eyre, Reginald
Monro, Hector
Walters, Dennis


Fortescue, Tim
Montgomery, Fergus
Ward, Dame Irene


Glover, Sir Douglas
More, Jasper
Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William


Gower, Raymond
Morrison, Charles (Devizes)
Wiggin, A. W.


Grant, Anthony
Munro-Lueas-Tooth, Sir Hugh
Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)


Grant-Ferris, R.
Murton, Oscar
Woodnutt, Mark


Grieve, Percy
Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael
Worsley, Marcus


Griffiths, Eldon (Bury St. Edmunds)
Onslow, Craoley



Hall, John (Wycombe)
Page, Graham (Crosby)
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Hamilton, Lord (Fermanagh)
Percival, Ian
Mr. Timothy Kitson and


Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)
Pink, R. Bonner
Mr. Bernard Weatherill.

Mr. Miscampbell: I beg to move Amendment No. 53, in page 13, line 14, at end insert:
'save that the period so specified shall begin forthwith if the court so orders'.
The Amendment follows the previous one in dealing with the requirements of the supervision order. In this case it is much more limited. The supervisor decides the form of any directions which he wishes to give. The Amendment recognises that he is left with the freedom to decide how the directions and orders of the court are to be carried out but fetters him and prevents the possibility of his ignoring the court's wishes.
The Clause sets out the provisions which the supervisor may use to control the supervised person. Subsection (2)(a) allows the supervisor to send the person supervised to detention for 30 days. Subsection (2)(b)(ii) is the junior attendance centre provision. Subsection (2)(b)(iii) is

the requirement for community work. The supervisor may use all these new and valuable provisions in his supervisory work.
It is apparent from the Clause that the supervisor can, if he wishes, ignore the court's desire that the supervision order should commence immediately. Though we believe that the supervisor should be given flexibility, we think that the court, if it has so decided, should be able to say that the order should commence immediately after it is made. We seek no more than that in this Amendment.
I believe there are two good reasons why this should be done. In the first place, it gives the power to the court, after it has made a full investigation of the case and all the circumstances, to say that it is important in this case that supervision should start immediately. This means that the consequences of the misdoing will follow immediately and


not be delayed possibly for many months as would be possible under this Clause. Delay in these circumstances could blunt the impact on the person on whose behalf the supervision order is being made.
Lastly, we believe that there is a real fear that the relationship with the supervisor may be prejudiced if too much discretion is left in his hands. If the supervisor has to make up his mind whether or not the directions of the court are to be carried out immediately, and it is known to the person to be supervised that the supervisor has got that discretion, it is inevitable that pressure and pleas will be put to him, and that there will he delay.
The very fact that the supervisor has got to make that decision, and can be seen to make that decision, will, I believe, make the relationship between the supervisor and the supervised a difficult one.

Mr. Elystan Morgan: The hon. Member for Blackpool, North (Mr. Miscampbell) said that it would be ideal if the order could take effect immediately after the misdoing. I hope he will have the patience to wait for the person to be taken before the court in the first instance. I hope that is a formality which he will concede. But I think, with respect, that the movers of this Amendment have tended to think of a supervision order as being nothing more than a carbon copy of the present detention centre order, and that is a very great fallacy.
It is true that a detention centre order made under the present law takes effect at once. The young person is taken to the detention centre straight from the court, no matter what his circumstances may be. This is part of the sharp, salutary lesson which a detention centre order is meant to give to him. In the Government's view this is not an appropriate way of dealing with young people who do not need to be removed from home for a long period. It is particularly inappropriate in the case of schoolchildren whose education may be suddenly interrupted, perhaps at a vital time, with long-term results quite disproportionate to the offence which they committed. Moreover, there is a practical difficulty. If the court is to be in a position to order that the period shall commence forthwith, and the young person is to be taken to the place direct from the court, the

court would have, in practice, to select the place, unless it is to be left to the supervisor in the course of a couple of hours or so to find the most suitable place.
The Government remain of the opinion that the best method of dealing with this question is to give the supervisor discretion. If the information before the court has shown that the period of residence ought to start very soon, there is no reason to think that the supervisor would not arrange accordingly. Summary removal, however, to any place where an immediate vacancy can be found, and without the parents and the child having time to collect their wits, or the child his belongings, would be alien to the aims of a supervision order. It is unconstructive, and may be damaging.
If the period of residence is to do any real good, time should be allowed for the necessary preparations. These are likely to take at least a day or two even if everyone agrees that the period of residence ought to start as soon as possible.

12.30 a.m.

Mr. Worsley: If the hon. Gentleman had been speaking to another Amendment he would have made an absolutely unanswerable case. He has been speaking to the Amendment as if it did not have at the end of it the five words
if the court so orders.
He has been speaking as if there was no discretion to the court whether or not it made the period run straight away. But this is not the Amendment which is before the House. The Amendment seeks to give the court the power, if it so wishes, to make the period run forthwith.
The hon. Gentleman surely made the case for us when he said that in the case of the detention centre at present the period does begin straight away. Surely he will accept that there will be cases in future which will be strictly parallel to the case of the detention centre today, when it will be necessary for the young person to be taken direct from the court. Therefore, it would be in the interests of the proper working of supervision orders in those cases if the court had the power when it so wished to make this order.
The hon. Gentleman has not made a case against our Amendment but against another Amendment which we have not put down. Our Amendment seeks to give the court the discretion, the flexibility—a word which is so often used but so rarely put into effect—to decide whether the period should run forthwith. Therefore, on reflection, does not the hon. Gentleman think that it would be reasonable, if a court felt that the order should come into operation at once, that it should have the power so to declare?

Amendment negatived.

Mr. Elystan Morgan: I beg to move Amendment No. 56, in page 14, line 15, leave out 'but such'.

Mr. Speaker: With this Amendment can be taken Amendments No. 57 and No. 59.

Mr. Morgan: Subsection (4) of Clause 16 enables the court to include in a supervision order a requirement that the supervised person shall submit to treatment for a mental condition. This provision is similar to the existing law on probation orders and supervision orders.
The probation law, which is contained in Section 4 of the Criminal Justices Act, 1948, provides that a court shall not make a probation order containing such a requirement unless it is satisfied that arrangements have been made for the treatment intended to be specified in the order, and, if the offender is to be treated as a resident patient, for his reception. The present law on supervision orders does not contain such a provision.
It is highly desirable that courts should satisfy themselves about the arrangements for treatment, and for reception in the case of a resident patient, before including a mental treatment requirement in a supervision order. The second Amendment so provides, and is in similar terms to the provision in Section 4 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1948. The first and third Amendments—that is, Amendments 56 and 59—are consequential drafting Amendments.

Amendment agreed to.

Further Amendment made: No. 57, in page 14, line 16, after 'order', insert:
'in pursuance of the preceding subsection—

(a) in any case unless the court is satisfied that arrangements have been or can be made for the treatment in question and, in

the case of treatment as a resident patient, for the reception of the patient;
(b) in the case of an order made or'.—[Mr. Elysian Morgan.]

Mr. Callaghan: I beg to move Amendment No. 58, in page 14, line 16, leave out 'young person' and insert:
'person who has attained the age of fourteen'.

Mr. Speaker: With this Amendment can be taken Amendment No. 68.

Mr. Callaghan: These are technical Amendments. Their object is to preserve the existing law. In both places, namely in Clause 12(4) and Clause 16(5), the Bill requires the consent of the person supervised, if he is a young person, to the provision of a supervision order dealing with submission to treatment for a mental condition, but the existing law requires consent where the person has attained the age of 14. We do not wish to alter that, and therefore we wish to insert the age of 14 in order to maintain the existing law.

A mendtnent agreed to.

Further Amendment made: No. 59, in page 14, line 17, after 'and', insert 'a requirement so included'.—[Mr. Elystan Morgan.]

Mr. Deedes: I beg to move Amendment No. 60, in page 14, line 18, at end insert:
(5) Where an order is made under subsection (4) of this section an application to a mental health review tribunal may be made in respect of the supervised person, either by the supervised person or by his nearest relative, as if a hospital order or guardianship order had been made in respect of him for the purposes of subsection (4) of section 63 of the Mental Health Act 1959.
This is a mental health point. I think the Amendment is reasonably self-explanatory. As the Under-Secretary has pointed out, subsection (4) enables the court to specify mental treatment for a supervised person up to 18. Under paragraph (c) this may include a hospital or mental nursing home under the Mental Health Act, 1959. The British Medical Association is concerned as to whether a person so confined will have the benefit of the review procedure established by the Mental Health Act, 1959. This Amendment would safeguard that point. Perhaps the Under-Secretary can give us the assurance we seek, or accept the Amendment.

Mr. Elystan Morgan: This Amendment would enable an application to be made to a mental health review tribunal by a supervised person, or his nearest relative, where a supervision order contains a requirement that the child or young person shall submit to treatment for a mental condition. Such a requirement cannot be included in an order unless the supervised person is under 14 or he consents. The provision in subsection (4) is exactly the same as the present provisions in Section 4 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1948, on probation orders and in the First Schedule to the Children and Young Persons Act, 1963, in relation to supervision orders. No right to apply to a mental health review tribunal has been found necessary in relation to these provisions.
There is nothing to prevent a child or young person from walking out of the hospital or mental nursing home or failing to attend the out-patient clinic. If he does so he cannot be apprehended and taken back as in the case of a hospital order. Parental rights are not overridden, as in the case of a guardianship order. All that can happen, as in the case of failure to comply with any other requirement in a supervision order, is that a supervises can again take the child or young person before the court. The court could then make a care order, but it is unlikely to do so to enforce treatment for a mental condition on an unwilling child, bearing in mind that before inserting such a requirement in a supervision order the court has to be satisfied that his mental condition is not such as to warrant his detention under a hospital order.
I therefore ask the right hon. Gentleman and his hon. Friends to consider that this Amendment is not necessary and not to press it.

Mr. Deedes: In view of that explanation, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 13

SELECTION OF SUPERVISION

Mrs. Knight: I beg to move Amendment No. 62, in page 14, line 27, after 'exercising', insert 'or has exercised'.
I make no secret of the fact that I dislike subsection (2) of this Clause and would prefer it to be removed. It puts

the probation officer in a position servile to the local authority. A more important aspect of what the subsection does with regard to the probation officer and the courts is expressed in a letter I have received from a probation officer, who says:
My colleagues and I feel that this is quite wrong as it takes away from the juvenile court a jurisdiction which it should be in a position to exercise to select the most appropriate supervisor for a particular case. It seems unethical for a local authority to have the power to agree whether or not to accept supervision and at the same time for a juvenile court not to have the power to place a child under the supervision of a probation officer unless the local authority so requests.
I am most concerned about this matter, because it seems to me that it downgrades the probation officer. He is enabled by the subsection only to take a case under certain circumstances. That is a great pity, because the record of our probation service is excellent. Although the Home Secretary said earlier that there were parts that could be bettered most of us who have had anything to do with cases with which a probation officer has been dealing have been extremely impressed by the way in which probation officers work and their knack of squeezing a drop of success from a stone of intractability.
Even more serious, the subsection places the judiciary fairly and squarely under the orders of the Administration, and this is deplorable. My Amendment suggests that where a probation officer has had contact with the family he may have dealings with the family again,. This contact may not have been with the person about whom the court is currently concerned. In almost every case where probation officers have had such contact they have become known and trusted by the family.
I have listened most carefully to everything that has been said about the duties of the probation officer and the children's officer in their new rôles under the Bill, and nothing so far said by the Home Secretary or his hon. Friend has begun to convince me that it is a good idea to remove from the probation officer his ability to deal with cases with which he could cope extremely well.
We have talked about the load the Bill places on children's departments, and one is concerned about their ability to cope with all the extra work being removed


from the probation officers. The Home Secretary has told us that the Bill will not come into force until the local authority can cope with all the duties the Bill puts upon it. But it is very odd that we should have it laid down so clearly here that henceforth a probation officer who has had dealings with a family may now not do so again except in exceptional circumstances. It would be very useful to be able to turn to a probation officer who has knowledge and experience.
The Minister said in Committee:
The formula that is devised in subsection (2) of this Clause is intended as a clear recognition of the overall responsibility of the children's service for work with children under 14."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee G, 24th April, 1969; c. 352.]
12.45 a.m.
This is the crunch point, about which we are arguing continuously. There are hon. Members on this side of the House and also hon. Members opposite who are very worried that the onus of the problem in relation to these children is being taken away from the probation officer, even probation officers with experience of the family, and placed in the hands of a completely fresh person.
When the Seebohm Report is implemented it will undoubtedly be true that problems of this sort will be shuffled around in an even greater number of hands in the Department. This again is a matter for worry. One person, the probation officer, has had knowledge and experience of the family, and yet now it is suggested that the family should be dealt with by someone else. The notion accepts nothing of the bond of trust and respect that the probation officer has probably built up with the family, particularly when, probably, he has ceased to have dealings with the family.
I find it odd that the Bill says grudgingly that where a probation officer is already exercising his duties in relation to another member of the household he may be considered to be capable of taking over the duties for the child or young person whom we are discussing. If he has finished having dealings with another member of the family, he has probably reached a successful conclusion in that family. It is odd that if he has brought a matter to a successful conclusion it is thought that he is not a

suitable person to have more dealings with the family.
The Home Secretary has taken a most extraordinary standpoint. I have a very great respect for the probation service and am very anxious that in future when the Bill is working we shall not lose the services of these people who have service of inestimable value to give, even more so when they have had close connection with a family.

Mr. Callaghan: I read the Amendment when it was tabled and have listened to the hon. Lady. It seems to me to be a sensible Amendment, and I am ready to accept it.
Having said that, let me say how much I deplore the emotional and exaggerated language used about probation officers in many of these discussions. The question is what rôle they should play in the interests of children. That is the purpose of considering the probation officer and his place in the scheme of things. As I have shown on a number of occasions during the Bill, I am ready to give him the place that seems required in the interests of the child.
I agree with the hon. Lady that if there is a probation officer who has in the past exercised his responsibilities in relation to another member of the household it is absolutely sensible to give him the opportunity once again of continuing his detailed knowledge.
There is no occasion because that is not in the Bill for all this hyperbole which is built up or seems to be building up in the Opposition in which the Government are supposed to be anti-probation officer and the Opposition are pro-probation officer. Nothing is further from the truth. To repeat what I have said before—the hon. Lady took something out of context—I am interested in the children's officers and in the probation officers from the point of view of what is best for the child. In this case it seems clear that the probation officer can exercise a useful rôle. I am very happy to accept the Amendment.

Mr. Worsley: I would just say to the right hon. Gentleman that if there is heat engendered and if there are strong feelings about this he has only himself to blame, because he in his Bill has deliberately restricted—I have already indicated the way he has done it and do not wish to repeat it—the rôle of the


probation officers. However, I will not follow the rather churlish manner in which he has accepted the Amendment, because I am grateful that he has done so.
I think my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Mrs. Knight) has made an extremely strong point. A probation officer often gets, over many years, a relationship with a family which is of the greatest value, and it would be sad if the Bill had been allowed to go through in a form which had indicated that there could be even a short break in that relationship, perhaps as a result of the very success of the probation officer. I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his acceptance of the Amendment, even if his way of doing so was rather churlish.

Mrs. Knight: I add my gratitude to the right hon. Gentleman. I am quite prepared to accept a gift horse and I will not look in any churlish mouth.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 15

VARIATION AND DISCHARGE OF SUPERVISION ORDERS

Mr. Elystan Morgan: I beg to move Amendment No. 63, in page 15, line 22, at end insert:
(2) If on an application in pursuance of the preceding subsection, in a case where the supervised person has attained the age of seventeen and the supervision order was not made by virtue of section 1 of this Act or on the occasion of the discharge of a care order, it appears to the court appropriate to do so it may proceed as if the application were in pursuance of subsection (3) or, if it is made by the supervisor, in pursuance of subsections (3) and (4) of this section and as if in that subsection or those subsections, as the case may be, the word 'seventeen' were substituted for the word 'eighteen' and the words 'a magistrates' court other than' were omitted.

Mr. Speaker: With this Amendment we can also discuss Government Amendment No. 69.

Mr. Morgan: These two Amendments have been put down to meet a point raised in Standing Committee on 24th April on an Amendment moved by the hon. Member for Walthamstow, West (Mr. Silvester) to leave out subsection (3). A number of hon. Members argued

that, where a supervised person has attained the age of 17, it should be possible for the court to impose a sanction for breach of a requirement of the supervision order. It was urged that otherwise there would be inconsistency between the treatment of a 17 year old under supervision and a 17 year old on probation.
We undertook to look at the matter again, although I pointed out that I did not hold out hope that a change could be made. There are difficulties in the way of providing that subsection (3) shall apply in all cases after the 17th birthday. First, it would not be appropriate in a case where the supervision order had been made for reasons other than an offence. Secondly, it would not be right to exclude the possibility of adding intermediate treatment or the possibility of substituting a care order.
However, the Government have looked at the matter again and have concluded that it would be possible to provide for an overlap between subsections (1) and (3) between the 17th and 18th birthdays in cases where the supervision order was made in criminal proceedings. Amendment No. 63 so provides and Amendment No. 69 provides that, if a supervised person attains the age of 17 or 18 while an application to juvenile court is pending, the court shall deal with the application as if he had not attained that age. This is because it would not be right for the court's powers to be affected by an adjournment.

Amendment agreed to.

Mr. Miscampbell: I beg to move Amendment No. 64, in page 16, line 4, at end insert:
(3) In any proceedings in a magistrates' court under subsection (2) of this section the same limitations shall apply on the publication of the particulars of the supervised person as if the said proceedings were in the juvenile court.
This is a short but important point dealing with the publication of names when a supervision order goes on beyond the age of 18. That can arise in a situation where a young person aged 16 to 17 is put under a supervision order. It is possible for the order to go on past the age of 18 and a discharge of the order has to be obtained not in juvenile court but in the magistrates' court.
The Government promised to look at this again when the point was raised


in Standing Committee and one feels disappointed that no Government Amendment has been put down to deal with it. But I understand the difficulties of dealing with the matter because one is always reluctant to ask for restrictions on reporting, particularly as in these circumstances it would be in that instance where there is a restriction on the reporting on an adult in the magistrates' court, and we are all familiar with the difficulties which arise when both juveniles and adults are up together. While the court can exercise its discretion and say that the juvenile's name is not to be disclosed, it often does not do so.
None the less, this circumstance is rather different from any other and may be unique because the young person will have received his supervision order while a juvenile, under the age of 18, when not a word could be said about it. On the other hand, if he does well and it comes to the time for his discharge after the age of 18, publication is possible. All we seek to do in the Amendment is to impose the same right of discretion upon the magistrates' courts as to publication as the juvenile court will have.
I fully concede that it is very unlikely that in large metropolitan areas the names of those who have obtained a discharge from supervision orders will be published in the newspapers, but I fear that the situation may be very different in small country districts and just as much damage may be done to a young man who had done rather well and who was getting his discharge if there were publication of the discharge as would have been done if in the original instance his name had been published when he was put on a supervision order. It is not possible in the juvenile court, but it is possible later.
Whether the Amendment does it or not, I hope that the Government will find some way to protect a young man or girl in these circumstances when he or she may have done rather well and the order is being discharged.

Mr. Elystan Morgan: The argument for the Amendment deserves sympathy, although it is fair to say that this is not a matter of earth-shaking importance. At present, there is no restriction on the

reporting of the appearance in court of those aged 17 and upwards, but once one makes any move from the present fairly clear cut position of the publication of the names of juveniles who appear in court, it is not clear where one should stop.
However, the Government have come to the conclusion that it would be right to accept the Amendment. Therefore, the hon. Member need feel no disappointment on account of the Government's not having put down an Amendment. That has allowed full scope for the hon. Member's own legislative faculties.

Mr. Miscampbell: I am obliged to the Government. I am glad that there have been second thoughts. Although this is only a minor matter, the change is well worth while.

Amendment agreed to.

Mr. Goodhart: I beg to move Amendment No. 65, in page 16, line 6, leave out 'eighteen', and insert 'fourteen'.

Mr. Speaker: With this we are to take Amendment No. 66, in page 16, line 7, leave out 'magistrates' court other than a'. and Amendment No. 67, in page 16, line 8, after 'court', insert
or in the case of a person who has attained the age of eighteen a magistrates' court".

1.0 a.m.

Mr. Goodhart: Under the Bill Children's officers will have to deal with some of the most rebellious, pig-headed and contrary young people in the country. Most delinquent young people realise clearly the powers that probation officers have under probation orders. Some are likely to be less impressed by the authority of children's officers under a supervision order. There may well be an increase in the number of young people who refuse to obey their supervisor and who just do not turn up for appointments.
A supervisor has power to take children or young people into court and into care or to ask for powers to remove them wholly from their homes. The young delinquent will know perfectly well that unless he is unspeakably bad in his conduct the supervisor has no effective weapon short of this absolute deterrent. The effect of the Amendment would be to allow the court to impose fines of up to £25 or to make an attend-


ance centre order on those who are aged between 14 and 17, not just 18.
The Government concede that a fine may be the right way to deal with someone who has reached the age of 18, but many people of 17 and 16 are already earning substantial sums. On financial grounds there seems no very good reason for drawing an absolute line at the age of 18. Young people of 14 and 15 would not be earning large sums, but they are very money conscious and a comparatively small fine could have an important deterrent effect. I do not see why recalcitrant young people should not be brought into line by pressure on their pockets. The Government will find that it will be important to see that supervisors should be given disciplinary powers which can be used.

Mr. Elystan Morgan: This is a repeat of Amendments which were tabled in Committee and discussed on 24th April. They were withdrawn when I undertook to consider the matter further before Report. I gave that undertaking in terms which made it clear that we were aware of considerable difficulties in our path and that we were not really too hopeful of finding an improved solution. The result of this undertaking was our Amendment 63. The Government Amendment goes in the same direction as the Opposition Amendment, but not quite so far. The Government propose that the power of the court under Clause 15(3) should be available from the age of 17 upwards, instead of, as under the Bill, at the age of 18. The Opposition propose that these powers should be available from the age of 14 upwards.
The debate in Committee revealed that there were certain misunderstandings over the issues involved. These were dealt with in Committee. I will mention three of the main points. First, it is not the case that without the Opposition's Amendment supervisors and courts would be powerless to take any action if a supervised person failed to comply with the directions of the supervision order. Under Clause 15(1), the court has wide powers to vary a supervision order—for instance, by adding or extending a requirement under Clause 12(2)

relating to intermediate treatment. The court also has power, if need be, to make a care order in substitution for that supervision order.
Secondly, these Amendments are not really concerned with cases where the supervised person commits an offence. If he does this, and has reached the age of 14, and court proceedings for the offence are called for, it would be possible to prosecute him in accordance with the new Clause discussed earlier today. The court will then have available to it all the powers available under both Clause 15(1) and (3).
Thirdly, in effect, the only power available under Clause 15(3), but not under subsection (1), is the power to impose a fine. The whole issue between us, therefore, is a fairly narrow one.
There are two questions. First, should the courts have power to fine for breach of a requirement of a supervision order from the age of 14 upwards or only from 17? Secondly, should the power to fine, from whatever age it starts, cover all supervised persons, as the Opposition propose, or only those placed under supervision for an offence, as the Government propose? The Government have no hesitation in saying that it would be quite inappropriate to fine a person who was put under supervision because, for instance, he was in moral danger or had been neglected. Possibly, the Opposition do not intend this. The essential issue, therefore, concerns the question of age.
In the debate in Standing Committee, the hon. Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) suggested that a variation order under Clause 15(1) was more cumbersome than proceedings under subsection (3). I believe that that is a misconception. In either case, the proceedings involve exactly the same things. The supervisor takes the supervised person before the court, the court listens to what they both have to say, obtains any further information that it wants and then decides what order, if any, to make. The procedure is equally straightforward in each case and it is wrong to suppose that Clause 15(1) is any the more cumbersome. For that reason, I hope that the Amendment will not be pressed.

Amendment negatived.

Clause 16

PROVISIONS SUPPLEMENTARY TO SECTION 15

Amendments made: No. 68, in page 18, line 7, leave out 'is a young person' and insert:
'has attained the age of fourteen'.

No. 69, in page 18, line 45, at end insert:
'; and if while an application to a juvenile court in pursuance of the preceding section is pending the supervised person to whom it relates attains the age of seventeen or eighteen, the court shall deal with the application as if he had not attained the age in question'.—[Mr. Callaghan.]

Clause 18

SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS RELATING TO SUPERVISION ORDERS

Mr. Callaghan: I beg to move Amendment No. 70, in page 19, line 39, at end insert:
'any person who has ceased to be the supervisor by virtue of the order; and
(c) to any local authority who is not entitled by virtue of the preceding paragraph to such a copy and whose area is named in the supervision order in pursuance of the preceding subsection or has ceased to be so named by virtue of the court's order;'.
The purpose of the Amendment is simple. It increases the number of persons entitled to be notified when an order is changed. The history of the Amendment is interesting. It was put down by my hon. Friend the Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. Archer), moved by the hon. Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) and undertaken by me in Committee to be considered. That combination is irresistible.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 20

ORDERS FOR COMMITTAL TO CARE OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES

Mr. Miscampbell: I beg to move Amendment No. 71, in page 22, line 14, leave out from the beginning to 'when' in line 17.
This is an equally short Amendment, although I suspect that it may not be

quite as successful as the last one I moved. It deals with the age of majority and it seeks to deal with the curious anomaly which arises in subsection (3) of the Clause, which states that
a care order other than an interim order shall cease to have effect—
(a) if that person to whom it relates had attained the age of sixteen when the order was originally made, when he attains the age of nineteen"—
that is to say, the care order ceases to have effect at the age of 19. The subsection goes on:
(b) in any other case, when that person attains the age of eighteen.
So one arrives at the situation that the care order can go to the age of 19 in certain circumstances and ends at age 18, which is now the currently accepted age of adulthood. Under the recent Family Law Reform Bill, that has been decided to be the age of adulthood. One appreciates that if the order is made in the seventeenth year there will be a very short time for the order to run, if it is automatically to come to an end at the age of 18, but, fortunately, one is not left in the situation that one has to acquiesce in that, because Clause 21(1) provides powers for the courts to consider whether orders ought to be continued after the age of 18.
What I suggest is quite simply that we ought to recognise what we recognise in every other sphere of law, and that the order should automatically fall at the age of 18, but that a wide discretion should be given under Clause 21 to extend the care order if necessary. It seems to me that that would both keep the principle which is universally accepted and yet give the discretion which is clearly necessary.

Mr. Elystan Morgan: Those who have argued against the Bill on the ground that it is inconsistent with the new age of majority seem to have overlooked that that was not the view taken by the Latey Committee. The second recommendation made by that Committee was in these terms:
The general capacity of young people to order their own personal affairs should not affect the criminal or penal field since it is the irresponsible, the disturbed and the inadequate who become involved in anti-social behaviour and law-breaking regardless of chronological age.


The Government agree with this. The age of majority is not really relevant to the issues raised by the Amendment.
The hon. Gentleman has asked the reason why Clause 20 provides for a care order to last until the nineteenth birthday if made at the age of 16. If the Bill did not provide this a care order made when the young person was nearly 17 would last for just over a year, and often this would simply not be long enough.
Under the present law it does not matter that a fit person order ends at 18 in all cases, since the court has the alternative of making an approved school order. The Bill removes that alternative, and in due course the care order will be the only form of residential treatment available to the courts. It is true that Clause 21(1) allows a care order to be extended to the nineteenth birthday. This can be done, however, only in limited circumstances, and such extensions would not cover the many cases where the reason why the period in care should last beyond the eighteenth birthday was simply that it did not start until the young person was over 16.
This Amendment would create a gap in the arrangements for dealing with young persons needing residential treatment and appearing before the courts at the age of 16. This gap would operate to their detriment and to the detriment of society.

Mr. Hogg: I propose to make a very short speech, and I propose to say simply this, that under the position which has now been defended by the Under-Secretary we propose to give a young man the vote but to put him in the care of the local authority, and that is the degree of absurdity which has been reached by the present Government.

Amendment negatived.

1.15 a.m.

Mrs. Knight: I beg to move Amendment No. 72, in page 22, line 18, at end insert:
'or three years from the date of the order, whichever is the earlier'.
The Amendment proposes that a firm time limit should be placed on an order for committal to the care of a local authority. Under the Bill, a young boy or girl could have an order for committal placed upon him or her at the age of ten, and that child could then

be in care for as long as eight years. Some of us feel that this is too long.
I know very well that sterling work is carried out in local children's homes. It used to be part of my duties to inspect a local children's home every three or four months, and I know what a lot of work is done. I well remember when first starting this type of social work how the children's officer with whom I was working explained to me that whatever was done, however carefully it was done and however much affection was poured out in the doing of it, the local authority children's home could never be anything but a very poor substitute for the child's own home.
When a child is in care in a children's home—I agree it is slightly different if the child is fostered—that child is institutionalised, and institutions are not the best places to bring up children. Even if the home is the best type of local authority children's home imaginable, even if the child conies from what many of us would regard as a very poor home—I do not mean poor in a monetary sense but poor in the sense that was frequently mentioned in Committee—even if a child comes from a bad home in every sense of the word, it may well be that the child would be happier in that home than in a local authority children's home. Under this Clause a child could be sent even to a closed institution, and perhaps forgotten, and there would be no publicity at any stage.
In a long debate in Committee hon. Members expressed their worries on this point, and the Minister felt that there were, as he put it, twin safeguards. He said that, on the one hand, there was the initiative of the parents of the child or of the young person and, on the other hand, the initiative of the local authority with its obligation to review the case every six months. I want to press the Minister on this, because I do not think that it bears too much examination.
I agree that there is provision in the Bill for the parents to apply for the child to be discharged, but I am puzzled at the notion that a child or young person can do this himself. I cannot imagine for one moment that a child in a local authority children's home would know sufficient of the law, and of this law in particular, to trot along and submit a case for his discharge from a children's


home. It is in no way realistic to imagine that a child is capable of applying for his own discharge.
The parents may apply for a discharge for their child, but it may be that they are travelling around, or that they are not very good parents. I am not happy about that, but I am less happy about the local authority obligation to review the case. I have read most carefully Clause 25(4) which provides for this, and again I find an element of unreality creeping in. With all the other duties already laid on the children officers, and with the vast extra burden laid upon children officers by the Bill, I cannot believe that this bi-annual shuffle through the case papers will be thoroughly done.
I wonder whether the House has considered what this would mean in a local authority area of, say, 100,000 souls. It would be a conservative estimate to assume that it would have as few as 200 children in care—fostered and in remand and other homes. Arithmetic is not my strong point, but with at least 200 children in care and with meetings every month except one, if all 200 cases are to be reviewed twice a year, each monthly meeting of the children's committee will have to consider 36 cases. That is assuming that it is the children's committee which will look at case papers, because I cannot think that the Minister would say that the work should be done completely within the office walls. My knowledge of children's committees leads me to suppose that the job would be laid as a duty on the committee.
As one who has sat through many children's committee meetings, some of which last a very long time, I wonder whether the Minister appreciates the burden placed on local authorities if children's committees have to go through 36 case papers each month. Surely it would be infinitely better to have a definite period of three years so that a committee's examination was not done in a cursory fashion, after which a child should not be kept in care unless a good case was made for it.
I was interested to hear the Home Secretary making great play earlier in the debate of the desirability of having uniformity of treatment. He made a powerful case and said that none of us

would wish to encourage any kind of system where there was no uniformity in meting out justice. Here we have a perfect example where there will not be uniformity if the situation is left in this haphazard state with the duty thrown on the local authority to scan cases every six months.
The right hon. Gentleman said that guidelines should be set, and I am trying to set them. Without them, I cannot feel that children will be as well served as they would be if it was recognised clearly that a period of three years was sufficient time for a child to remain in care without the authority having to show why that child should not remain in care.

Mr. Callaghan: I am afraid that I cannot recommend acceptance of the hon. Lady's Amendment. She exaggerates the amount of work which would be required to be done by these committees. She assumes that all children are in care for three years, whereas 50 per cent. of them remain in local authority homes for less than six months. To start with, therefore, she has to halve her figures.
The real test is that it is going on now. For the last 36 years, there has been in existence the fit person order, under which children are committed to the care of the local authority as a fit person and remain in its care unless and until there are revocations or the local authority decides to review cases. This is giving it statutory authority.
The hon. Lady said—and I disagree with her profoundly—that she cannot believe that the review will be thoroughly done. She says that she knows about children's committees. So do I. It is one thing that I do know about. I have considerable family and personal connections with the work of children's committees. I know what goes on. I have seen the papers spread over the dining room table. I can assure the hon. Lady from personal knowledge that voluntary workers do a great deal of work in reviewing these cases very thoroughly.
The hon. Lady has not shown us that, among the 20,000 children who are now committed under fit person orders at present, whose cases are exactly analogous with those on whose behalf she is speaking, there are any complaints


about the procedure. So why does the hon. Lady seek to alter the procedure?

Mrs. Knight: Does not the Home Secretary think it is faintly possible that the experience of having papers spread over the dining room table, while extremely valuable, is not so valuable as having been a member of a children's committee for ten years and known from the inside how it works?

Mr. Callaghan: I am sure that the hon. Lady knows from the inside how it works. I am claiming to know how it works, too. What the hon. Lady as failed to demonstrate in her eloquence is that the 20,000 children now committed without any time limit being set on the period for which they are committed have suffered in any way. She has not produced any example. The hon. Lady is seeking to alter a system which has stood the test of time for the last 36 years without producing any reason why we should do so. At any rate, the hon. Lady has produced a lot of theoretical reasons based on statistics which are suspect, but she has not produced a really genuine case about it.
We are seeking to give statutory authority to what the best authorities already do; namely, that they should be required to review these cases conscientiously and thoroughly every six months. Apart from that, it is always open to the parents, or anybody else, to apply for revocation of the order. It is open to the young person himself to apply for revocation if he feels it is appropriate to do so. Some of them can do that at the age of 16 or 17. I am sure that the hon. Lady has seen these children in children's homes. I certainly have. They know what they can do under these provisions. They are very well versed in them. The hon. Lady dismisses that, but is is not unimportant. They or their parents can secure revocation of the order. In the case of those in more secure accommodation, there will be certain regulations which I propose to make in due course under Clause 40.
Despite the hon. Lady's great experience of children's committees, she is arguing purely on theory and not by reference to the practical difficulty that has emerged in the care of the 20,000 children in children's homes without any three-year or other limit placed on them.

I recommend to the House that the system which exists, is well tried, and is working successfully, should continue. I hope, therefore, that the hon. Lady will not press the Amendment.

Mr. Hogg: I feel that the Home Secretary is a great deal too complacent about this matter. He overlooks the fact that a great many more children will certainly be placed in this position than have been in the past. I do not think that is in dispute.
I do not want to under-estimate either the personal experience of my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Mrs. Knight) or that of the Home Secretary in seeing the papers spread out over his dining room table, which is the kind of folksy way he approaches these subjects. The fact remains that, whether the papers are spread out over his dining roam table, the child can be placed in care at the age of ten and, under the Clause, will or can go on to the age of 18—eight years, if my arithmetic at this hour of the morning serves me.
Of course the order can be revoked. At the age of 16 or 17, or whatever it is, the young person, as he is by that time, can himself apply for its revocation.
1.30 a.m.
That is all very well, but it would be much more like common sense that after about three years, which my hon. Friend mentioned as an appropriate period, the local authority itself should justify the continuance of the child under such an order. There should be a limit of time during which a child or young person can be subjected to this kind of supervision and constraint. If the situation after this period justifies a renewal, the renewal will obviously take place.
I am unimpressed by the Home Secretary's conservatism. Conservatism is a good thing in due measure, at the right time, and in the hands of the right people. The Home Secretary as a convert has all the excess of enthusiasm from which converts usually suffer. The system may have been working to his satisfaction for 36 years. There is probably a little more latent unease than he is aware of, however. Whether there is or not, it would be more commonsensical to put a limit on these things than to leave it to the operation of time, which


might in theory be as much as eight years—from 10 to 18—to bring it to an end in due course.
The Home Secretary has been much too complacent. Many people with experience of a particular administrative system allow their enthusiasm for that administrative system to outrun their discretion. I suspect in this case that the papers spread over the Home Secretary's

dining room table have proved a snare and a delusion which has led him into error, prejudice, and a sort of rigid conservatism which he is beginning to show in more directions than one.

Question put, That the Amendment be made:—

The House divided: Ayes 93, Noes 135.

Division No. 238.]
AYES
[1.33 a.m.


Astor, John
Hastings, Stephen
Pink, R. Bonner


Balniel, Lord
Hiley, Joseph
Pounder, Rafton


Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gos. &amp; Fhm)
Hill, J. E. B.
Prior, J. M. L.


Berry, Hn. Anthony
Holland, Philip
Pym, Francis


Biffen, John
Hordern, Peter
Ramsden, Rt. Hn. James


Biggs-Davison, John
Hornby, Richard
Rees-Davies, W. R.


Black, Sir Cyril
Howell, David (Guildford)
Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon


Boardman, Tom (Le'cester, S. W.)
Hunt, John
Ridley, Hn. Nicholas


Boyle, Rt. Hn. Sir Edward
Iremonger, T. L.
Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey)


Brinton, Sir Tatton
Jenkin, Patrick (Woodford)
Russell, Sir Ronald


Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)
Jopling, Michael
Sharples, Richard


Buck, Antony (Colchester)
King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)
Shaw, Michael (Sc'h'gh &amp; Whitby)


Burden, F. A.
Kitson, Timothy
Silvester, Frederick


Campbell, B. (Oldham, W.)
Knight, Mrs. Jill
Sinclair, Sir George


Campbell, Gordon (Moray &amp; Nairn)
Lane, David
Speed, Keith


Clark, Henry
Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry
Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir M.


Clegg, Walter
Longden, Gilbert
Taylor, Frank (Moss Side)


Cunningham, Sir Knox
MacArthur, Ian
Temple, John M.


Dance, James
McNair-Wilson, Michael



Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F. (Ashford)
McNair-Wilson, Patrick (New Forest)
Vaughan-Morgan, Rt. Hn. Sir John


Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)
Marten, Neil
Waddington, David


Elliott, R. W. (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, N.)
Maude, Angus
Walters, Dennis


Eyre, Reginald
Miscampbell, Norman
Ward, Dame Irene


Fortescue, Tim
Monro, Hector
Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William


Glover, Sir Douglas
Montgomery, Fergus
Wiggin, A. W.


Grant, Anthony
More, Jasper
Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)


Grant-Ferris, R.
Morrison, Charles (Devizes)
Woodnutt, Mark


Grieve, Percy
Munro-Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh
Worsley, Marcus


Griffiths, Eldon (Bury St. Edmunds)
Murton, Oscar



Hamilton, Lord (Fermanagh)
Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)
Onslow, Cranley
Mr. Humphrey Atkins and


Harrison, Brian (Maldon)
Page, Graham (Crosby)
Mr. Bernard Weatherill.


Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)
Percival, Ian





NOES


Alldritt, Walter
Dempsey, James
Johnson, James (K'ston-on-Hull, W.)


Armstrong, Ernest
Diamond, Rt. Hn. John
Jones, T. Alec (Rhondda, West)


Ashton, Joe (Bassetlaw)
Dobson, Ray
Kenyon, Clifford


Atkins, Ronald (Preston, N.)
Dunnett, Jack
Lawson, George


Atkinson, Norman (Tottenham)
Dunwoody, Dr. John (F'th &amp; C'b'e)
Leadbitter, Ted


Bagier, Gordon A. T.
Eadie, Alex
Lipton, Marcus


Barnett, Joel
Edwards, William (Merioneth)
Loughlin, Charles


Bidwell, Sydney
Ellis, John
Luard, Evan


Binns, John
English, Michael
Lyon, Alexander W. (York)


Booth, Albert
Evans, Fred (Caerphilly)
Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)


Bray, Dr. Jeremy
Evans, Ioan L. (Birm'h'm, Yardley)
Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson


Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.
Fernyhough, E.
McBride, Neil


Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan)
Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)
McCann, John


Brown, Bob (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, W.)
Fowler, Gerry
McGuire, Michael


Brown, R. W. (Shoreditch &amp; F'bury)
Fraser, John (Norwood)
Mackenzie, Gregor (Rutherglen)


Buchan, Norman
Freeson, Reginald
Maclennan, Robert


Buchanan, Richard (G'gow, Sp'burn)
Gregory, Arnold
MacMillan, Malcolm (Western Isles)


Callaghan, Rt. Hn. James
Griffiths, Eddie (Brightside)
McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)


Carmichael, Neil
Hamilton, James (Bothwell)
McNamara, J. Kevin


Coe, Denis
Hamling, William
Mahon, Peter (Preston, S.)


Coleman, Donald
Harper, Joseph
Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)


Concannon, J. D.
Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)
Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.)


Conlan, Bernard
Haseldine, Norman
Manuel, Archie


Crawshaw, Richard
Herbison, Rt. Hn. Margaret
Marks, Kenneth


Dalyell, Tam
Howell, Denis (Small Heath)
Mellish, Rt. Hn. Robert


Davidson, Arthur (Accrington)
Howie, W.
Mendelson, John


Davies, Dr. Ernest (Stretford)
Huckfield, Leslie
Millan, Bruce


Davies, Ifor (Gower)
Hughes, Roy (Newport)
Milne, Edward (Blyth)


Dell, Edmund
Jackson, Colin (B'h'se &amp; Spenb'gh)
Mitchell, R. C. (S'th'pton, Test)




Molloy, William
Rees, Merlyn
Tinn, James


Morgan, Elystan (Cardiganshire)
Roberts, Albert (Normanton)
Varley, Eric G.


Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)
Roberts, Gwilym (Bedfordshire, S.)
Wainwright, Edwin (Dearne Valley)


Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)
Rodgers, William (Stockton)
Walker, Harold (Doncaster)


Moyle, Roland
Roebuck, Roy
Wallace, George


Newens, Stan
Ross, Rt. Hn, William
Watkins, David (Consett)


Ogden, Eric
Rowlands, E.
Watkins, Tudor (Brecon &amp; Radnor)


Oram, Albert E.
Ryan, John
Wellbeloved, James


Orme, Stanley
Shaw, Arnold (Ilford, S.)
Whitlock, William


Oswald, Thomas
Sheldon, Robert
Williams, Alan Lee (Hornchurch)


Palmer, Arthur
Short, Mrs. Renée (W'hampton, N. E.)
Wilson, Willian (Coventry, S.)


Parkyn, Brian (Bedford)
Silkin, Rt. Hn. John (Deptford)
Winstanley, Dr, M. P.


Pavitt, Laurence
Silverman, Julius
Woof, Robert


Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred
Spriggs, Leslie



Pentland, Norman
Taverne, Dick
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Prentice, Rt. Hn. R. E.
Thomas, Rt. Hn. George
Mr. Alan Fitch and


Price, Christopher (Perry Barr)
Thomson, Rt. Hn. George
Mr. Ernest G. Perry.


Probert, Arthur

Clause 22

SPECIAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO INTERIM ORDERS

Mr. Elystan Morgan: I beg to move Amendment No. 75, in page 23, line 40, at end insert:
', so however that the said provision shall, if the court making the order considers it appropriate so to direct by reason of the fact that that person is under the age of five or by reason of illness or accident, require the local authority to bring him before the specified court on the expiration of the order only if the specified court so requires'.
Subsection (2) of Clause 22 requires an interim order to contain provision requiring the local authority to bring the person before the court. However, the preceding subsection empowers the court to make an interim order without the child or young person being present if he is under the age of five or cannot be present by reason of illness or accident. There may be cases where for those reasons, it is desirable to make a further interim order in the absence of the child or young person. Clause 22(2) as now drafted would prevent this, since an interim order must require the local authority to bring the child or young person before the court.
The Amendment enables the court to dispense with the attendance of the child or young person on any further occasion, as it can when making the original interim order.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 24

POWERS AND DUTIES OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES TO PERSONS COMMITTED TO THEIR CARE

Mr. Callaghan: I beg to move Amendment No. 76, in page 26, line 5, at end insert:

(6) While a care order other than an interim order is in force in respect of a person who has not attained the age of eighteen, it shall be the duty of his parent to keep the local authority to whose care he is committed by the order informed of the parent's address; and if the parent knows of the order and fails to perform his duty under this subsection, the parent shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding ten pounds unless he shows that at the material time he was residing at the address of the other parent and had reasonable cause to believe that the other parent had kept the authority informed of their address.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Harry Gourlay): With this Amendment we shall take Amendments Nos. 119 and 120 to Schedule 4.

Mr. Callaghan: This is a short and simple Amendment which replaces the existing law in Section 14 of the Children and Young Persons Act which places a duty on the parents of a child or young person detained in an approved school to keep the local authority notified of their address. This Amendment provides that the same duty shall be laid on the parents of a child or young person under 18 subject to a care order. It has proved to be administratively useful, and I am sure this should be done as it enables the local authorities to keep in touch with the parents.
The second and third Amendments are consequential.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 25

CONSEQUENTIAL MODIFICATIONS OF 1948 c. 43 SS. 11 AND 12

Mr. Goodhart: I beg to move Amendment No. 77, in page 26, line 31, after 'may', insert:
'bring the child before a Juvenile Court and may if the Court so orders'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this Amendment we can take Amendment No. 78, in page 26, line 34, after 'powers' insert:
'under subsection (2) of this section'.

Mr. Goodhart: Not all children's homes run absolutely smoothly, and it is unfortunately possible for the head of a home to grow to dislike one of the children and to decide that the child is such a menace that it should be locked up. I concede that the local authority must have power to move a child from one sort of accommodation to another, but under Clause 25(2) it will be possible for a child to come into care because of the illness of its parents and then, because of grave personal antagonism, it would be possible for that child to be locked up for a lengthy period without reference of any sort to a court. This seems quite wrong. I do not believe that this kind of accident, as it were, is likely to happen often, but it should not be possible for it to happen at all.

1.45 a.m.

Mr. Elystan Morgan: This requirement would apply irrespective of how the child had come into care in the first instance. The majority of children in care are not there by virtue of any court order. Even in respect of those children who would be in care because the court had earlier made a care order, it would be quite impracticable to require a local authority to obtain a court order before taking immediate measures to do what is necessary to protect the public, including other children in care, from the activities of, say, a seriously disturbed or aggressive child in the authority's care.
This Amendment and the new subsection (5) which the Opposition has proposed, are attempts to restrict the local authority's proper discretion in discharging its responsibility for children who, by one means or another, have been placed in its care. For this reason, they cannot be accepted. When it is necessary to take measures to prevent a child from injuring members of the public, it can usually be argued that it is in the child's interest to prevent him from doing this. But such measures might take the form of placing the child in secure accommodation and it could be argued that this would be bound to deny him some of the opportunities for develop-

ment that he would otherwise have and could therefore be said to be against his best interests.
The object of subsection (2) is to prevent any such argument arising. The necessity for local authorities to take measures for the protection of the public arises now, with fit person order children for example, but it may arise more frequently when local authorities are responsible, under care orders, for the care and control of young persons who would at present be sent to approved schools or borstal. It is, therefore, desirable to have it clear that authorities have the power to take such measures, should a case arise in which an authority is in doubt whether the action necessary for the protection of the public could be justified if the interests of the child were the sole consideration.

Mr. Hogg: I do not want to prolong the discussion and, clearly, this is not a matter upon which we should divide, but I have some reservations about the Under-Secretary's answer. What worries some of my hon. Friends and me is the possibility that a child might be caught up in the administrative machine and subjected to administrative restraint and thereby be sunk without trace until it emerges at the age of 18.
Much as one may be filled with admiration for administrative procedures in this country at their best—and, happily, they are at a fairly good best most of the time—one cannot help being a little disconcerted that at their worst and when mistakes are made rather dreadful things can happen.
The Under-Secretary made a powerful case, and I recognise that sometimes a local authority must act in a hurry to protect other people from the activities of a delinquent child. But there is more sense in the principle underlying the Amendment than the hon. Gentleman's criticism of it allows for. I am not saying that in the form in which it has been proposed it is acceptable, because I was impressed by what the Under-Secretary said, but I hope that he will bear in mind what both I and my hon. Friend have said.
If the hon. Gentleman, can find a way of compelling a local authority to come before a court if it has to act in this way, I shall be very grateful if he can put that into effect in another place or


in some other way. I do not believe that administrative procedures can ever safeguard the subject against injustice. Publicity and the court are the real protection for the individual, whether a child or an adult, and I think that my hon. Friend's Amendment is sound. The form in which it is couched will probably not be satisfactory, but I hope that, although he has made a case against it, the hon. Gentleman will think of the difficulty again.

Amendment negatived.

Clause 26

DETENTION OF CHILD OR YOUNG PERSON IN PLACE OF SAFETY

Mr. Callaghan: I beg to move Amendment No. 80, in page 27, line 40, at end insert:
'and inform him, and take such steps as are practicable for informing his parent or guardian, of his right to apply to a justice under subsection (5) of this section for his release'.
This Amendment and Amendment No. 81, which is consequential upon it, give an additional protection to the child or young person. Its purpose is to require a police officer who is responsible for placing the young person in a place of safety to inform him of his right to apply to a justice and the police themselves to take such steps as are practicable to inform his parent or guardian.
The object of the Amendment is to ensure that the child and parents are aware of their rights under Clause 22(5). I think that this is done at present, because it is left to the discretion of the police, but it will now be incorporated in the Statute, and this constitutes an additional protection.

Amendment agreed to.

Further Amendment made: No. 81, in page 27, line 41, leave out 'subsection (5) of this section' and insert 'the said subsection (5)'.—[Mr. Callaghan.]

Clause 27

RELEASE OR FURTHER DETENTION OF ARRESTED YOUNG PERSON

Amendments made: No. 82, in page 29, line 3, at end insert:
(4) Where an officer decides in pursuance of subsection (1) of this section not to release a

person arrested without a warrant and it appears to the officer that a decision falls to be taken in pursuance of section (Restrictions on criminal proceedings for offences by young persons) of this Act whether to lay an information in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by that person, it shall be the duty of the officer to inform him that such a decision falls to be taken and to specify the offence.

No. 83, in page 29, line 10, leave out 'and'.

No. 84, in page 29, line 10, leave out 'this' and insert 'the preceding'.

No. 85, in page 29, line 12, leave out 'the court may remand him' and insert:
'and the court does not proceed forthwith to inquire into the case, then—

(a) except in a case falling within paragraph (b) of this subsection, the court shall order his release; and
(b) in the case where he was arrested in pursuance of a warrant or the court considers that he ought in his own interests to be further detained or the court has reason to believe as mentioned in subsection (1)(b) of this section, the court shall remand him; and

and where a court remands a person in pursuance of this subsection otherwise than on bail it shall, if he is not represented by counsel or a solicitor, inform him that he may apply to a judge of the High Court to be admitted to bail and shall, if he is not so represented or his counsel or solicitor so requests, give him a written notice stating the reason for so remanding him'.—[Mr. Elystan Morgan.]

Clause 29

REMOVAL TO BORSTAL INSTITUTIONS OF PERSONS COMMITTED TO CARE OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES

Amendment made: No. 86, in page 30, line 33, after 'remand', insert 'or legal aid'.—[Mr. Elystan Morgan.]

Clause 31

TRANSITIONAL MODIFICATIONS OF PART I FOR PERSONS OF SPECIFIED AGES

Amendments made: No. 87, in page 32, line 1, leave out '5 of this Act' and insert:
'(Restrictions on criminal proceedings for offences by young persons) of this Act (except subsection (8))'.

No. 88, in page 32, line 5, after 'in' insert:
'subsection (8) of section (Restrictions on criminal proceedings for offences by young persons)'.

No. 89, in page 32, line 6, after '7(8)' insert '89(1)'.

No. 90, in page 32, line 26, after '2(3)', insert:
'or subsection (8) of section (Restrictions on criminal proceedings for offences by young persons)'.

No. 91, in page 32, line 28, leave out from 'acts' to 'and' in line 29.—[Mr. Elystan Morgan.]

Mr. Deputy Speaker: The next Amendment selected is Government Amendment No. 92, with which we may discuss Government Amendments Nos. 93 and 94.

Mr. Elystan Morgan: I beg to move Amendment No. 92, in page 32, line 34, leave out from 'specify' to 'to' in line 35 and insert:
'an authority shall, without prejudice to subsection (2) of section 9 of this Act, not be required by virtue of subsection (1) of that section'.
In Committee, on 17th April, my hon. Friend the Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. Archer) pointed out that during the transitional period Clause 31(3) relieved the local authority, in areas where there were local arrangements for probation officers to make home surroundings inquiries, of any duty to make investigations and provide information on home surroundings placed on them by virtue of Clause 9.
Clause 9(1) deals with inquiries before a court appearance. Subsection (2), however, places on the local authority a duty to provide information requested by the court; that is, after the process before the court has begun. By relieving the local authority of its duty under subsection (2) as well as under subsection (1), Clause 31(3) enables the authority, in the words of my hon. Friend, to give a blank refusal to the court if the court should ask for its help. Of course, in practice no local authority would be likely to do any such thing. Amendment No. 92, however, clarifies the position by making it clear that the local authority is relieved of its duty under subsection (1) of Clause 9 but not of its duty under subsection (2).
Amendment No. 94 is a consequential drafting Amendment.

Amendment agreed to.

Further Amendments made No 93, in page 32, line 36, after 'information'. insert:
which it does not already possess'.

No. 94, in line 39, leave out such information in respect of him and insert:
'information with respect to his home surroundings'.

No. 95, in line 40, leave out 'or justice', and

No. 96, in line 40, leave out from 'officer' to end of line 44.—[Mr. Elystan Morgan.]

Mr. Elystan Morgan: I beg to move Amendment No. 97, in page 33, line 10, at end insert:
'and, in the case of an order of which the effect is that the reference to a child in section 4 of this Act includes a child who has attained an age of more than twelve, shall not be made unless the draft has been approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament'.
The principle of the Amendment was accepted in Standing Committee on 1st May. It was generally agreed in the Committee that Clause 4 was right in relation to children aged 10 and 11, and an assurance was given by the Government that in the first instance Clause 4 would be brought into operation only up to the twelfth birthday. Concern was, however, expressed on the Opposition side about the application of Clause 4 to children aged 12 and 13, and the object of the Amendment which was accepted in principle was to ensure that this could not be done without a positive decision of each House of Parliament.
The effect of the Amendment is that a draft Order raising the age in Clause 4 above the twelfth birthday, whether it be to 13 or to 12½—although it is likely that it would move up in stages of only one year—will be subject to affirmative Resolution procedure instead of negative Resolution procedure.

Mr. Worsley: We very much appreciate the Amendment, as we said in Committee. We regard it as of very considerable importance that the two Houses should have time to consider all the issues involved, the facilities available, the manner in which the new procedure works, and so on, before any further change is made. In view of this, I gratefully accept the Amendment.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 33

REGIONAL PLANS FOR COMMUNITY HOMES

2.0 a.m.

Mr. Lane: I beg to move Amendment No. 98, in page 34, line 12, after 'homes', insert 'and schools'.
The effect of the Amendment would be that the places which the regional planning committees are obliged to provide and maintain will be known not just as community homes but as community homes and schools. We had a long debate on this in the Standing Committee, and we have put down this same point again tonight because we hope that the Government may have second thoughts on this matter.
If I may remind the House of a point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Chelsea (Mr. Worsley) in Standing Committee, it is that today about one-seventh of the total number of children in care are at approved schools. The underlying reason for our wish to keep the word "school" in the description of these places is to stress even more than is done in the Bill the educational aspect of the total care the Bill is providing for the children. There is also the secondary although still important point about the need to attract teachers of the highest quality to serve in these schools within the total system of care.
In Committee, the Under-Secretary of State gave a persuasive answer. He made the point that, under the Bill as it stands, it will still be open to mergers of these homes to include the word "school" in the title. But I doubt whether even so he paid sufficient attention to the feeling among those concerned in running these schools. There is a considerable psychological point here, even granting the weight of his argument in Committee. Although we are at a late stage in the Bill, I still hope that the Government will reconsider their attitude on this matter.

Mr. Elystan Morgan: I am sorry that on this occasion one is not able to show the sweet reasonableness which has characterised so many of our deliberations. I appreciate that the Amendment is promoted by the Approved Schools Association, as explained by the hon.

Member for Cambridge (Mr. Lane) in Committee, and that it wishes to preserve the schools' identity through the Statutory use of the word "school". The Association fears that, unless that word is preserved in statute, ultimately there will be no establishment that will provide for education on these terms. The Association claims that teachers will only work in places which are by statute called "schools". I suggest that these fears are ill-founded.
A term is needed to identify, for statutory purposes, a residential establishment whose purpose is wholly or mainly to accommodate children in the care of the local authority and whose management is carried out wholly or partly by the local authority. Therefore, the chosen term should apply to all such establishments and should be an exclusive term.
The term at present in the Bill is "community home" and this will apply to a variety of establishments ranging from small family group homes providing much the same facilities as the ordinary household to places where children with special needs are provided with education and treatment on the premises, sometimes in conditions of security.
The term "community home" is merely a description of the legal status of the establishments. The actual title of a particular community home will be for the responsible local authority or voluntary organisation to decide. Therefore, although such an establishment's legal status will be that of a community home, there is nothing to prevent it having as its proper name the designation "Green Bank School", for example, or whatever else it wishes to call itself.
There is every reason to assume that some community homes will need to provide educational facilities on the premises and members of the teaching profession will be required to occupy positions of responsibility in such homes. It is argued that teachers will only work in a place which is not only known as a school but is by statute a school. It can be said in refutation that, within the child care service already, there are teachers in reception centres and remand homes, and there is no reason to believe that recruiting of


teachers for particular schools is any easier than it is for these centres and homes.
There are two reasons which make the suggested alteration to the term "community home" very difficult to accept. "School" is defined as a statutory term in the Education Act, 1944, and I am sure that the House will accept that it is important to avoid any confusion with establishments provided under other enactments. Secondly, the majority of the 2,000 community homes will rely on outside school facilities provided for the use of children living at home with their parents, and only a minority, probably not exceeding 10 per cent., are likely to have full-time educational facilities on the premises as an integral part of the care provided at the home.
I hope that I have said sufficient to convince the House that the Amendment should be resisted.

Amendment negatived.

Clause 38

MANAGEMENT OF CONTROLLED COMMUNITY HOMES

Mr. Elystan Morgan: I beg to move Amendment No. 99, in page 39, line 35, leave out from beginning to 'proper' in line 36 and insert 'keep'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this we are to take Amendment No. 100.

Mr. Morgan: These two Amendments restore the wording of Clause 38(6) as introduced and reverse Government Amendments, made in Committee, which were defective and undesirable.

Amendment agreed to.

Further Amendment made: No. 100, in page 39, line 37, leave out from 'accounts' to 'but' in line 39.—[Mr. Elystan Morgan.]

Clause 40

CONTROL OF PREMISES USED FOR, AND CONDUCT OF, COMMUNITY HOMES

Mr. Miscampbell: I beg to move Amendment No. 101, in page 41, line 32, at end insert:
'and of a Juvenile Court'.

The Amendment deals with Clause 40(c), which requires the approval of the Secretary of State to the provision of accommodation for the purpose of restricting the liberty of children in community homes. It imposes another requirement for the placing of a child in such accommodation. The Clause provides that before a child is placed in such accommodation, the permission of the local authority and a voluntary organisation is required. We seek to add to those the juvenile court.
Once a child is into the system, he is completely at the mercy, albeit the tender mercy, of the local authority which may move him from one home to another without the aye or nay of anyone, subject to the provisions laid down in Clause 40. Certainly, he may be moved from an open home into one where his liberty is restricted and which is indistinguishable from an approved school today.
We feel that an outside body should say whether a child should, in fact, he sent to an approved school where his liberty is restricted and that outside body would appear to be most appropriately the juvenile court which in the ordinary way would have had to deal with him and send him to an approved school as the law stands. But, by mere administrative decision, with certain safeguards which are only internal and administrative, he could be moved to an approved school or its equivalent.
For those reasons, we believe that an outside body should scrutinise and scrutinise carefully before any child is put into an enclosed establishment.

Mr. Elystan Morgan: I have every sympathy with the sentiments articulated by the hon. Member, but there is no basis on which the juvenile court would be properly involved in the decision of a local authority in respect of a child in its care provided in accommodation approved for the restriction of liberty. The juvenile court may have had no dealings with the child and even if the child is subject to a care order, the proper question for the court to determine is whether the order is to remain in force, and to this end application may be made at any time for the court to discharge the order under Clause 21(2).

Amendment negatived.

Mr. Callaghan: I beg to move Amendment 102, in page 41, line 44, leave out 'by local authorities and voluntary organisations'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this Amendment we can also discuss Amendments 79 and 103.

Mr. Callaghan: The Amendment results from the consideration which the Government have given, as promised in Committee by my hon. Friend, to the question of how to provide for the judgment of an independent person to play some part when a local authority reviews arrangements for a child in its care. The safeguards provided by Clauses 25(4) and 21(2) are substantial. They place a statutory duty on local authorities to review each child's case at least once every six months, but the children accommodated in secure conditions are special cases and the local authority must be fully answerable for the welfare of such children.
I have no doubt that the local authorities will take great pains, but having considered what was said in Committee, it is right that the law should provide that there should be no risk, however slight, of a child being kept in secure accommodation for perhaps a protracted period without some independent person having a say in what is being done.
The purpose of the Amendment is to meet the criticisms made in Committee. There is a limitation on the independent person's intervention, but nevertheless it is pretty comprehensive, and I hope that the House will feel that we have tried to meet the points made.

Mr. Worsley: We are grateful to the Government for meeting the points made in Committee. The decision of the House not to have a three-yearly review by the court makes this provision even more important. We have tabled an Amendment to Clause 25 on these lines. In Committee, and in our Amendment we laid stress on the value of having a magistrate as part of the reviewing machinery. Does the right hon. Gentleman envisage that the regulation he would make would or could include magistrates in such determinations? The experience of magistrates would be particularly valuable. There is something to be said, if there is no review by the court for a long time, as is now to be

the case, for actually having a magistrate among those reviewing cases. The concept of the review having an independent element is one which we very much welcome.

Mr. Callaghan: Regulations will provide that a magistrate could operate, but I would prefer not to make it mandatory that it should be a magistrate, because I have found from my own experience in other connections that sometimes it is quite difficult to get a magistrate to do these things. We can all think of other persons who may not be magistrates but who, nevertheless, might have some connection with the law—a local solicitor, for example. There are a number of people who have a direct or indirect connection with these matters who could do the job. I would certainly hope to see a good sprinkling of magistrates among those independent persons considering these cases.

Amendment agreed to.

Further Amendment made: No. 103, in page 41, line 46, at end insert:
'and provide for such a review to be conducted in a manner approved by the Secretary of State by a committee of persons representing the local authority or voluntary organisation in question but including at least one person satisfying such conditions as may be prescribed by the regulations with a view to securing that he is independent of the authority or organisation and unconnected with any community home containing such accommodation as is mentioned in the said paragraph (c);'.—[Mr. Callaghan.]

Clause 44

DISCONTINUANCE BY VOLUNTARY ORGANISATION OF CONTROLLED OR ASSISTED COMMUNITY HOME

Mr. Elystan Morgan: I beg to move Amendment No. 104, in page 44, line 42, after 'section', insert:
'or such earlier date (if any) as may be specified for the purposes of this paragraph in the order'.

2.15 a.m.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this Amendment we will take Amendment No. 105.

Mr. Morgan: The two Amendments result from an undertaking given to my hon. Friend the Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. Archer) to accept in principle an Amendment moved by


him in Committee on 6th May. Under Clause 44(4), the Secretary of State may require a local authority to run an assisted or controlled home where the voluntary organisation concerned has given the two years' notice which is required by subsection (1) of its intention to cease to provide the home and the managers are unable or unwilling to continue to run it until the expiry of the notice.
Amendment No. 104 enables the Secretary of State to require a local authority to run a home in these circumstances either until the expiry of the two-year period or for a shorter period specified by him. Obviously, there would be circumstances where it would be proper to have a much shorter period than the two years. An assurance can be given that the Secretary of State would consider the views of the local authority concerned before deciding how long the local authority should run the home.
Amendment No. 105 provides that where the home is run by the local authority for less than the full two-year period, it shall cease to be a community home on the local authority ceasing to run it.

Amendment agreed to.

Further Amendment made: No. 105, in page 45, line 10, at end insert:
'; and
(c) on the date or earlier date specified as mentioned in subsection (4)(b) of this section the home shall cease to be a community home'.—[Mr. Elystan Morgan.]

Clause 58

CONTRIBUTIONS IN RESPECT OF CHILDREN AND YOUNG PERSONS IN CARE

Mr. Hiley: I beg to move Amendment No. 106, in page 57, line 17, after 'period', insert 'exceeding three days'.
The Clause relates to contributions in respect of children and young persons in care. Subsection (2) provides that no contribution shall be made in respect of periods when children are not actually being accommodated in community homes. It has been suggested to some of us by the Association of Municipal Corporations that as the amounts granted by the courts are usually so very small

for a weekend period—and I understand that some children leave the homes for a short week-end break—no deduction should be made for this period of three days, merely because the administrative cost of trying to carry out such a provision would be quite out of proportion to the amounts gained by the parents. The cost of relieving the parents of the charge would be too great in comparison with the amount of money involved.

Mrs. Knight: Earlier experiences this evening lead me to fear that we are about to hear two excuses why the Amendment should not be made. One is that the children's departments do not have too much to do already and that, therefore, we should not worry because of this other little job. I hope that we do not have that argument again, because I cannot accept it as an argument against trying to relieve children's departments of whatever duties we can. Whether or not this duty would fall on the treasurer's department or, through the department, on the children's department, it is important to try to save local authorities the administrative troubles which are involved in deducting tiny sums of this kind.
The other excuse to which we have been accustomed this evening is that because this procedure already operates, we should let it continue. We have heard that argument at least twice from the Minister, and I hope that he will not advance it on this occasion.
It never seems to be to be a sound reason for allowing something which is not a good idea to continue, that it has been continuing for some time past. Yet that has been the argument advanced on two occasions. It is not really a sound idea that a child's going home for just a short period, at the weekend, say, should involve the local authority in such a silly little bit of bookkeeping, and I hope the force of my hon. Friend's argument will be accepted by the Government.

Mr. Elystan Morgan: If I was minded to possess myself of excuses the hon. Lady certainly presented two or three on which I might be able to build a case, but I hope that she will listen carefully to what I have to say about the background of the situation, and I am sure that the hon. Member for Pudsey (Mr. Hiley) will do so, also.
Sections 86 and 88 of the Children and Young Persons Act, 1933, as


amended by Clause 58, place on the parents of a child in the care of a local authority the duty to contribute towards the child's maintenance, and, where payments are not made voluntarily, they empower the court to make a contribution order requiring the parent to pay a weekly sum to the local authority. Clause 58(2) provides that whether or not a contribution order has been made no contribution shall be payable in respect of a child for any period during which he is allowed by the local authority to be under the charge and control of a parent, guardian, relative or friend.
The reason for this provision is to avoid the parent having to pay a contribution in respect of a period during which he is incurring expense himself. The Amendment would limit the exemption so that the parent would still be liable to pay a contribution where this period is three days or less. I hope that the hon. Lady will not think me un-chivalrous, but it is seeking to make the parent liable both for the maintenance of the child and, at the same time, to make a payment to the local authority, as if the local authority were at that time responsible for the maintenance of the child.
Thus, there is a very heavy onus of proof upon her to show that such an Amendment should be made, and, in the circumstances, I doubt very much whether the hon. Lady could discharge such an onus of proof.

Amendment negatived.

Mr. Hiley: I beg to move Amendment No. 107, in page 57, line 38, after 'shall', insert 'normally'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this Amendment we can also discuss Amendment No. 108, in page 58, line 3, at end insert:
'but the Court may if it seems necessary in all the circumstances of a particular case to do so make a contribution order at the same hearing as it makes the care order'.

Mr. Hiley: In spite of the not very helpful response we have just heard to my last Amendment I must pursue this one, because it also relates to the contributions by parents. In practice, I understand, those parents who are asked to

make contributions invariably complain, and particularly complain that the amounts involved are very much more than what the cost would be if the children were in their own care. In spite of that I believe that the amounts usually charged to them are only a small proportion of the cost to the local authorities or to the national Exchequer.
In view of the reluctance of many of them to pay, and, very often, their determination not to pay at any price, the Amendments would ensure easier collection of contributions, which the parent has had to agree to when the case goes before the court. They are often not prepared to contribute, particularly in cases where a child has been wilfully neglected or where a child appears to have been rejected. Much time and effort would be saved if local authorities had a discretion to apply for an immediate contribution order without having to give notice to the contributor and wait for a month. I commend the two Amendments to the Home Secretary; they make it easier to carry out what the court requires.

Mr. Elystan Morgan: There are two objections to the Amendments. First, the local authority would have no opportunity of proposing an amount to the contributor, and the court would have no information about the parents' means and liabilities on which to base a decision. Secondly, the court, having disposed of the case and made a care order, is unlikely to want to start to inquire on inadequate information into the proper amount of a contribution. If the parent contested the matter, the court could hardly proceed and would have to adjourn. If the parent was not objecting to making a contribution, it is probable that an order would not be required.
The normal course at present is for the local authority to ask the parent for a contribution after obtaining from him a statement of means and, if the contribution is not forthcoming, then, and only then, to make application to the court. The court need not be a juvenile court. This is a better system than for the juvenile court to try to settle this question in the middle of a list of cases.

Amendment negatived.

Clause 65

ORDERS AND REGULATIONS ETC.

Mr. Elystan Morgan: I beg to move Amendment No. 109, in page 61, line 20, at beginning insert:
'A statutory instrument containing'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this Amendment it will be convenient to take also Amendment 111.

Mr. Morgan: These are purely drafting Amendments.

Amendment agreed to.

Further Amendments made: No. 110, in page 61, line 20, leave out '(6) of section 5' and insert:
'(4) of section (Restrictions on criminal proceedings for offences by young persons)'

No. 111, in page 61, line 20, leave out 'and' and insert 'or'.

No. 112, in page 61, line 24, leave out '(6)' and insert '(4)'—[Mr. Elystan Morgan.]

Clause 66

INTERPRETATION AND ANCILLARY PROVISIONS

Amendment made: No. 113, in page 63, line 10, leave out 'may be exercised' and insert 'shall also be exercisable'.—[Mr. Elystan Morgan.]

New Schedule

MODIFICATIONS OF PART IV OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 1967

1.—(1) In section 73(1), after the word proceeding', there shall be inserted the words and the proceedings mentioned in subsections (3A) and (3B) of this section'.

(2) At the end of section 73(2) there shall be inserted the words 'and any other magistrates' court to which the case is remitted in pursuance of section 56(1) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933'.

(3) In section 73, after subsection (3) there shall be inserted the following subsections:—
'(3A) Where a person—

(a) is or is to be brought before a juvenile court under section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969; or
(b) is the subject of an application to a magistrates' court under section 15 or section 21 of that Act; or

(c) is or is to brought before a juvenile court under section 29 of that Act,

the court may order that he shall be given legal aid for the purpose of proceedings before the court and, in a case falling within paragraph (a) of this subsection, be-for any juvenile court to which the case is remitted.
(3B) Where a person desires to appeal to a court of quarter sessions in pursuance of section 2(8), 3(6), 16(6), 21(4) or 29(6) of the said Act of 1969, that court or the court from whose decision the appeal lies may order that he be given legal aid for the purpose of the appeal'.

2.—(1) At the end of section 74(2) there shall be inserted the words 'and except in the case of proceedings under section I of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 where it is alleged that the condition mentioned in subsection (2)(e) of that section is satisfied in consequence of an indictable offence and where the court is of the opinion aforesaid'.

(2) In section 74(3), after '(3)' there shall be inserted the word '(3B)' and for the word 'either' there shall be substituted the word 'any'.

(3) In section 74(5), after the word '(2)' there shall be inserted the words 'or (3A)'.

(4) In section 74(6), after the word 'section', there shall be inserted the words or to any person by a legal aid order under subsection (3B) of that section' and after the word 'sentence' there shall be inserted the words 'or, as the case may be, dismissing the appeal mentioned in the said subsection (3B) or otherwise altering the order to which the appeal relates'.

3. In section 75, after subsection (4) there shall be inserted the following subsection:—
'(4A) Subsections (3) and (4) of this section shall have effect, in their application to a person, who has not attained the age of sixteen, as if the words "he", "him" and "his" referred to that person and a person who is an appropriate contributor in relation to him or such of them as the court selects, and as if for the word "shall" in subsection (4) there were substituted the word "may", and the court may require that a statement furnished by an appropriate contributor in pursuance of subsection (4) shall specify both his means and those of the other person aforesaid.

4.—(1) In section 76, after subsection (1) there shall be inserted the following subsection:—
'(1A) In a case where a legally assisted person has not attained the age of sixteen, the power conferred by the last foregoing subsection to order him to pay contributions in respect of the relevant costs shall include power to order any person who is an appropriate contributor in relation to him to pay such contributions; and for the purposes of any order proposed to be made by virtue of this subsection in connection with a legal aid order, an appropriate contributor who has failed to furnish a statement which he was required to furnish in pursuance of section 75(4) of this Act in


connection with the legal aid order shall be deemed to have resources and commitments which are such that he may reasonably be ordered to pay the whole amount of the costs in question'.

(2) In section 76(4)(a), after the words 'that magistrates' court' there shall be inserted the words, or any other magistrates' court to which the case is remitted in pursuance of section 56(1) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933,'.

(3) At the end of section 76 there shall be inserted the following subsection:—
'(5) Nothing in subsection (4) of this subsection applies in a case where the legal aid order in question was made by virtue of section 73(3A) or (3B) of this Act, and in such a case an order under this section may be made—

(a) where the legal aid was ordered to be given for the purpose of proceedings before a magistrates' court, by that court, or any other magistrates' court to which the case is remitted in pursuance of section 2(7) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969, after disposing of the case; and
(b) where the legal aid was ordered to be given for the purposes of an appeal to a court of quarter sessions, by that court after disposing of the appeal'.

5. In section 77(1), after the words 'assisted person', there shall be inserted the words', or a person who is an appropriate contributor in relation to him,', for the words 'into his means' there shall be substituted the words 'into the means of that person and any such contributor or of either or any of them' and the words 'on his means' shall be omitted.

6. In section 78(1), after the words 'that he', there shall be inserted the words 'or any other person'.

7.—(1) In section 79(2), after the word 'by' there shall be inserted the words ' or in respect of', and for the words 'to him' there shall be substituted the words—

'(a) where the contribution was made by one person only, to him; and
(b) where the contribution was made by two or more persons, to them in proportion to the amounts contributed by them'.

(2) In section 79(3) and section 79(6) after the words assisted person' there shall be inserted the words 'or an appropriate contributor'.

8.—(1) In section 84, in the definition of appropriate authority', after paragraph (a) there shall be inserted the following paragraph:—
'(aa)in relation to legal aid ordered by virtue of section 73(3A) or (3B) of this Act, the clerk of the magistrates' court before which the proceedings were heard or from which the appeal was brought or the clerk of the magistrates' court nominated for the purposes of this paragraph by the first-mentioned court'.

(2) In section 84, after the definition aforesaid there shall be inserted the following:—

'appropriate contributor', in relation to a person who has not attained the age of sixteen, means his father, any person who has been adjudged to be his putative father and (whether or not he is legitimate) his mother.

(3) At the end of section 84 there shall be inserted the following subsections:—
'(2) Any power to make an application in pursuance of this Part of this Act which is exercisable by a person who has not attained the age of seventeen shall also be exercisable by his parent or guardian on his behalf, without prejudice to any powers of the parent or guardian apart from this subsection; and in this subsection "guardian" has the same meaning as in section 66 (2) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969.
(3) A person who attains the age of sixteen after a legal aid order is made in respect of him or, in a case where such an order is made in pursuance of an application, after the application is made, shall be treated for the purposes of this Part of this Act, in relation to the order, as not having attained that age',
and accordingly the said section 84 as amended by sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of this paragraph shall be subsection (1) of that section.—[Mr. Elystan Morgan.]

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

Schedule 3

TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS AND SAVINGS

Amendment made: No. 115, in page 74, line 12, leave out '5' and insert:
'(Restrictions on criminal proceedings for offences by young persons)'.—[Mr. Elysian Morgan.]

Schedule 4

MINOR AND CONSEQUENTIAL AMENDMENTS OF ENACTMENTS

Amendments made: No. 116, in page 79, line 12, at end insert:
(3) Section 107(2) of the Act of 1933 shall cease to have effect.

No. 117, in page 79, line 38, at end insert:
13 In section 4(3) of the Children Act 1948, the proviso shall cease to have effect.

No. 118, in page 79, line 39, leave out 'Children Act' and insert 'said Act of'.

No. 119, in page 84, line 10, after 'words"', insert '14(1) of this Act keep'.

No. 120, in page 84, line 11, after 'words"', insert:
'24(6) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 keep'.

Page 84, line 20, at beginning insert:
46.—(1) In subsection (1)(b) of section 11 of the Family Allowances Act 1965, for the words 'said Act of' there shall be substituted the words 'Children and Young Persons Act'.

Page 84, line 20, leave out
'section 11 of the Family Allowances Act 1965'
and insert 'that section'.—[Mr. Elysian Morgan.]

Schedule 5

REPEALS

Amendments made: No. 123, in page 85, column 3, leave out lines 16 and 17.

No. 124, in page 85, line 56, column 3, at end insert:
Section 107(2).

No. 125, in page 86, line 11, column 3, at beginning insert:
Section 3(3) to (5).
In section 4(3), the proviso.

No. 126, in page 86, line 11, column 3, leave out '3(3) to (5)'.

No. 127, in page 90, line 49, column 3, at end insert:
'In section 77(1), the words "on his means"'.—[Mr. Elysian Morgan.]

2.30 a.m.

Mr. Callaghan: I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
Even though the hour is late, perhaps I might begin by expressing my eppreciation of the consideration given to the Bill by the House and by the Standing Committee. In Committee, we had a lot of arguments on merits, but such Divisions as took place were on means rather than on ends. When I moved the Second Reading, I undertook to listen carefully to the arguments advanced in Committee, and I hope that the House will agree that my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State and I have redeemed that promise fully.
Indeed, it is almost unnecessary to make the claim when one considers the number of Amendments which have been accepted by the Government both from

right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite and from my hon. Friends. As a result, the Bill is a better one today than it was when it set out on its voyage some months ago. Some of the Amendments are on points of major importance, and, as a result, the area of agreement over the Bill has been increased.
This is the fulfilment of a personal ambition. When I went to the Home Office, the original White Paper was still on the stocks. The House will be aware that the freedom for manoeuvre among Ministers is not very great, especially when money is limited. But, I thought, here was an opportunity to put something on the stocks to which even the Treasury could not take exception. I am very glad to have been personally associated with the preparation of the Bill and its passage through the House.
I want particularly to thank my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary, the hon. Member for Cardigan (Mr. Elystan Morgan), whose reputation has increased substantially during the progress of the Bill as a result of his handling of it. He was always a "Crown Prince" in Wales, where his abilities are well known. The Bill has introduced him to a wider English audience, who will equally appreciate his virtues.
I want also to thank the hon. Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle), the hon. Member for Chelsea (Mr. Worsley) and the hon. Member for Beckenham (Mr. Goodhart), who shared the labour on the Front Bench opposite, for their approach and their courtesy during our consideration of the Bill. As I have said, the area of agreement over the Bill has been increased appreciably. I know that some issues still divide us, and there have been Divisions today, but I think that they were more on method than on ends.
This is a children's Bill, and it should be emphasised that a lot of it is not controversial. It would be worth setting out some of the more important points of agreement. In our discussions, there has been general agreement that care and control run in harness. They are not opposed. They go together.
Secondly, there has been complete agreement that children who are in trouble should, wherever possible and where we can find equally effective or more effective means be dealt with outside the courts and not by the law. That


view has been accepted by the Opposition, as it has by the Government. There has been a general desire to encourage parental responsibility, and certainly that is a view which I hold strongly.
There has been general agreement that we should seek to provide children with the necessary support, guidance and control that they need. There has also been agreement that liability to criminal prosecution should start at a somewhat higher age than the tenth birthday. Some think that the higher age should be 12. Others think that it should be school-leaving age. The Government believe that it should be the fourteenth birthday. But this is a matter which is left not for further consideration but for its implementation to be effected by means of an operational order which the House will have to agree.
I should emphasise, once again, that there has been agreement on the necessity for retaining the juvenile courts. I mention them in particular because I should not want anybody to think from the course of the debate that I under-estimate their importance or, indeed, that of the work of the probation officers who have conducted a very worthwhile and interesting campaign to ensure that their point of view and activities are fully known and appreciated by all Members of the House. There are some situations which require the intervention of a court, and the safeguards provided by courts remain as essential as ever.
I trust that I have been able to dispel some of the fears that were expressed about the nature of informal action which is taken when there are no court proceedings. This is on a genuinely voluntary basis. We have had a discussion on this earlier, and I do not propose to go over it again now.
There is agreement on the need to provide a comprehensive system of residential establishments for children which embrace not only the present local authority children's homes, but local authority and voluntary approved schools and those voluntary children's homes which wish to join the new system. This is a major revolution in the organisation of residential child care, and one that I have felt for many years was needed. I believe that it increases and improves the opportunity for getting the

right treatment for the child. It does not narrow it; it broadens it.
There has also been general agreement about the desirability of building up more flexible methods of treatment, halfway between supervision in the home and removal from home, as provided for particularly in Clauses 12 and 19.
I do not propose to go over the points of difference in detail, except in relation to the matter that I referred to as one of the main planks of the Bill, namely, the comprehensive system of residential establishments. Some people have expressed the fear that this might lead to mixing up children with totally different needs. On the contrary, it is the very reverse. The fact that we shall have such a broad system of homes will make it possible to separate out children according to their needs much more clearly than we can today. The fact that there will be more homes available means that we can divide them up in a much more rational way.
The selection of a community home for each child will be based on the assessment of his individual needs and problems and of the full range of possibilities that will exist for meeting these needs. Homes offering specialised treatment would be unsuitable for children whose need is for ordinary care and community life while having to live away from home. These homes will be able to be brought into perhaps rather more rational use than up to now, although I should not like anything that I say to be interpreted as subtracting from my appreciation of the work that has been and is being done by them. The variety of facilities which will become available will be used sensibly in accordance with the needs of the individual children.
Concern has been expressed about the extent of the responsibilities which the Bill places on local authorities. I have said before, and I repeat, that the purposes of the Bill will be achieved only if it is introduced at a time when the local authority structure can stand the additional weight that will be placed upon it. I do not wish to shrink from that. I believe that it is the right approach to place substantial extra responsibilities upon the local authorities.
The essence of a care order under the Bill, as of a fit person order, as it is called in the jargon under the present


law, is to make the local authority responsible for the care or control of the child That is the object of the Bill. There is widespread, though not universal, agreement that this is the way we should go. If the authority is to be answerable for any failure of care or control, it needs the power to select the arrangements which are best calculated to meet the needs of the particular child.
The philosophy of the Bill is to preserve all the necessary judicial safeguards for the child and his parents, but to place upon the local authority full responsibility for the care and control of the child once the court has made a care order. We cannot expect the local authorities to carry out this responsibility unless we give them the power to do so. They have had a great deal of experience in this matter already. I am told that nearly one-third of the 4,500 fit person orders made annually are made in criminal proceedings. This experience stretches back over 35 years of entrusting local authorities with the responsibility to act as substitute parents for children of all kinds, including those who have broken the law and been prosecuted.
There is nothing new about this. They have the experience already. The way that experience has been discharged is conclusive proof that it is right in the Bill to embrace within the system those children who are now sent to approved schools and in due course those under 17 who are now sent to borstal.
If we believe, as we do, that court proceedings against children should be avoided where possible, it follows that the same positive discrimination should be exercised in deciding whether a child need be taken to court, and in deciding what form of voluntary help, guidance or treatment should be given to those who are not taken to court. In this sense, Clause 1(2) is discriminatory. It is intended to be. I wanted it to be. The House has agreed that it should be. It requires the exercise of a sensible discrimination by the police. Indeed, they exercise that discrimination now over a wide field. It requires the exercise of a sensible discrimination by local authorities and all other agencies concerned in deciding how best to deal with each individual child.
It turns the argument upside down to suggest that this is not fair. It is a

matter of elementary social justice that children should be dealt with according to their individual needs and that they should be looked at in this light. I believe that these proposals in the Bill introduce a greater element of fairnesss and a greater opportunity for certain children who do not possess this opportunity at present.
Finally, whatever the differences may have been, whatever views may have been advanced on behalf of particular groups of persons, all of whom are desperately anxious to do their job of helping children, I know that now that the Bill is likely to receive a Third Reading and move oil its way, all of the organisations in this field will work together for the benefit of children. I have every confidence of this. Indeed, one of the attractive things about being Home Secretary is that one sees such dedication, not only from voluntary members in the community who want to dedicate themselves, but from the professional staff, too.
I am very proud of the degree of dedication that there is among the professional staff. It destroys much of the cynicism that is sometimes expressed about the future of Britain in some of the more erudite journals. There are many people in Britain doing a very good job, not only because they are paid for it, but because they believe in it and because they have a sense of service and are trying to give expression to it.
I thank the House again for the way that it has considered the Bill with such care and attention. The Bill is devoted only to the end of securing the very best for children in society as it exists at present. It aims to combine care with control. It aims to be humane but it also aims to be effective. It aims to combine social justice with protection for the liberty of the subject. It is part of the process of further social development to which my colleagues and I are devoted and which, in this field, I believe is shared by all those in the House who have the welfare of children at heart.

2.45 a.m.

Mrs. Knight: I want to raise a small point on Clause 1 at this stage, which is the very last chance there is to raise it. It could be put right even at this late stage if the Minister would accept it.
We had a debate during the Committee stage about what some of us felt


to be the stupidity of having the word "avoidably" in line 17, on page 1. We talked about a child's proper development being prevented or neglected, and said that whether it was avoidably prevented or neglected ought not to weigh. At the end of the discussion we agreed that the matter would be met if two commas were inserted, otherwise quite ridiculous situations could arise where a child's development was being avoidably neglected. The Minister did say that he would look at this again in column 33 in the OFFICIAL REPORT of the first sitting of the Committee, and on the understanding that he would look at it again, and insert the commas if he felt it wise to do so, I withdrew the Amendment.
I gave notice to the Minister that I would raise this point today.

2.46 a.m.

Mr. Lane: I wish the Bill well, but I feel some doubt whether it is going to work out as the Government expect. I would like at this last moment to make a strong plea to the Government that they should proceed very cautiously in fixing the appointed day and bringing into effect the various provisions of the Bill, and I want to touch upon the two most obvious and important reasons for this.
I think that we all recognised during our debates that to be successful the Bill will require a considerable increase in the development of facilities and staff. We have had assurances from the Government that they are well aware of this problem. I would remind them of these assurances now, because if they try to introduce the new provisions with undue haste it would be disastrous and would undo much of the benefit which we all want to follow from the Bill.
To some extent related to that is the problem of expense. In my own area it has been estimated that the Bill, taking everything into account, will result in an increase in annual expenditure by local authorities on child care of about 10 per cent. It is being regarded as one more extra burden on the ratepayers and taxpayers. I do not want to exaggerate the financial effect, but at a time when we have got used to accepting many burdens from the Government I hope that the Government will do everything possible to cushion the financial effects of the Bill.
I want to make a final appeal to the Government. There is a great deal of concern on these points among people who are in general sympathy with the Government's approach, so in carrying out the Bill let the Government go carefully and cautiously.

2.48 a.m.

Mr. Longden: I was not on the Committee, but I have followed the Bill with great interest and a good deal of anxiety from time to time. It is, as other hon. Members have said, a most important measure. In Hertfordshire, for example, we find that the majority of offences detected by the police are committed by young persons under 21, and of these the larger proportion are under 17; some are even of primary school age.
I have wondered whether we may not be in some danger of forgetting that our juvenile courts, under the present system, have achieved a very high success rate and have most successfully maintained a balance between the need to protect society and the need to protect those who are too young to protect themselves. Of course, everything is capable of improvement, but I have wondered from time to time whether all the changes we are making by the Bill are changes for the better.
I have wondered, more particularly, whether we are not giving to local authorities and social workers duties of a judicial, or at least quasi-judicial nature, which should be the sole prerogative of the bench. I have sent the Home Secretary a letter from a very distinguished police officer, and I would like to remind him of some sentences of it.
As I understand it, the object is to avoid bringing children and young persons before a juvenile court. Instead, it is proposed to give young offenders informal advice and guidance. In the majority of cases—presumably, such as wilful damage—there are to be investigations and reports and prior consultations between children's officers, teachers, social workers and the police as to whether a prosecution is to be instituted. … My view, which is shared by other police officers, is that in practice this procedure will cause delay, extra work and extra expense without achieving any good result. There are not enough children's officers to operate the scheme. I cannot think that informal advice and guidance is going to do much to reduce hooliganism in cases, for instance, where youths of 15 and 16 have deliberately smashed up public lavatories or private pram sheds


or hurled milk bottles against blocks of flats. It will, I fear, undermine the authority of police officers who have to enforce the law if they no longer have the power to prosecute but must abide a decision reached later on by debate with children's officers and social workers. What is needed in such cases is prompt and firm action.
I think that the Home Secretary would agree with that. We must hope that these somewhat pessimistic prognostications do not come about.
I should like to refer to the debate that we had some hours ago on Clause 1(2). I do not think I have ever heard a debate where from both sides of the House there was only one side to the argument. It was a devastating criticism of this Clause, and I reinforce the plea of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg) that the Home Secretary should think again about that Clause between now and when the Bill goes to another place.

2.52 a.m.

Mr. Goodhart: I, too, share the hopes of my hon. Friends and the Home Secretary that the Bill will be helpful in curbing juvenile delinquency throughout the country. But I must say that I do not share the enthusiasm of the Home Secretary for the idea that children and society are best protected outside the law. It seems to me that over the years it is the law and the courts that have been the best protection for the public and for the liberties of the individuals who come before the courts.
At the same time, it strikes me as odd that we end our debate on this Bill within 36 hours of the publication of a report which will mark a fundamental change in the structure of local government. As the Home Secretary has said, the Bill will put fresh pressures on the local authorities. It seems to me strange, when I recall that discussions about the Bill have extended back over the last 10 years, that the Government should now be seeking to push the Bill through just when the local government structure of this country will he changed for 10 years to come.
I was not wholly encouraged by the Home Secretary's remarks about the Treasury. I fear that it will be an effort in the near future to try to make the Bill work on the cheap. Perhaps the Treasury does not appreciate the amount

of extra effort that will have to be made if it is to work. I do not mean primarily in financial terms. The extra cost to local authorities has been estimated at £5 million after rate support grant. That means locally perhaps 2d. on the rates.
It is important that staff should be available before the Bill is implemented. Here, I am afraid, we shall run into substantial difficulties. Staff in sufficient numbers and of sufficient quality to make the reforms suggested a reality will be far harder to get, to train, and then to keep than the Government appear to appreciate. So, while I join with the Home Secretary in hoping that the Bill will do good, having sat through all the debates on it, I have my doubts.

2.56 a.m.

Mr. Hogg: I endorse every word that has fallen from my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Mr. Goodhart) and my other hon. Friends on Third Reading. I fully share their reservations about the Bill. I think the Home Secretary has been a little over-optimistic in his commendation of it to the House.
I make a personal apology to the House. Those who have been sufficiently observant have noticed my somewhat eccentric behaviour during the evening. Having disappeared for three hours, I urged my hon. Friends into the Lobby and failed myself to vote. That was due to the fact that my car broke down and I provided myself with a "pair" which subsequently I did not need. I hope that hon. Members on either side of the House will not criticise me unduly.
I thank the Home Secretary particularly for what he said about my hon. Friend the Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle). He has taken a close interest in the Bill even before its inception. But for his constant assistance, I do not know whether we could have manned the Front Bench either in debates in the House or in Committee. I say the same about my hon. Friend the Member for Chelsea (Mr. Worsley).
I endorse the Home Secretary's praise for the Under Secretary. We on this side of the House thought that he carried out his duties not only with skill, but with considerable tact and reasonableness. We are grateful to him for the way in which he has handled this whole piece of legislation, and it should be known that we are grateful.
I agree with the Home Secretary that the Bill has improved during its passage through Parliament. The first White Paper the Government produced was horrible, the second White Paper was only marginally less horrible, and the Bill was pretty horrible when it came to Second Reading, but it is less horrible now. To that extent I can share the Home Secretary's enthusiasm for it. But I still feel that there are grave deficiencies about what is now proposed. We have had our debates on the first two Clauses and I still feel that the individual is not sufficiently protected against inequality of treatment and injustice.
But the real trouble about the Bill—and I think that it will emerge as time goes on—is that which was described at greater length by my hon. Friends. It will do no good at all unless it incurs considerable expense. I am convinced that when it is implemented in its more expensive form its provisions as it stands will prove to be wrong in the light of the changes in local government which are shortly to be made and changes in the social services if and when the Seebohm Report is implemented.
That being so, although many of the Bill's provisions are uncontroversial, as I think the Home Secretary said, and was perfectly right and fully entitled to say, at the end of the day my reservations remain about it. This in no way qualifies either my praise for the Under-Secretary or the Home Secretary for the way in which they have kept their promise to listen to our criticisms, or my agreement with what the right hon. Gentleman said about my hon. Friends and other Members who have made contributions to the Bill. At the end of the day there can be no question of a party division or a Division at all on the Third Reading. I hope that my misgivings are wholly unfounded, as no doubt the Home Secretary thinks they are. Time alone will show which of us is right.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed.

Orders of the Day — OVERSEAS AID

Select Committee on Overseas Aid to have power to appoint Sub-Committees and to refer to such Sub-Committees any of the matters referred to the Committee:

Every such Sub-Committee to have power to send for persons, papers and records; to sit notwithstanding any adjournment of the House; to adjourn from place to place; to report to the Committee from time to time; and to admit strangers during the examination of witnesses unless they otherwise order:

Two to be the Quorum of every such Sub-Committee:

Committee to have power to report from time to time the Minutes of the Evidence taken before such Sub-Committees.—[Mr. Concannon.]

Orders of the Day — POLICE, LEICESTER (MR. AND MRS. HILTON)

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Concannon.]

3.3 a.m.

Mr. Tom Boardman: I am glad to have this opportunity to raise, even at this late hour, the treatment of Mr. and Mrs. Hilton by the police at Leicester. I am sorry that the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, who is to reply, has to do so at the end of what must have been a very long and tiring day for him. I shall deal briefly with the facts and the points where we are in dispute.
Mrs. Hilton, a woman of 47 and in bad health, lived at 25, Stanton Row, Leicester, where she was interviewed by three police officers on 12th November, 1968. They accused her of obtaining drugs by false prescriptions, and she was duly cautioned. As events subsequently showed, she was completely innocent. Another woman was arrested and charged with that offence three days later on 15th November.
Mr. Hilton, who was in the house when the police officers called, heard the conversation on the doorstep and came to the door. He is described as becoming very cross and excited when told what had been said. He said that


his wife had a bad heart, which is denied by the police. The husband perhaps acted unwisely, but in doing so showed a loyalty, courage and confidence in his wife that were both understandable and commendable.
Mr. Hilton asked the police if he could telephone the doctor and go and call a neighbour. He says—and this is denied by the police—that he was for some time not allowed to leave his front door to do so. He says—and again this is denied—that he was pushed back by one of the police officers when he tried to leave the house. Eventually, he went out and called a neighbour, but she said that it was nothing to do with her, and she stayed but a few moments.
The conversation with the police continued. The husband then said that he wanted to call the police station and speak to a senior officer there. He said—again, this is denied by the police—that this was refused for some time but he was eventually allowed to go. On this occasion and on the previous occasion, when he left the house he first asked that his wife should be allowed to accompany him, but he says that the police refused to let her do so. He then said that the police were not to question his wife while he was away, and it is conceded that he said that.
But the police did so. They continued to ask Mrs. Hilton questions. The Home Office and the Minister in correspondence had said that Mrs. Hilton took up the conversation, but the police report shows that they continued to question her. Perhaps they were legally entitled to do so despite the husband's instructions that she was not to be questioned while he was away.
Next day the husband lodged a complaint with the police through his officer at his works, and he had an interview with a chief superintendent on 13th November. He claimed that this interview was a very difficult one for him in which the chief superintendent said that both Mr. Hilton and the chief superintendent knew that the wife was guilty and that Mr. Hilton had better bring her along and confess. The policy deny this.
The police in their report and the Home Office in subsequent correspondence have claimed that this interview went on for three hours. It is now con-

ceded —and this was in a report by the superintendent which was material to the investigation—that it lasted about an hour.
Subsequently, a policewoman superintendent called on Mrs. Hilton at her home and said, according to reports that Mrs. Hilton gave to her children, that she had come to apologise but she was not to tell her husband. She, the policewoman, took a statement from Mrs. Hilton. But there are some peculiarities about that. It was undated, which is unusual. It was subsequently said that it was taken on 25th November. There seems to be some mistake there, because I am told that Mrs. Hilton was not at her home on that day. But it may be an error in the date on one side or the other.
This statement was apparently taken 10 days after the guilty woman, for whom Mrs. Hilton had been mistaken, had been arrested, and yet, according to the police, they never at that time came to apologise, nor did they tell Mrs. Hilton that she was no longer under suspicion. Surely this should have been done when the guilty woman had been arrested and made a confession, or if the police still believed that Mrs. Hilton was under suspicion surely it would have been right that she should have been cautioned again before they took the statement from her.
Also, there is the fact that Mrs. Hilton was practically blind, and without her glasses, which were then at the Leicester Royal Infirmary, was unable to see. She signed the statement in that circumstance, but there is no note on the statement, as the police form requires, to give notice that the statement was signed by someone who was unable to read it.
It was only on 29th November, 14 days after the guilty woman had been arrested, that a letter was received from the chief constable apologising for the mistake and saying that it was a case of mistaken identity. The letter said that the police officers against whom Mr. Hilton had lodged complaints denied that they were rude or offensive. But it made no reference at all to the findings of the investigating officer who had been required to look into those complaints.
Mrs. Hilton, as a result, so her family allege, of the police inquiry stopped taking the tablets which had been prescribed for her, and she refused to see


her doctor. She had not in any case seen him for some weeks. On 24th December she collapsed, and she died after an operation on 14th January.
A suggestion has been made—and some of the family are still, I believe, convinced that it is so—that Mrs. Hilton's death from thyrotoxicosis, which medical opinion says is possibly caused by emotional factors, was the result of the strain of the interview. I do not believe that the action of the police resulted in or in any way contributed to her death. However, clarification through a proper investigation might have been helpful in removing that suggestion, which remains, as I have said, in the minds of some members of the family. I stress that I do not make that allegation, and I hope that no one else does.
The police have an extremely difficult job to do, and I have sympathy with them. The Leicester police have a high reputation and are well led. They set a high standard. This makes it all the more important that, when criticism of this nature is made, it should be fully investigated. There is need for an impartial investigation. I believe that this is essential so that the public can be satisfied, as they cannot be by a police inquiry into complaints against the police.
Having heard perhaps only one side of the story and something of the other, I do not know where the truth lies. Justice may have been done, but has not been seen to have been done. This is bad for public confidence and damaging to the reputation of a fine police force. I believe it possible that the police were convinced, when they called on Mrs. Hilton, that they were interviewing a guilty woman. It was a case of mistaken identity. I believe it possible that they gave her less consideration than they might otherwise have done. This is only my supposition but the police, in the course of the inquiry, have refused to produce the police note books, which they could have produced and which might have been helpful in removing some of the doubts.
The inquiry was held by an investigating officer appointed by the Chief Constable. The result of it we do not know. But we know that this officer did not interview Mr. Hilton, the main complainant. He only heard one side of the

story. This is not a satisfactory way in which a police inquiry into complaints of this nature can be conducted.
As the matter stands, the Hilton family and others feel that justice has not been done. They believe that complaints against the police have been swept under the police carpet. The police officers concerned may have a complete answer and they surely cannot feel that the complaints have been publicly refuted. From the point of view of the public there must be, and is, a feeling that a family in modest circumstances has been pushed around by the might of the police.
It was with great reluctance that I sought to raise this matter, because I well recognise the problems of the police and I have been loath to ventilate criticisms which may become exaggerated. When the question of Mrs. Hilton's death following the interview, but which, I believe, was not connected with it, first came up, many stories went about. The Press behaved responsibly. It knew of the stories, but held its hand until the facts could be established. Unfortunately, the facts have not been established and we do not know where the truth of the matter lies.
I am glad that as Member for the constituency of the late and innocent Mrs. Hilton I have had the opportunity to raise this matter. I hope to have an assurance that procedure for a more satisfactory form of investigation into this and similar matters is to be introduced. I was heartened to read in The Times today that the Chairman of the Police Federation has expressed some favour towards having an outside observer looking into complaints of this nature.
Something of that procedure is necessary and desirable in doubts raised in matters of this nature where the truth may well be established by an independent observer or public inquiry, but cannot be satisfactorily established by the present method. I hope that the Under-Secretary will be able to give us some assurance for the future.
I conclude by making three points. I want, first, to make it clear beyond all doubt that the charge levelled against Mrs. Hilton was one of which she was completely innocent. Secondly, the reputation of the Leicester police stands high. I make no criticism of individual officers


and I make no criticism of the force, but I criticise the procedure which does not enable complaints of this nature to be fully investigated. Thirdly, I hope that the Under-Secretary will give full consideration to finding some form of investigation which will enable justice not only to be done, but to be seen to be done.

3.16 a.m.

The Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Elystan Morgan): I know from the letters which the hon. Member for Leicester, South West (Mr. Tom Boardman) has sent me over the period since these events last November of his concern for the interests of his constituent, Mr. Hilton, in this case. He has taken great care to ascertain and examine the many details of all that occurred on 12th November when three police officers went to see the late Mrs. Hilton at her home. I fully appreciate that the hon. Member should feel this concern, but, at the same time, I feel bound to say that in putting his case, which he has done so cogently, some matters may have been mentioned on which there may be some possibility of misconception and misunderstanding.
I wish, first, however, to speak of the sad death of the late Mrs. Hilton in January, this year. I was deeply sorry to hear of this, as the hon. Member knows from a letter I wrote to him earlier this year, and Mr. Hilton has my deepest sympathy. I know the hon. Member has himself acknowledged that it is his firm opinion that Mrs. Hilton's death was not connected with the police inquiries. I think it right, however, that this should go on record here tonight, as Mrs. Hilton's death tends inevitably to get mentioned in any publicity given to the complaints of Mr. Hilton against the police. I am very glad to say that there is no suggestion whatsoever that Mrs. Hilton's death was in any way attributable to the events in which she was involved with the police.
It has been alleged by Mr. Hilton that when the police officers came to see his wife they were aware from what he told them that she was in no condition to be questioned in such circumstances. He has said that he protested to them at the time that his wife was ill and had a bad heart. All three police officers concerned have strongly asserted that this is not so.

They did not know Mrs. Hilton was ill and they deny being told by Mr. Hilton that she had a bad heart. Mrs. Hilton herself had, in fact, said to them, in connection with the questioning about the prescriptions, that she had not visited her doctor for about three months and that she had just returned from a three weeks' stay with her daughter in London. She made no complaint or other indication as to her state of health.
The other matter—and again, it is a matter on which I think there is no disagreement; at any rate, no longer any disagreement between the hon. Member and myself—concerns the justification for the police going to see Mrs. Hilton as they did on 12th November. Here again, however, I think it right to make plain the actual circumstances, which clearly provided every justification for the police to seek to see Mrs. Hilton, lest there be any misunderstanding lingering in the matter.
As the hon. Member knows, the police had been given what they believed to be reliable information that Mrs. Hilton had illicitly been obtaining drugs on doctors' prescriptions. She had been identified by the chemist and a doctor from among photographs of 12 different women as the woman who had been so presenting such prescriptions at the chemist's shop. Clearly, the police would have been failing in their duty not to have acted on such information. The Chief Constable agrees, however, that in one respect, better arrangements could have been made. It would have been better for two, and not three, police officers to have gone to see Mrs. Hilton, and steps have been taken to correct this for any future case.
I now turn to specific allegations which have been made against the police, if not all of them by the hon. Member in his speech tonight, then in the correspondence which has passed between us. I have, in fact, gathered from all that he has said that the real burden of his complaint concerning the actual events on 12th November lies not so much with any issue whether the police should have questioned Mrs. Hilton, but rather with the way in which the questioning was carried out. The gap between us is, therefore, a narrow one.
Mr. Hilton has alleged that after making his statement of complaint in an


interview at the police station on 13th November with Chief Superintendent Glen, he was told by the chief superintendent that he knew his wife was guilty and had better bring her to the police station then and confess. The officer has stated that he did not, and, indeed, could not have said such a thing. The inquiry was, in fact, being conducted by a department other than the one under his command and he had no knowledge at all of the matter.
The hon. Member has copies of the reports of 14th January by Chief Superintendent Glen and Miss Tickner, his secretary, about this interview. He will know, therefore, that both say that at the end of the interview Mr. Hilton thanked the chief superintendent for spending so much time with him, and said that he now felt much better about the whole thing.
Another allegation is that Mr. Hilton was for a time prevented from leaving his doorway to telephone the police station. It is further alleged that when he was allowed to leave, his wife was prevented from going with him, and the officers continued to question her in his absence despite his requests that they should not do so.
The officers have denied that they prevented Mr. Hilton from leaving his house to telephone, or restrained Mrs. Hilton from accompanying him, or that they acted improperly in any way. Their statements are specifically supported by those of the neighbour, Mrs. Harding, who was called by Mr. Hilton, of whose own statements the hon. Member also has copies.

Mr. Tom Boardman: Mrs. Harding was there for a short time in an interview which lasted a considerable period.

Mr. Morgan: I appreciate that.
When Mrs. Hilton first came to the door the officers explained the purpose of their visit and a short conversation ensued before Mr. Hilton joined them. Mrs. Hilton took up the conversation herself, at the point at which it has been interrupted, after her husband left. Again, it was a brief conversation, as to the name of the doctor who had issued the prescriptions. Mr. Hilton then returned with Mrs. Harding.
The officers have also denied that they behaved in any way improperly. In this, statements by the independent witness, Mrs. Harding, support the officers' statements, and indicate that it was Mr. Hilton who was excited and showed a certain lack of control. There has, I think, been some tendency endorsed by the hon. Gentleman's intervention to suggest that Mrs. Harding's views should be discounted as of no great consequence, as she was not present throughout the interview.
But, I think, to put it no higher, that they do not assist the suggestion that has also been put, that the investigation must necessarily have been prejudiced. It is to be remembered, also, that Mrs. Harding was Mr. Hilton's own witness, specifically called by him as he put it in his written statement to the police, "to listen to what was being said by the police officers". Therefore, Mrs. Harding's evidence is of some value to the case.
Complaint has also been made that Mr. Hilton was unaware that his wife had made any statement and, I think, he originally suggested to the hon. Member that it might have been taken while she was in hospital: the statement was, by oversight, undated. He learned subsequently that it was taken at her home and then claimed that the woman police officer concerned had told Mrs. Hilton that she had come to apologise and if she was given a statement that would be the end of the matter and that the police did not wish her to tell her husband about it.
The hon. Member has a copy of the statement in question. It was taken on 25th November by a police woman superintendent at Mrs. Hilton's home. Mrs. Hilton was alone in the house and doing her weekly wash. The superintendent says that Mrs. Hilton was quite willing to make a statement; she did not say that she had come to apologise or ask Mrs. Hilton not to tell her husband about the visit.
In fact, no apology was given until the Chief Constable's letter of 29th November to Mr. Hilton. Despite the arrest of the other woman who was apprehended at the chemist's shop, it was thought right at the time to wait until the investigation into Mr. Hilton's


complaints under Section 49 of the Police Act, 1964, had been completed. As I have previously informed the hon. Member, I agree with his view that it would have been better for Mr. and Mrs. Hilton to have been told earlier of the other woman's arrest.
As to the officers' notebooks, I have, as the hon. Member knows from our previous correspondence, seen photo-stat copies of the relevant extracts from the notebooks. I wrote on 19th March to tell him this and to explain that they added nothing to what was already known about the case. I want once again to give the hon. Member my assurance that the entries in the notebooks add nothing to our and his knowledge of the case.
As I have also informed the hon. Member, in the context of a case of this sort, which involves an investigation into complaints against individual police officers—and, as such, is distinguishable from court proceedings—disclosure of the relevant entries in the notebooks is entirely a matter for the Chief Constable, and the Home Secretary has no authority whatever to require him to make them available.
As I have explained, however, I have seen these entries, and I know that the hon. Member will take my word that they do not help in the matters which we are debating tonight.

Mr. Tom Boardman: Of course, I accept the Minister's word on that. My only point is that there may be things in those books which strike no relevance to the Minister but might strike a note with me, having heard the full story the other side. One is entitled to see both sides of the story—for example, how long the interviews lasted and matters of that kind, which would have been most helpful.

Mr. Morgan: I have looked carefully at the notebooks, but the principle is a general one and it is a matter for the chief officer of police. No one is able to override him in the decision whether the notebooks should be disclosed.
As to further inquiry, Section 32 of the Police Act, 1964, provides that the Home Secretary may cause a local inquiry to be held by a person appointed by him into

any matter connected with the policing of any area. Any such inquiry may be in public or private as the Home Secretary may direct and there is power to summon and examine witnesses. The report of the inquiry may be published, or, where it is not, the Home Secretary must make known a summary of the findings and recommendations so far as appears to him to be consistent with the public interest.
But such an inquiry under Section 32 would not be appropriate in this case. The provisions of the Section are intended for use in connection with the Home Secretary's responsibilities for the efficiency of the police service as a whole. An inquiry for which the Section provides would be justified only while there appear to be major defects of police organisation which are causing grave and widespread public concern and which have not been clearly identified by other methods of investigation.
An inquiry under Section 32 inevitably leads to all parties acting through legal representatives, and it is prolonged. Only one such inquiry has so far been held; it was conducted by Mr. A. E. James, Q.C., as he then was, and the hearing extended over five months.
In the present case, the Home Secretary is in no doubt that the case has been thoroughly investigated, and the circumstances are not such as to require further investigation under Section 49 of the Police Act by an officer from another police force, or any form of ad hoc inquiry. The investigation already made was clearly thorough and painstaking and statements were taken from all persons who were considered likely to be able to assist.
As I have already said, the hon. Member has had the fullest possible information in the matter, from the Chief Constable and the Deputy Chief Constable direct, both in correspondence and a meeting with them. He has been provided with copies of statements. I have endeavoured, in my replies to his letters, to give him such further details as he has requested in correspondence with me.
It is true that on a small number of points the statements of the police officers and Mr. Hilton are in conflict, but that does not, in my view, necessarily provide any sufficient ground for


thinking that further inquiry would be justified, or would be likely to resolve the few issues where the evidence is in conflict. A most careful and thorough investigation has already been made and nothing of substance has been produced to sustain the allegation that it was not an impartial inquiry. It was conducted by a senior officer wholly unconnected with the incident.
The appointment of another chief superintendent as investigating officer in place of Chief Superintendent Glen was, in fact, arranged to secure strict impartiality in the investigation, as Mr. Hilton had indicated that he was not satisfied with the way Chief Superintendent Glen had conducted the interview with him.
The procedures for investigating complaints against police officers are those for which Parliament provided in the Police Act, 1964. They are based on, and go further than, recommendations made by the Royal Commission on the Police in 1962. These procedures are kept under close review by the Home

Secretary, but in the present case it is clear that they were thoroughly and properly followed. There are also no grounds for thinking that any new facts would be revealed by any further inquiry or that conclusions would be different.

Mr. Tom Boardman: Would the hon. Gentleman make it clear that the investigating officer never saw Mr. Hilton? He relied, presumably, on the statement which had been taken by the superintendent against whom Mr. Hilton had made a complaint.

Mr. Morgan: I am prepared to check that matter carefully, and will correspond with the hon. Member again. I believe that it may be that the hon. Member is correct in that the second investigating officer adopted the statement which had been taken by Chief Superintendent Glen.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at twenty-eight minutes to Four o'clock am.